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Abstract 
In this study, the task of assessing the strength of Malaysian 
ethnicity, in particular that of Chinese ethnicity, was undertaken. The 
core to this dissertation is an application in a questionnaire study of 
the contention that individuals 'align' themselves with ethnic groups 
(symbols and loyalties) in different ways in different circumstances. 
The study tries to reveal this by asking hypothetical questions about 
how a typical Chinese Malaysian might act under various circumstances of 
value conflicts where ethnic preference is presumed to be in conflict 
with self-interest of material and status kind and personal obligation. 
This is a replication of the method used by Mansor (1992) in studying 
peoples' estimations of the likely actions of a 'characteristic Malay 
actor'. 
The present study displays some criticism of the methodology employed in 
this study, and that of Mansor's, and of the wider conclusions which he 
reaches, i. e. ethnicity is weakening in the processes of modernisation 
and economic development in Malaysia. First, the questions employed are 
chiefly about the micro-social sphere. The findings cannot necessarily 
be transferred to conclusions about the macro-social level of ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. Second, that the rational choice model underlying 
the questions ought to be complemented by an analysis of constraint and 
structure. Thirdly, that actual interpretation of the meaning of 
responses in the questionnaire study is open to a wider range of 
possibilities than one may at first recognise. The findings which 
support the notion of different levels of ethnicity, invite critical 
analysis of the very nature of the social contexts in which ethnicity 
may take on relevance. The study appears to show that while individuals 
iSay not express attitudes of a kind overtly consistent with 'blind' 
ethnic loyalty in some circumstances, they do strongly indicate the 
persistence of ethnic sentiments and the importance of ethnic identity 
in matters related to one's family and culture. On the other hand, to 
reach a sound conclusion about the strength of ethnicity in Malaysia, -we 
cannot ignore the force of macro-ethnicity that is profoundly shaped at 
the higher political structural level by the Constitution, political 
decisions and public policies. Issues of macro-ethnicity, as revealed by 
the responses to the political attitude questions, shows that ethnic 
antagonism continues to persist in Malaysian society as a consequence of 
ethnically defined social inequalities and the feeling on the part of 
the non-Malays that they are discriminated against and excluded. The 
test on the effect of 'modernisation' does not indicate support to the 
weakening of ethnic boundaries and ethnic antagonistic attitudes in 
Malaysia. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNICITY IN MALAYSIA: 
HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War, several polyethnic 
countries have emerged as new nations after achieving 
independence from Western colonial rule. In the process of 
nation building, one of the common problems faced by these 
countries is how to bring about political stability and 
unity among their ethnically diverse peoples who seem to 
have no binding common identity (Shils, 1963; Weiner, 1965). 
Malaysia is one such new state, and with a population 
composed of three major ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, 
Indians), this problem is a very pressing one for the nation 
(Enloe, 1968/69; Ghazali, 1970). 
Divisions among these people have always been marked and 
even during colonial rule, there were not any attempts to 
create a united society. These ethnic groups lacked a sense 
of common belonging to one political and social community. 
Clifford Geertz (1963) has referred to this situation in 
these societies as a situation where the sentiment of 
primordialism takes precedence over civil unity, loyalty or 
politics. Primordialism which refers to the 'original' bond 
of ethnic loyalty is seen as the fundamental and stable 
identity for a person in these societies. This situation is 
defined as being very vulnerable to serious ethnic conflict 
(Geertz, 1963: 109; Shils, 1963). 
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In a society like Malaysia, primordial ties may be seen as a 
major cause for divisions among people of different ethnic 
origins. These ties are believed to create a narrow 
parochial communal sentiment among people, which becomes a 
primary reason for the maintenance of ethnic group culture, 
identity and the development of communal politics. 
Communalism, or the politics of communalism has been 
described as the main form of political mobilisation in a 
given society (Melson & Wolpe, 1970; Ratnam, 1965). Each 
group possesses its own set of leaders and political 
organisations, and political mobilisation is based on ethnic 
group sentiments and loyalty. This political mobilisation of 
ethnic identity and group solidarity has contributed to 
'problems of ethnicity' in different nations, not least 
Malaysia. It may be difficult to deny totally the influence 
of primordialism in the lives of the people who are still 
strongly attached to traditional cultures and religions. On 
the other hand, the development of ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict has also been shaped by people's experiences and 
major events in the social history of the country. 
Since the time of colonial rule, ethnicity in Malaysia has 
emerged to play a vital role in politics among the different 
ethnic groups in competing for their group interests and 
promoting their separate ethnic identities. Social divisions 
and inequalities among these ethnic groups have contributed 
towards the political mobilisation of ethnic allegiance and 
the importance of ethnicity in Malaysia. As one of the 
polyethnic societies in the world, Malaysia shares some 
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common features with other such societies, notably with 
other developing third world societies which are composed of 
different ethnic and racial groups. Although ethnicity has 
appeared as more or less a permanent fixture of contemporary 
societies, the degree of complexity and the factors that 
influence ethnic relations are different from society to 
society. In any study undertaken to understand the extent of 
ethnicity, it is very important to begin with a clear socio- 
historical account of the development of ethnicity in that 
country. With this objective in mind, this chapter will 
discuss the development and the role of ethnicity in 
Malaysia from a historical and structural perspective. 
Political Background 
Malaysia' came into being in 1957 after achieving its 
independence from Britain. Prior to western colonisation, 
the region had existed as a part of the 'Malay Archipelago'. 
This term refers to a much wider geographical area where the 
population is basically believed to belong to the Malay 
'stock', more or less sharing the same cultural and 
historical background, and has been under the influence of 
the same traditional political powers (Andaya & Andaya, 
1982: 7-36). The Malay Archipelago has received western 
traders since the sixteenth century. The colonisation 
process by Western Powers, particularly the struggle between 
the Dutch and the British to occupy this part of the world, 
1 Malaysia was known as the Federation of Malaya. With Sarawak, 
Sabah and Singapore joining the Federation in 1963 the larger 
entity was renamed as Malaysia. 
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led to a division of the region with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty 
of 1824 (Andaya, 1982: 114). 
The British colonial involvement in Malaysia started with 
the opening of a British entrepot in Singapore in 1819, 
which eventually led to the creation of British Malaya by 
1919. In this year, the administration of the states of the 
Straits Settlement (Singapore, Penang and Malacca), 
Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States (in 
Peninsular Malaya) and British Borneo territories (Sabah and 
Sarawak) was brought under one centralised colonial 
control. Colonial rule came to an end in 1957 with the 
independence of Peninsular Malaya. When Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak achieved their independence, they joined Malaya to 
form Malaysia in 1963. In 1965, however, Singapore separated 
from Malaysia to set itself up as an independent state, 
attributing the separation to the problem of ethnic 
relations between the Malays and non-Malays, mainly the 
Chinese. 
Creation of a Polyethnic Society 
The Malaysian polyethnic society of today mainly consists of 
three major ethnic groups. The Malays are the indigenous 
people, while the Chinese and Indians are the immigrants. 
Although this polyethnic society of Malaysia was the result 
of British colonial rule (Freedman, 1960), it was, however 
not the first time these people had come in contact with 
each other. Before the arrival of colonial power, the Malays 
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had already established contact with Chinese and Indians 
traders, as well as Arabs and early Europeans like the 
Portuguese (Andaya & Andaya, 1982). The Malaysian peninsular 
has historically been a major crossroads for trade in Asia. 
The Malays had adopted some of the cultural elements of the 
people with whom they came into contact, mainly in the form 
of Hindu religion and Indian culture, and later, Islamic 
religion and culture. 
A small number of these early Chinese, Indians, Arab and 
Portuguese traders had also settled down, married local 
people and assimilated to a large extent the Malay culture. 
These communities are referred to as Chitti (Indians), Baba 
(Chinese) and Darah Keturunan Arab or people of Arab 
descent, and Eurasians (Portuguese). By and large, before 
British intervention, the establishment of these small mixed 
blood communities in the port areas of Singapore, Malacca 
and Penang, did not change the overall homogeneous nature of 
the Malay population in the Malay Peninsular. But during 
their rule, the British brought in large numbers of Chinese 
and Indian immigrants to work in the colonial economy in 
Peninsular Malaya. This not only changed the nature of this 
society from a homogeneous one to a polyethnic society, but 
more importantly laid the structural foundations for the 
development and persistence of ethnicity in Malaysia. 
The massive immigration of Chinese and Indians has been the 
chief cause for their population increase in Malaya up till 
the mid 1930's (Vlieland, 1934). Consequently, this not only 
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reduced the percentage of the Malay population but at a 
certain stage, ie. between 1921-1957, the population of the 
non-Malays exceeded that of the Malays (Sandhu, 1969: 41; 
Sidhu & Ahmad, 1978: 19). In fact, since 1921, statistical 
evidence shows that the indigenous Malay population was 
never an absolute majority. In 1921, the Malays had already 
been reduced to 54% of their population and in 1931 to 
49.2%. In 1931, out of a population of 3,787,758,1,575,448 
were Malays, 1,281,611 Chinese and 572,613, Indians 
(Morrison, 1949: 240). Since then, till 1970, the percentage 
of Malay population had never exceeded 54%. The provisional 
estimation of population in 1991 of Peninsular Malaysia 
shows a slight increase in the percentage of the Malays 
(58.2%), with the Chinese and Indians making up 41.1% of the 
population (Malaysia, 1992: 30). 
The numerical strength of ethnic groups is one of the 
important elements in a multiethnic society, but ethnicity 
and its importance in Malaysia is also due to the 
historically inherited structural divisions that have made 
the political processes of ethnic group mobilisation and 
conflict much easier to perpetuate since colonial days. To 
understand the development of these ethnic institutions and 
the political mobilisation of ethnicity in Malaysia, we need 
first to understand the initial structuring of ethnic 
divisions that have taken place in the colonial period. 
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The Structuring of Ethnic Divisions 
The modern 'race' or ethnic relations situation in Malaysia 
is a by-product of British colonialism (Abraham, 1983; 
Ahmad, 1968; Hirschman, 1986). As one scholar puts it '... 
the social and political inequalities moulded by colonial 
racial ideology were replicated and elaborated after 
independence because the structural blue print of colonial 
Malaya was not radically transformed upon the departure of 
the British' (Lee, 1990: 485). To understand the development 
of ethnic issues and the salience of ethnicity in current 
Malaysian society, one has first to grasp how, during the 
colonial period, segmentation along ethnic lines was 
structured among the major ethnic groups in the country. 
Among the most important initial social structuring that 
resulted in ethnic polarisation in the colonial period was 
economic functions and residential segregations. 
From the beginning, the colonial British labour policy that 
favoured divisions of the labour force in Malaya produced 
the economic and spatial divisions among the Malays, Chinese 
and Indians. British officers were also committed to the 
pro-Malay policy by recruiting more Malays into the Malayan 
Civil Service. The traditional Malay rulers in the various 
states were preserved while colonial rule was administered 
indirectly via British residents. The colonial rule did not 
introduce any measures to integrate the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians in this new multiethnic society. The Chinese and 
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Indian immigrant groups were considered by their colonial 
masters as non-permanent settlers. 
(i) Economic Segmentation 
To develop the modern export-oriented economy during the 
colonial period, from the late nineteenth century to the 
early twentieth century, the British brought in immigrant 
labour from South China and South India to work mainly in 
the tin mines and rubber plantations, respectively (Palmer, 
1960; Blythe, 1947). As a consequence, three separate labour 
forces were established. Chinese labour was brought in 
mainly to work in the mining industry and the Indians mainly 
in the rubber plantations. The native Malays were not 
encouraged to participate in these newly expanding colonial 
economies, with the consequence that they remained mainly in 
the traditional subsistence agricultural sector. 
The emergence of new urban areas as colonial administrative 
centres for the development of mining and plantation 
industries created an even greater difference in the 
occupations of the Malays, Chinese and Indians. In urban 
areas, the Chinese began their involvement in commercial 
activities, and the Indians were employed as labourers in 
the government departments like public works, the post and 
the railways. At the political and administrative levels, 
the British policy of safeguarding the interest of the 
Malays, besides recognising and maintaining their 
traditional Malay rulers, created a Malay administrative 
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group, a Malay elite, second only to the British 
colonialists, as well as the lower rank Malay clerical group 
(Khasnor, 1984; Ramasamy, 1993: 218-220). In 1956, the Malay 
federal officers was 12,376 out of 27,315 officers as 
compared to 4,235 Indians, 6,165 Chinese, 766 Eurasians, 
2,060 Europeans, 1,305 Ceylonese, and 108 others (Ramasamy, 
1993: 220) 
This pattern of -an ethnically divided labour force is still 
evident in the post-independent period without significant 
changes in the distribution. Table 1.1 show the distribution 
of the Malay, Chinese and Indian labour forces in different 
occupational sectors in the year of independence (1957) and 
in 1970 when the first major socio-economic policy of 
'restructuring society' was implemented through the New 
Economic Policy. 
Analysing the Malaysian labour force divisions from the 
class perspective can overlook the occupational differences 
between the Malays and non-Malays. The occupational 
divisions between the Malays and non-Malays are a very 
strong feature that can prevent the development of strong 
class ties among them (Ali, 1991; Osman, 1983). Table 1.2 
shows the internal divisions along ethnic lines that have 
arisen from the ethnic labour force concentration within the 




Occupation Groups by Ethnic Group, 1957-1985 ( in per cent) 
1957 
Malays Chinese Indians 
Professional 2.1 (35.1) 3.3 ( 41.9) 2.4 (12.1) 
& Technical 
Administrative 0.4 (17.5) 2.0 (62.3) 1.0 (12.3) 
& Managerial 
Clerical 1.7 (27.1) 3.8 (46.2) 4.0 (19.9) 
Sales 2.9 (15.9) 15.9 (66.1) 10.0 (16.8) 
Service 7.3 (39.7) 8.0 (33.3) 7.6 (12.8) 
Agricultural 74.2 (62.1) 38.3 (24.3) 50.2 (12.8) 
Production 10.6 (26.5) 28.3 (53.5) 24.6 (18.9) 
Total ('000) 1,023.7(48.2) 772.0(36.3) 313.0(14.7) 
1970 
Malay Chinese Indian 
Professional 4.3 (47.0) 5.2 (39.5) 4.9 (10.8) 
and technical 
Administrative 0.5 (24.1) 1.9 (62.9) 0.8 ( 7.8) 
and managerial 
Clerical 3.4 (35.4) 6.3 (45.9) 8.1 (17.2) 
Sales 4.7 (26.7) 15.3 (61.7) 9.5 (11.1) 
Service 6.8 (44.3) 8.6 (39.6) 10.9 (14.6) 
Agricultural 62.3 (72.0) 21.1 (17.3) 41.0 ( 9.7) 
Production 18.0 (34.2) 41.6 (55.9) 24.7 ( 9.6) 
Total ('000) 1,477.6(51.8) 1,043.6(36.6) 301.4 (10.6) 
Source: Sundaram, 1990: 82 
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Table 1.2: Class Structures and Ethnic Concentrations 
by Occupations in Malaysia 
Class Ethnic Composition 
The Upper Class 
Nobility Exclus ively Malay 
Leading government politicians 
and administrators Mostly Malay 
Successful capitalists, or 
businessmen Mostly non-Malay 
Successful professionals Mostly Malay 
The Middle Class 
Middle-range government, or 
public servants Mostly Malay 
Professionals Mostly non-Malays 
Businessmen, managers etc. Mostly non-Malay 
The Lower Class 
Peasantry Mostly Malay 
Government workers mostly Malay 
Commercial and industrial 
workers Mostly non-Malay 
The division along ethnic lines in the labour force has been 
an influential factor in sharpening ethnic consciousness and 
conflicts between the Malays and non-Malays in Malaysia 
since the colonial period. Although the Malays have made 
rapid progress in various occupational sectors following the 
Government's New Economic Policy (see Table 1.3 for 
comparison), the broad generalization of the division of 
labour along ethnic lines undoubtedly has a strong basis. 
In the rural areas, the Malays are predominantly 
agricultural smallholders whose main activities involve the 
cultivation of paddy, rubber tapping and fishing. The 
Chinese are involved in vegetable farming as well as rubber 
tapping, while the Indians work in the rubber and oil palm 
plantations. In the urban areas, the Malays form the main 
labour force in government administration, the armed forces 
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Table 1.3: Occupational Groups by Ethnic Group 







Professional 47.0 60.3 39.5 30.8 10.8 7.7 
& Technical 
Administrative 24.1 33.3 62.9 58.7 7.8 5.3 
& Managerial 
Clerical 35.4 54.9 45.9 36.9 17.2 7.8 
Sales 26.7 36.0 61.7 56.5 11.1 6.5 
Service 44.3 61.5 39.6 27.0 14.6 10.6 
Agricultural 72.0 76.4 21.2 15.8 9.7 7.0 
Production 34.2 48.5 55.9 40.4 9.6 10.7 
Total 51.8 57.8 36.6 32.9 10.6 8.5 
Source: Sundaram, 1990: 82-83; Malaysia, 1991 : 34. 
and at the ministerial levels. Occupations related to 
labouring and management in manufacturing, construction and 
commerce are mainly in the hands of the non-Malays, chiefly 
the Chinese. The Chinese and Indians are also predominant in 
the professional occupations notably in the medical, 
technical and legal services. This is due to the better and 
early educational opportunities for the Chinese and Indians 
in the urban areas. The Malay and non-Malay labour force is 
also widely segmented between the governmental and non- 
governmental sectors, respectively. 
The economic inequalities among the ethnic groups are quite 
extensive (Snodgrass, 1980; Anand, 1983). The division of 
employment along ethnic lines has resulted in the unequal 
distribution of income, ownership of wealth and poverty 
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among the ethnic groups and more importantly with regards to 
the Malay/non-Malay division. This is because more non- 
Malays than Malays are involved in the modern, export- 
oriented, and private economic sectors. These sectors have a 
relatively higher income and capital generating capacity 
than the rural traditional economy and government sectors, 
in which more Malays than non-Malays are involved. 
It is not surprising if the vast economic differences 
between the Malays and non-Malays are interpreted as 
comparable to class differences. But as clarified by Husin 
Ali, who uses this class perspective, ... in each class 
there are Chinese, Malays, Indian, etc., although they may 
be concentrated in different economic functions. Thus, the 
system is not based on ethnic stratification, where only one 
particularly ethnic group makes up a particular class' (Ali, 
1991: 105). On the other hand, there seems to be no 
indication of any strong class solidarity across ethnic 
lines that can undermine ethnic influence (Ali, 1991; Osman, 
1983). There is even a strong tendency for class interests 
to become muted by perception of ethnic differences (Nagata, 
1975; Ackerman, 1985). For example, as Ali writes (1991: 
115): 
The problem of poverty in Malaysia is actually of 
a class nature, but very often it is presented as 
a racial or ethnic one. The plight of the majority 
of poor Malays is compared to by some politicians 
in government, as well as those in the opposition, 
to the relative affluence among the Chinese 
businessmen in towns. Some of these politicians, 
... raise this issue in order to gain mass support 
or sympathy. They tend to blame the plight of the 
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Malays on non-Malays. Thus, genuine economic 
problems are often given a racial twist. 
The higher incidence of poverty among Malays in the rural, 
agricultural sector has always been a striking feature that 
has been compared with the success of the Chinese in the 
urban, modern economic sector (Nash, 1989: 40; Ali, 
1991: 115). As a consequence, the economic inequalities, 
between the Malays and the non-Malays have been viewed in 
both ethnic and class terms among the majority of the 
Malays. As Nash puts it '... in the folk version of social 
structure, at least in the Malay native or native model of 
wealth, Malays are poor, Chinese are rich, and this economic 
fact is one and the same thing. Malay poverty and Chinese 
wealth are the same social fact' (Nash, 1989: 41). This 
forms the basis for the articulation of ethnic nationalistic 
sentiment and radicalism among the Malays that has been a 
strong motivational and driving political force behind the 
Malays' struggle to implement more vigorous economic 
policies and strategies to correct the economic imbalance. 
(ii) Residential Segregation 
From the beginning, because of their involvement in 
different economic functions, the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians also lived in different areas (Sidhu, 1976: 18). The 
development of modern economic sectors and urban centres 
started in the West Coast states of Peninsular Malaysia 
owing to the expansion of rubber plantations and tin mining 
during the period of colonial rule. Many of the Chinese and 
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Indians who initially came as labourers to take part in 
these major economic activities have been living mainly in 
these areas since then. The Malays, on the other hand, 
continue to be the dominant group in the East Coast states 
and rural areas (Sidhu & Ahmad, 1978: 22-25). 
The striking feature between the Malays and non-Malays, in 
terms of residential segregation, is that the Malays are 
much less urbanised than the non-Malays. Only about 30% of 
the Malays live in these urban areas, compared to 59.2% of 
the Chinese and 43.5% of the Indians (Malaysia, 1986: 134- 
135). The urban Malay proportion at an earlier stage was 
even lower. In 1921, only 6.7% of the Malays were living in 
the urban areas, above the size of 1,000 persons. In 1931, 
it was 8.6%, and in 1947, it was 11.3%. The urban Malay 
population was 27.6% of the total urban population in 1970 
(Sidhu and Ahmad, 1978: 25-26). 
Ethnically dominated residential areas can be found in both 
rural and urban areas. Rural Malays live in their own 
traditional villages called kampung2. The traditional Malay 
villages are located mainly in inland paddy growing areas 
and coastal fishing areas. Rural Chinese areas mainly 
developed surrounding the mining and vegetable growing 
areas. But at a later stage, Chinese villages called new 
villages were created under the British resettlement 
2 One of the reasons for this largely rice-growing area to become a 
Malay dominated area is the legal protection given to it since 
1931 by the Malay Reservation Enactments which forbids non-Malays 
buying Malay land freely (Tregonning, 1964). 
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programme during the period of the 'emergency' to prevent 
the rural Chinese from giving support to the Communist cause 
in Malaya (Means, 1976: 118-120; Sandhu, 1964)3. The Indians 
live in the areas of rubber and oil palm plantations which 
are commonly referred to as estates. 
In the urban areas too, Chinese, Malays and Indians have 
formed their own ethnically dominated residential areas 
(Lee, 1976). More Malay dominated areas in the urban centres 
were the result of rapid rural-urban migration among the 
Malays in the post-Independence period, particularly since 
1970, with the launching of the government plan for greater 
urbanisation and modernisation among the Malay population. 
Residential areas of ethnic concentration in many Malaysian 
cities and towns are more prominent among the lower strata 
of urban population as a result of the rapid migration of 
rural Malays and Indians seeking jobs in the expanding job 
markets and industries in urban centres. Squatter areas in 
cities like Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya are examples of 
ethnic residential areas of lower class urban population. As 
well as the ethnically concentrated working class areas, the 
development of new and modern housing estates has attracted 
a greater mixture of ethnic population from middle and upper 
class backgrounds. One of the factors that contributes to 
greater ethnic mixture in these areas is the government rule 
for developers of housing estates to allocate a certain 
3 In 1951, about 400,000 rural Chinese were resettled in the new 
villages, and by 1954 it had increased to about 600,000 in 410 new 
villages (Means, 1976: 128n). 
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percentage of the new houses, with a discount rate (15%), 
solely for the Malays. 
The initial ethnic structuring of labour force 
concentrations in separate economic activities and spatial 
separation has become one basis for ethnic group 
mobilisation processes. With the absence of a central 
structure under colonial rule to facilitate integration, 
the Malays, Chinese and Indians established their own 
separate ethnic, political, economical and educational 
organisations, and these endure in the socio-cultural 
differences and ethnic identities of contemporary Malaysia. 
Through the initial structuring of ethnic divisions during 
the colonial period, ethnic boundaries and social distances 
between the Malays, Chinese and Indians have been 
strengthened and consequently perpetuated. 
These forms of segregation offer very little opportunity for 
the Malays, Chinese and Indians to interact socially 
(Nagata, 1975: 118). The situation did not improve very much 
in the post-Independence period, despite government policies 
and strategies for national unity. At the micro-level, 
although some increase in interethnic interactions was 
observed, this did not, however, lead greatly to wider 
interethnic interpersonal networks of friendship and 
contacts between the ethnic groups (Lee, 1977; 1978; 
Rabushka, 1969). Among the other factors that maintain the 
social distance and reinforce cultural definitions of 
ethnicity are endogamous marriages, religion, language, 
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family and kinship relations within each ethnic group. The 
cultural differences between the Malays, Chinese and Indians 
form another basis for the development, and survival of 
ethnic politics in Malaysia. 
Cultural and Ethnic Identity 
One of the factors that gives a kind of 'natural' or 
primordial strength to the reinforcement of group solidarity 
among the Malays, Chinese and Indians, and the spontaneous 
ethnic consciousness of their members, is their inherited 
'traditional' culture. These markers of ethnic boundaries 
are not only expressed in the highly visible ways in the 
cultural practices of customs, religions and languages 
spoken, but also in their values and ideological preferences 
(Nash, 1989; Taib & Ismail, 1982: 108-119). Above all in 
Malaysia, the importance of cultural and religious divisions 
and identity among ethnic groups are politically mobilised. 
The Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaysia are, however, 
not homogeneous groups. Hirshman's (1987) analysis of the 
development of ethnic classification in the censuses from 
1871 to 1980 clearly shows the existence of internal 
differentiations within the Malay, Chinese and Indian 
groups. These differentiations are mainly based on the 
linguistic and regional variations within the broader form 
of ethnic cultural similarity. British colonisation 
provided the first historical setting in Malaysia to enhance 
the political process of ethnic category-making and creation 
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of ethnic identity among the Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
The colonial situation provided the political context for 
the emergence of ethnic solidarity and movements among these 
divided groups of Malays, Chinese and Indians. As Horowitz 
notes, 'Within several decades, however - and certainly by 
end of World War II - strong, coherent Malay and Chinese 
(also Indian) identities had, for most purpose, superseded 
these lesser loyalties (internal divisions). This 
development was prompted by the juxtaposition of these 
groups throughout most of the Malay Peninsula' (1975: 128). 
Before colonial intervention, as one scholar observed, 
'Malay society was thus far removed from abstract notions of 
nationalism and economic development. The Malay peasant only 
dimly perceived that he belonged to a wider world than the 
village community' (Jesudason, 1990: 26). Nagata wrote, 'The 
modern term Malay, used in its grossest form in opposition 
to non-Malays (usually Chinese and Indian), obscures a whole 
host of internal differentiations arising from their 
history. For the category of Malay has been built up by a 
gradual series of aggregations from a variety of other 
peoples who still sometimes assert their separate identity 
(1981: 103). The Malay population in Malaysia, apart from 
the Malays themselves, also includes various groups of 
people from different parts of Indonesia (Ramsay 1956; 
Nagata, 1981). Among those of Indonesian origin are the 
Javanese, Minangkabau, Bugis, Boyanese and Banjarese. One 
common factor among them, however, is their religion. They 
are followers of the Muslim religion. Although the Malays in 
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the different states may have shared greater cultural and 
religious similarities, they were politically not a self- 
aware unified ethnic group under the traditional indigenous 
political system before British intervention. This regional- 
based division still exists to some degree among the Malays 
of the different states in the current Malaysia. 
In Malaysia today, the Malays are considered the indigenous 
people. In their struggle to establish their indigenous 
status and political and economic rights, the mobilisation 
of solidarity among the various indigenous groups has become 
an important political strategy in order to differentiate 
themselves from the Chinese and Indians immigrants. The 
presence of the Chinese and Indians in Malaysia during 
British rule, created the demand for political unification 
between the Malays and the other ethnic groups of Indonesian 
origin, as well as among the Malays from the different 
states within the Malay peninsular. As Nagata observed, 
while they may maintain the 'local recognition of different 
types of 'Malays'... Javanese, Bugis, and so forth (they) do 
not hesitate to identify as Malays, which they justify on 
the basis of common bangsa (race), when certain political 
economic privileges are at stake' (1981: 105). 
As a consequence, the Malays and other small linguistic 
groups of Indonesian origin mainly the Javanese, Minangkabau 
and Bugis who have inhabited Peninsular Malaya for a long 
time, have politically identified themselves as Malays and 
'Bumiputra' (sons of the soil). The search for a common 
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identity as a Malay between the main Malay-speaking and 
other linguistic groups of Indonesian origin was never a 
problem, since they shared the same religion (Islam) and to 
a large extent the same cultural values (Ramsay, 1956). The 
other factor that made the mutual acceptance of a common 
Malay ethnic identity much easier was probably the fact that 
the local Indonesians had played a very important role in 
the traditional political system of Malaya before British 
intervention (Gullick, 1969). 
There are other native people in Malaysia who are not 
considered as Malays. These include the other natives like 
the '0rang Asli' in Peninsular Malaysia and the Dayak, 
Dusun, Than and Kadazan in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
Because of their cultural dissimilarities from the Malays, 
particularly those who are not Muslims, they are not 
considered Malays, although they have been granted the 
status of 'bumiputra'. 
The Chinese and the Indians, too, are divided 
linguistically, and to some extent, culturally (Arasaratnam, 
1970; Purcell, 1960; 1978). Among the Chinese, there are 
groups who come from different provinces of China, speaking 
different dialects like Hokkein, Cantonese, Teochew, 
Hainanese and Hakka. Among the Indians, there are different 
linguistic groups like Tamils, Malayalees, Punjabis, 
including Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Whereas 
Islam is the unifying factor for the Malays, the Chinese and 
Indians do not have a common religion. A small proportion of 
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Chinese and Indians are also Muslims but the majority of 
them are not. The Chinese are mainly followers of 'Chinese 
religion' which encompasses the element of beliefs and 
practices of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and ancestral 
worship (Ting, 1980: 89-90). Indians are mainly Hindus, and 
Sikh (Rajoo, 1975). A small proportion of these non-Muslim 
Chinese and Indians now also share common religious beliefs 
and practices through Christianity, Buddhism, Bahaism, and 
the neo-Hindu Sai Baba spiritual movement (Lee, 1982: 136). 
It is vital not to overlook the vast cultural and religious 
differences that exist between the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians in Malaysia. It is not surprising to note that in 
some instances, these differences can prevent the 
development of close relations among members of these ethnic 
groups. The most important among these differences is 
religion. For the Malays, their religious practice has 
always been considered an important and serious matter in 
their community life and in their relations with non- 
Muslims. In simple everyday interactions, the Muslim 
religious code of practice could also limit, and put a 
strain on, relations between individuals and the families of 
Malays and non-Malays (Nash, 1989: 36). For instance, as one 
commentator rightly observes, 'Muslim proscriptions on 
eating pork and keeping dogs may seem rather insignificant 
to non-Malaysians. But in reality they are central emblems 
of ethnic divisions. Malays regard both as deeply polluting, 
whereas Chinese either ignore Malay attitudes or respond 
even more assertively by clinging to these ethnic symbols' 
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(Basham, 1983: 74). Another symbol of social distance is 
beef. Among the Malays, beef is their favourite meat but it 
is totally rejected by the Hindus who consider the cow as a 
sacred animal. By and large, one can say that religious 
taboos within each group do pose some constraints on the 
Malay and non-Malay groups mixing freely, by going out for 
a meal or an outing together in informal social gatherings. 
Religious divisions, mainly between the all-Muslim 
characteristic of the Malays and the overwhelming non-Muslim 
characteristic of the Chinese and the Indians, have also 
strengthened their ethnic groups' boundary maintenance 
mechanism through the practice of endogamy. Mixed marriages, 
between the Malays and non-Muslim non-Malays, rarely happen 
because of the compulsory conversion of the non-Muslims to 
the Islamic faith in order to marry the Malays. This is rare 
because of ... the high social and cultural costs and 
dislocations it entails', as Nash puts it (1989: 36). 
Regardless of the internal differences, the solidarity that 
exists within the Malays, Chinese and Indians as politically 
distinct ethnic groups, is an important fact in Malaysian 
politics. The divisions are not in any way seen as weakening 
the ethnic group consciousness and identification. Their 
internal differences may be completely ignored when these 
groups come to face each other on important ethnic issues. 
As Wilson observes, 'in any relation involving non-Malays, 
the Malays will ignore their internal differences and become 
one in their opposition towards non-Malays' (1967: 23). 
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Similarly, the Chinese and Indians will ignore their 
internal differences and even the difference between them to 
show a greater unity as 'non-Malays' in their opposition 
with the Malays. The underlying reason for such ethnic group 
mobilisation to take place in the form of Malays versus non- 
Malays is the very political definition of Malay ethnicity. 
Malay ethnicity and the Malays' entitlement to special 
rights as Bumiputra (sons of the soil) is constitutionally 
defined in Malaysia. The Malaysian Constitution defines a 
Malay as 'a person who professes the Muslim religion, speaks 
Malay, conforms to Malay customs', (Article 162 [2]: 124). 
In addition to this, the Malay language and Islam have also 
been granted the status of official language and religion of 
the state. This very political definition of 'Malays', their 
language and religion in the Constitution has further 
reinforced the importance of cultural-religious definition 
of ethnicity between the Malays and non-Malay groups. 
Cultural and religious differences between the Malays and 
non-Malays have become politically significant symbols of 
ethnic identity in Malaysia (Ratnam, 1965: 3). 
Since the Malays are constitutionally defined, the Chinese 
and Indians have automatically formed the other political 
category as 'non-Malays'. The division which is again 
synonymous with bumipitra/non-bumiputra division, runs 
parallel to Muslim/non-Muslim division. For the Malays and 
non-Malays, all these overlapping identities are politically 
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important in their relations and demands against each other. 
For Malays, as Means puts it, 
The categories Malay, Bumiputra, and Muslim are 
not quite contiguous but do overlap to a very 
large extent. ... Which of these three categories is stressed for political mobilization is a matter 
of shifting strategies and alliances. Each 
category is energized by a different set of 
emotive symbols of identity as well as by 
different issues of public policy that highlight 
and make salient that constituency. ... Thus there is a continuous interplay between the themes of 
ethnicity and culture, of indigenousness, and of 
religion in the discourse of politics (Means, 
1991: 123). 
Ethnic Institutional Support 
In addition to their traditional cultural, social and 
religious activities, at the institutional level, two most 
important organisations that provided opportunities for 
group mobilisation and further ethnic divisions were 
established. These were ethnic schools and political 
parties. Without alternative central structures, these 
ethnic organisational developments became crucial in 
providing social services for individual ethnic communities. 
Thus, these became mechanisms for maintaining and fostering 
ethnic culture, sense of ethnic identity and ethnic 
allegiance. 
The development of vernacular schools - Malay, Chinese and 
Tamil - during the colonial period was among one of the 
important types of institutional segregation of ethnic 
groups. These separate schools were established to ensure 
the survival of ethnic languages, as well as ethnic cultural 
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values, practices and early socialisation. During this 
period, English schools were established in urban areas as a 
common school for all. It did not, however, appeal to the 
Malays to send their children because the majority of them 
lived in the rural areas. Apart from this, being Muslims, 
they found these mostly Christian missionary schools not 
suitable for them (Hashim, 1983: 17-18). 
After Independence, under the National Education Policy, 
Malay schools took over the position as common schools for 
Malaysians by being conceded the status as national schools. 
The Malay language was granted the status of national and 
official language, and subsequently called Bahasa Malaysia 
to symbolise national unity. Malay was made a compulsory 
language to be taught in all schools, including the Chinese 
and Tamil primary schools which continued to survive. As a 
consequence, compared to the earlier generation, children of 
the new generation of non-Malays now have learnt, and can 
speak, fluently the Malay language. Since the implementation 
of the National Educational Policy, the question of language 
in the Malaysian education system has been one of the most 
sensitive political issues between Malays and non-Malays 
(Lee, 1980; Roff, 1967; Saad, 1981; Ward and Hewstone, 
1985). 
Among non-Malays, mainly the Chinese, the implementation of 
this policy of using Malay as the sole national and official 
language of the country, is considered a clear-cut strategy 
by the Malay-dominated government to weaken and undermine 
27 
the political right of the non-Malays to preserve their 
mother tongue and culture. The policy is seen as setting up 
a dead end to their ideal aspirations for their ethnic 
languages to be accorded the status of official language and 
for the expansion of their own ethnic educational 
institutions, like the proposal by the Chinese for the 
Merdeka University. The issue of language and education 
among the non-Malays, chiefly that of the Chinese, still 
continues to be a sensitive political agenda that can create 
a 'big event' of ethnic tension, to use Blumer's term (1958: 
6), in Malaysian politics (Lee, 1980). 
It has been argued that the political sphere is the most 
dominant and expressive dimension of ethnicity in any modern 
multi-ethnic society (Smith, 1979; 1981). In modern society, 
people become more aware of the importance of mobilisation 
of ethnic group consciousness, solidarity and ethnic 
identity as the most effective political instrument for 
applying pressure for defense of social, economic and 
political interests. In Malaysia, this has been the case 
since the colonial period (Enloe, 1970; Hirschman, 1975; 
Ratnam, 1965). Each ethnic group formed its own political 
organisation to pursue its group interests. In this form of 
communal politics, the mobilisation of ethnic consciousness 
is a crucial factor in developing the salience of ethnicity 
and one that has influenced the way in which ethnic 
relations have taken shape. 
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Divided ethnic group mobilisation in Malaysia could be said 
to have emerged with the separate political activities among 
the Malays, Chinese and Indians in the pre-war period. This 
period witnessed the emergence of communal political 
organisations in the first phase of Malay, Chinese and 
Indian nationalism (Silcock & Aziz, 1953; Roff, 1967). In 
this period, the Malays' nationalist movement, which was 
inspired by nationalism in the Middle East and Indonesia, 
concentrated on religious reformation as a basis for their 
political awakening and Malay ethnic group identity 
(Soenarno, 1960). On the other hand, the Chinese and Indian 
nationalist movements in Malaya were influenced by 
nationalism and reflected the events in their country of 
origin (Arasaratnam, 1970; Purcell, 1978; Wang, 1970). 
Political interests and activities in Malaya from the 1900s 
to the 1930s did not have much direct effect on ethnic 
relations among the national groups. Nonetheless, as one 
scholar describes, 'Although British intervention determined 
to a large extent the structure of ethnic relation, the 
growth of separate ethnic nationalism also contributed to 
the maintenance of colonial racial ideology' (Lee, 1990: 
485). 
Throughout the stages of nationalism before Independence, 
the socio-political interests of the Malays have been 
mobilised via important organisations like the Kaum Muda 
(Young Generation Movement), Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young 
Malays' Union), Pembela Tanah Air (PETA or Defenders of the 
Homeland), Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS or 
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Union of Peninsular Indonesians), Partai Kebangsaan Melayu 
(Malay Nationalist Party), Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu 
Bersatu (United Malay National Organisation or UMNO) and 
Parti Islam Sa Malaysia (PAS or Pan Malayan Islamic Party). 
The political activities of the Chinese were mobilised 
through The Chinese Kuomintang, the Malayan Communist Party 
and Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association or MCA. As for the 
Indians, they were mobilised through the Central Indian 
Association, Indian Independence League of Malaya and the 
Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress or MIC. 
The formation of these communal political or semi-political 
organisations gave very little opportunity for any sort of 
political cooperation among the Malays, Chinese and Indians 
till the early 1950s, although mutual anti-colonial feelings 
were expressed among them. Generally, there was no sense of 
a common political community. Among the other reasons, in 
terms of political status and rights, in the pre-war period 
the colonial British treated the Malays as a special group, 
for they had ruled Malaya through treaties with the Malay 
aristocracy. This practice has been formalised since 1953 
(Means, 1976: 25n). The Chinese and Indians were treated as 
non-permanent settlers in Malaya. The most important reason 
is that the Malays also felt threatened by the non-Malays, 
particularly by the Chinese advancement in the economy, and 
because of their strong support for the Communist struggle 
in Malaya. The Malays perceived this as a threat to their 
political rights and privileges as natives of Malaya. As one 
Malay writer puts it, there was a '... fear of alien 
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(Chinese and Indian) encroachment into their land, the Tanah 
Melayu, or the Land of the Malays' (Hashim, 1983: 2). 
Ethnic relations between the Chinese and the Malays became 
seriously strained during the Japanese Occupation in the 
1940s. This was because the Japanese, in their attempt to 
persecute the Chinese for their moral and material support 
to the Chinese nationalists in the Sino-Japanese war, had 
used para-military units that were mainly composed of Malays 
to fight the Chinese led Communist Malayan People's Anti- 
Japanese Army (MPAJA). As a consequence, there were other 
follow-up open ethnic clashes between the Malays and Chinese 
just before the Japanese surrender, and the return of 
British forces (Wahid, 1970a; Cheah, 1979,1981). 
The feeling of animosity between the Malays and Chinese 
again intensified during the period of emergency when the 
Malay armed forces clashed repeatedly with the Chinese 
communist guerrillas. As Means has commented, 'Although the 
war was never defined in racial terms by either side, it did 
complicate the problems of developing communal harmony and 
understanding.... Inter communal tensions increased when 
Malay communities responded to guerrilla terrorism by 
retaliatory attacks against neighbouring Chinese' (1976: 
118-119). Andaya and Andaya wrote that 'The communal 
violence of the post-war years can thus be regarded as a 
logical outcome of divisive ethnic policies and attitude 
which had developed gradually over the period of colonial 
rule. ... The implications of the post-war violence were not 
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lost on the people of Malaya. While Independence was a 
desirable goal, there were some who expressed doubts that 
any independent Malayan government would be able to restrain 
ethnic enmities once the mediating hand of the colonial 
power had been removed' (1982: 253). 
Matters of citizenship and political rights were the most 
crucial issues that evoked direct political conflict between 
ethnic groups in Malaysia (Allen, 1967; Tadin, 1960). The 
solidarity of the Malays against the non-Malays was strongly 
expressed through their total rejection of the proposal of 
the Malayan Union Constitution by the British government 
with the intention of returning independence to Malaya. The 
Malayan Union's idea of giving equal rights to all citizens 
was clearly not acceptable to the Malays. Historically, the 
country was (and is still) considered by the Malays as 
belonging to them and sharing equal citizenship rights with 
non-Malays is seen as taking away their indigenous rights 
and sharing in the country. Recognising this fact, during 
the colonial period, the British showed a commitment towards 
the pro-Malay policy by maintaining the traditional Malay 
rulers and special rights of the Malays in politics and the 
administration of the country. 
Strong objections to the Malayan Union were expressed by the 
Malays through UMNO. They fought back to establish their 
special rights and privileges constitutionally. The colonial 
rule was left without much choice but to revoke the plan. 
The Malayan Union was substituted with a new constitution of 
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the Federation of Malaya. This new constitution enshrined 
the legal basis for Malay hegemony. On the other hand, 
strict measures were imposed on the matter of giving 
citizenship to non-Malays (Wahid, 1970b: 115-116). Thus 
politically, a dominant division between Malays and non- 
Malays was structured in the form of Malay indigenousness 
versus non-Malay non-indigenouness. 
Malay Hegemony, Riot and Ethnic Preferential Policies 
Since the proposal of the Malayan Union, the constitutional 
matters of common nationality and special positions that 
represent conflicting aspirations of the Malays and the non- 
Malays have become the central issue in Malaysian ethnic 
politics. Divided ethnic nationalism, political aspirations 
and conflict have undoubtedly accentuated strong ethnic 
group consciousness, distrust and feelings of insecurity 
among the Malays and non-Malays in the post-Independence 
period. The past experience has become a hindrance in 
forging a new Malayan unity and national consciousness among 
the three major ethnic groups. In the post-Independence 
period, Malay hegemony has made itself the new political 
force that has influenced the rise of ethnic salience and 
allegiance in Malaysian society. 
The formation of the Alliance (Perikatan), the coalition 
party between UMNO, MCA and MIC, indicated in one way or the 
other, the acceptance 'by the leaders of the non-Malays of 
Malay supremacy in Malaysian politics. This was later 
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adopted into the Constitution of Independent Malaya of 1957. 
The 'bargaining' process which brought about a compromise 
among the communal leaders at this stage followed the 
pragmatic approach among the leaders of the Alliance to 
solve the Malay/non-Malay dispute by trading the special 
rights of the Malays for the citizenship by j us soli of the 
non-Malays. But the dispute between the principle of 'common 
nationality' and the 'special position' was a pressing one. 
While the cooperation among the ethnic leaders of the major 
political parties led to Independence, this cooperation 
could not be perceived as having received wider social 
consensus within the individual communities for the above 
reason. The controversy surrounding these two issues was 
reflected by Means as follows, 
The Reid Commission found it impossible to reconcile 
two principles in its terms of reference: providing for 
'a common nationality' and 'safeguarding the special 
position of the Malays'. The first principle presumed 
the equality of all citizens, while the second implied 
the creation of separate rights for two classes of 
citizens. The Commission expressed its preference for 
the principle of equality, but it also acknowledged 
that the Malays would suffer if special privileges were 
suddenly withdrawn. To resolve the contradictions, the 
Commission did not give Malay special rights 
constitutional status; rather, it allowed the system 
to continue by law, thus permitting termination or 
diminution by legislative enactment. The Commission's 
most controversial proposal provides that Malay special 
privileges would be continued for a substantial 
period, but that in due course the present preferences 
should be reduced and should ultimately cease'. 
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the 
existing Malay privileges be reviewed fifteen years 
after Independence with the objective of preparing for 
their eventual abolition' (1976: 173-179; 1986: 101). 
Article 153 of the Federal Constitution on the Malays 
Special Privileges ensures the reservation of quotas for the 
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Malays in public services, granting licences or permits for 
business and in scholarships. Regardless of the general 
agreement and assurance given by the leaders of the Alliance 
on the temporary nature of the Malays' special privilege 
(Heng, 1988: 222; Malaya, 1957: 183; Ratnam, 1965: 102-117), 
this term was not included in the constitution of 1957. 
While this may have caused contradictory expectations 
between the Malays and non-Malays, the compromise or the 
'bargain', notably the Special Privilege of the Malays, has 
been regarded after Independence by the Malays as a law, a 
binding contract that applies to all for all times (Chee, 
1991: 6; Nawawi, 1990). Chee wrote, 'The prospects for the 
plural-ethnic democracy that was inaugurated on 31 August 
1957 would hence hinge on the maintenance of the ethnic 
security equilibrium between the inherently conflicting 
requirements of Malay 'special position' and non-Malay 
'legitimate interests' (1991: 6). In fact, experience shows 
that it is not always easy to maintain such an equilibrium 
without conflict, or without applying authoritarian 
political measures to suppress it. 
Malaysia had experienced ethnic clashes before independence 
in 1957. In the post-Independence period, the year 1969 was 
undoubtedly a major landmark and turning point in the 
history of Malaysian politics and ethnic relations. Ethnic 
violence erupted again in this year (Goh, 1971; Gagliano, 
1970; Parker, 1979). This incident occurred because of the 
dissatisfaction and frustration among both the Malays and 
non-Malays. Despite the special rights of the Malays, even 
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after more than ten years of Independence, the Malays had 
not really achieved any significant progress in the economy, 
in reducing the inter-ethnic economic gap. In a 
retrospective view on the frustrations of the Malays before 
the riots, Mahathir Mohamad, who is currently the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, explained, ... although the Malays 
have managed to enter the economic field, they have never 
been able to, and can never hope to catch up with the 
Chinese. Even as Independence brought the Malays increased 
opportunities, it has brought the Chinese even greater 
opportunities which have propelled them so far ahead as to 
make the entry of the Malays into business almost 
ridiculously insignificant. The Malay economic dilemma is 
still unsolved and seems likely to remain so. The Malays' 
feeling of frustration continues to deepen' (1970: 51). 
For non-Malays', the institutionalisation of the Malays' 
special rights in the Malaysian constitution was a political 
blow. The political cooperation of the non-Malay leaders 
with UMNO of the Malays in forming the Alliance party and 
the government, could not stop the accumulation of political 
frustrations among the non-Malays, chiefly the Chinese, the 
second largest ethnic group, with more previous experiences 
of ethnic clashes and political radicalism that represented 
their animosity towards the Malays. In addition to this, in 
the 1960s, there was also a fear among the non-Malays of 
losing their cultural identity, following the efforts of the 
Malay dominated government to establish the Malay tongue as 
the sole official and national language. The Chinese and 
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Indians, the MCA and MIC, despite being members in the 
ruling coalition, were not able to ensure the preservation 
of their ethnic cultural identity. 
For the first time after Independence, the non-Malays, 
particularly the Chinese, took the opportunity to express 
their political frustrations in the 1969 general elections 
by backing the non-Malays' opposition parties. In the 
elections, although the Alliance held the majority of seats 
in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), compared to 
the previous elections in 1964, the number of seats had been 
reduced from 89 to 66 or from 58.4% to 48.8% in the popular 
vote. The non-Malay opposition parties - Gerakan, Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and People's Progressive Party (PPP) - 
together won a total of 22 seats, the Pan Malayan Islamic 
Party (PAS) won 12 seats, thus depriving the Alliance 
Government of the two-thirds majority. The Chinese even went 
to the extent of celebrating the victory of the opposition 
in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur with various outrageous 
slogans like 'Malays may return to their villages', 'Kuala 
Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese', 'We'll thrash you, we 
are now powerful', 'This country does not belong to the 
Malays, we want to chase out the Malays' (Goh, 1971; 
Malaysia, 1969). As for the Malays, Goh wrote, 'They felt 
outraged that they, the natives of the soil, should have 
been asked to withdraw from Kuala Lumpur, the capital of 
Tanah Melayu (the Land of the Malays) into Red-Indian-style 
reservations so that the immigrant community could gain 
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domination over it' (1971: 21). The anger of the Malays 
exploded into several days of rioting. 
On the significance of this event for the Malays, Lee 
explained, that it has become 
... ingrained as a collective symbol of the political 
sanctity of Malay nationalism. ... the 13 May incident 
presaged an era of Bumiputrasim4 in which the symbol of 
Malay struggle ... was consolidated in the form of NEP (New Economic Policy).... the 13 May incident has 
transcended the actual event to become an ideological 
instrument of the states, being a powerful symbolic 
code for protecting Malay nationalism and curbing non- 
Malay assertiveness' (1990: 491-493). For the non- 
Malays, especially the Chinese, he further explains, 
'... the 13 May incident seemingly spelled the end of 
their attempt at political self-determination. Without 
strong, consistent nationalist ideologies reinforced by 
military power, the electoral victory was a Pyrrhic one 
that exposed their weaknesses in political organisation 
(1990: 492). 
The 1969 riots could have been perceived by the Malays as a 
blessing in disguise. The incident made it possible for the 
first time after Independence, for the Malays to reactivate 
and rationalise their political hegemony through the 
political ideology of Bumiputraism that is derived from the 
special rights of the Malays as Bumiputra (Sons of the 
Soil). This became a central driving force for the Malay- 
dominated government for formulating and implementing ethnic 
preferential policies that were to promote Malay economy and 
culture. 
4 An ideology based on the Malays' rights/status as sons of the 
soil. 
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The political economic strategy to modernise the Malays and 
to improve their participation in the Malaysian economy, as 
well as to establish the Malay national identity, has been 
of paramount importance to them. The robust manner in which 
these policies, primarily the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
were implemented has even overshadowed other strategies like 
the Rukunegara, for national unity (Means, 1991: 23). The 
national ideology which was also implemented after riots is 
in fact a kind of formal declaration of inter-ethnic 
bargaining (Means, 1991: 13). The Ministry of Unity, which 
was established after the riots, did not seem to have a 
vital role to play in the society, as the status of this 
ministry was later reduced to a board for national unity 
before being 'demoted' to just a department. Regardless of 
its less important status to that of the NEP, the Rukunegara 
nevertheless represents a symbol of Malay political hegemony 
through some of its principles, including loyalty to the 
king and upholding the constitution. 
The important tool in implementing Malay economic and 
cultural policies is, however, the Sedition Act. This Act 
prohibits public or even parliamentary questioning on 
constitutional matters that are regarded as 'sensitive 
issues'. These issues include the sovereignty of the Malay 
rulers. Safeguarding the Malay rulers is politically very 
significant since they symbolically represent the Malays' 
exclusive historical link with the country. Others are the 
Malays' special privilege, status of Malay as the sole 
official and national language, status of Islam as the 
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official religion, and the citizenship rights of non-Malays. 
As one scholar explains, 'This amendment implies, inter 
alia, restriction of the democratic process and indirectly 
assures continued Malay political control' (Hashim, 1983: 
93). The government may also prohibit any other ethnically 
controversial issues if the government perceives it can 
directly, or indirectly challenge political stability. In 
1987, when the issue of Chinese education almost threw the 
country into another riot, massive detention was carried out 
to stop the eruption of another conflict in the country. 
New Economic Policy and Ethnic Relations 
The Malays' economic nationalism has been the most 
significant driving force in the Malay political 
mobilisation after independence. Uneven development and 
modernisation between the Malays and non-Malays were the 
major concerns for which the New Economic Policy was 
implemented immediately after the 1969 riot. The development 
of Malay economic power and modernisation was seen as vital 
in securing interethnic harmony in the society. Greater 
participation of the Malays in modern economic sectors, 
educational and training programmes and urbanisation 
processes was the aim of the policy. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) that was introduced in 1970 
stipulates that 'within a period of twenty years (by 1990), 
the Malays and other indigenous people will manage and own 
at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial 
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activities in all categories and scales of operation' 
(Malaysia, 1971: 41). This objective is central to the" 
strategy of restructuring Malaysian society and eventually 
eradicating poverty to bring inter-ethnic peace and social 
justice. The NEP as such is not an economic policy per se, 
but an overall policy of socio-economy and politics. Its 
implementation has resulted in greater state intervention in 
exercising a favourable increase in the intake, or quotas, 
for Malays in government employment, in educational training 
programmes, and in the private sectors of the economy. To 
increase the Malays' ownership of the Malaysian economy, to 
achieve 30% of share equity by 1990, public enterprises were 
expected to act as Bumiputra Trust Agencies to buy 
corporate shares and to acquire control of industries on 
behalf of the Malays. 
As a consequence, more public enterprises at the federal, 
state and regional levels were established. By 1986, there 
were 841 such enterprises at all levels, mostly established 
in the 1970s (Ibrahim, 1987). The Public Services Commission 
and other public agencies have directly recruited a high 
proportion of Malays in the government services. According 
to one calculation, as quoted by Means, between 1969 and 
1973, Malay intake in the government services, including the 
armed forces, was 99% of the total intake (1991: 26). To 
increase the participation of Malays in the private sectors, 
the government rule requires all private firms to ensure 
that the intake of Malays is at least 32% to 45%, and 
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compels them to include them in their training and 
promotional schemes. 
In order to increase the Malays' participation in the modern 
sectors of the economy, the NEP has brought about favourable 
Malay quotas for scholarships and admissions, either to 
study in the local universities or overseas, including 
specific courses of studies. In addition to the existing 
University of Malaya, more universities have been opened to 
accommodate this policy, where Malay students form between 
65% and 90% of the total student population (Means, 1991: 
26). Means adds, 'In addition, large numbers of government 
scholarship were made available for advanced study abroad, 
with over 90% of these foreign study scholarships being 
awarded to Malays. By contrast most non-Malays who studied 
abroad have to do so on their own resource. By 1982, there 
were 50,000 Malaysian students pursuing education abroad, 
... with almost all the overseas Malay students fully funded 
by the government. All these programmes of assistance to the 
Malays were planned as part of the overall NEP strategy' 
(1991: 26). 
Cultural Policies 
In addition to this economic strategy, there were also 
cultural strategies that were consistent with Malay 
nationalism. As one scholar observed, 'For the Malays, the 
changes brought by colonialism had a major imprint on their 
psyche. The experience of external domination weakened their 
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collective self-confidence and drove them, particularly the 
second generation post-Independence Malay elite and 
intelligentsia, to recover this loss in the symbolic, 
political, and economic spheres' (Jesudason, 1990: 29). 
Apart from securing political hegemony and the economic 
policy to promote their economic development, the Malays 
were also concerned for the position of their own culture in 
relation to the development of national culture and national 
identity. Probably what concerned the Malays culturally was 
the domination of the English language, and the presence of 
the competing Chinese and Tamil schools. Even before 1969, 
the 1950 National. Educational Policy and the 1967 National 
Language Act were already enforced to promote Malay schools 
and the Malay language. The concept of 'Malaysian Malaysia' 
in the 1960s as advocated by some radical non-Malay leaders 
was not acceptable to the Malays. The idea was based on the 
liberal political approach, and it saw Malaysia as a country 
with equal rights for all its citizens. This idea was not 
acceptable to the Malays, as it contradicted their view of 
the special rights of the indigenous people and their 
culture. It was this that led to the separation of Singapore 
from Malaysia in 1965. 
In 1971, the National Cultural Policy was announced. The aim 
was to create a national culture and national identity which 
was expected to promote unity and a sense of belonging to 
the nation among the ethnic groups. The National Cultural 
Policy was based on the views of the Malays, who basically 
43 
see Malaysia as the Malays' country. The policy maintains 
that the national culture has to be based on Malay culture 
and religion (Islam). The assimilationist view of national 
culture is reflected in the cultural and language policies. 
To complement this policy, from 1981, the policy of 
Islamisation was introduced to intensify the emphasis on 
Islamic symbols and ideals in administration as well as in 
economics and education. The Islamic Bank of Malaysia, 
Islamic Insurance Schemes, the Islamic University and the 
teaching of Islamic civilisation courses for all Malaysian 
students, as well as the importance of Islamic law, have 
already been implemented (Means, 1991: 99-105). 
Strengthening the political status and the characteristic of 
Malay culture and religion in the society is another way in 
which the Malay leadership tries to create a strong all- 
round predominant status over the non-Malay communities. In 
the process, many matters related to culture, language and 
religion, have from time to time provoked ethnic ill 
feelings. One of the most important issues that created a 
kind of a 'big event' impact on ethnic relations was the 
issue concerning the Chinese University which is more 
popularly known as the Merdeka University controversy (Lee, 
1980). In another instance, the issue was who founded Kuala 
Lumpur, Yap Ah Loy (a Chinese) or Raja Abdullah (a Malay)?. 
But in 1987, the question of the promotion of non-Mandarin 
speaking teachers in the Chinese (Mandarin) schools was a 
serious one. It caused friction between the Malays and 
Chinese and almost created another major riot in Malaysia. 
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Lee described these issues as a political conflict 
manifested in the form of a status conflict where symbolic 
events, or issues '... serve to heighten the cognizance of 
status differences between ethnic groups ... (Lee, 1986: 
35). He explains, 'There is an implicit understanding 
between the Malays and non-Malays on the avoidance of 
publicly discussing sensitive matters, particularly matters 
dealing with power relations between ethnic groups, such as 
Malay special privileges. ... Given the restricted 
conditions under which power issues can be discussed, it is 
not surprising that many political and non-political groups 
select status issues as an outlet for ethnic grievances' 
(1986: 43). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the factors that have influenced the 
transformation of ethnic relations in Malaysia among the 
major ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, Indians) from the 
period of British colonialism to the post-Independence 
period has been presented. The divisions among the ethnic 
groups in Malaysia encompass cultural, economical, spatial 
and political spheres for Malaysia to be considered as a 
plural society par excellence. What is called institutional 
completeness in sociology, to use Breton's term, has given 
ethnicity in Malaysia the strength to persevere. Strong 
parallel ethnic institutions in politics, economic, socio- 
culture and family spheres have greatly influenced the way 
in which Malaysians express the importance of their 
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ethnicity depending on the nature and organisation of the 
social contexts in which they take part. The establishment 
of ethnic institutions that accelerated ethnic cultural, 
social, economic and political practices have created 
relatively strong ethnic group enclaves, ethnic sentiments 
and identity in the society. Ethnic boundaries, ethnic group 
solidarity and interethnic contact among ethnic groups have 
been enhanced through various ethnic institutions. Thus, it 
is not surprising, as Nash emphasises, that the salience of 
ethnicity in Malaysia has been infiltrated in all the three 
macro, meso and micro levels or spheres of social 
organisations encompassing political, economical and 
ordinary daily interactions among ethnic groups (1989: 30). 
In the beginning, there was very little opportunity for 
interethnic contacts and cooperation among ethnic groups 
mainly owing to the division of labour along ethnic lines. 
The situation encouraged development of communal-based 
politics and sentiments in the society. There was not any 
common political interest that could unite them. In fact, 
multi-ethnic political organisations never seemed to 
interest them, even during the period when common anti- 
colonial British feelings were felt among all the ethnic 
groups. Ethnic allegiance in political mobilisation has 
taken a strong hold in Malaysian society since then. Divided 
nationalism among ethnic groups had denied political 
integration via a strong sense of common political community 
identification and equal constitutional rights between the 
Malays and non-Malays. Instead, the Malays' strong rejection 
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of the principles of equal citizenship rights had brought 
about the establishment of the constitutional rights of 
Malay hegemony. This institutionalisation of Malay political 
hegemony has consequently resulted in the implementation of 
ethnic preferential cultural, language and, more 
importantly, economic policies in favour of the Malays. 
Political cooperation among the major ethnic political 
organisations5 has come to play a significant role in 
achieving independence for Malaysia. They form a coalition 
government which since then has provided considerable 
political stability to the society. But conflicting 
interests of the ethnic groups, basically between the 
contradicting constitutional rights of the Malays' special 
position and common nationality of the non-Malays, is still 
very much an important underlying social force that has 
mobilised ethnic consciousness and ethnic identity in 
Malaysia. 
In 1969, the ethnic riot which took place in Malaysia led to 
the introduction of new policies and strategies to try to 
forge national unity. These policies, which greatly favoured 
Malay interests, have focussed on the strategies to improve 
the participation of Malays in the Malaysian economy and 
establishing Malay-Muslim ethnic identity as a national 
identity. The policies are consistent with the awakening of 
new radical Malay nationalism in the post-Independence 
5 After the 1969 riot, the Alliance Party (UMNO, MCA and MIC) was 
expanded with the inclusion of other ethnically based parties and 
was called the National Front (Barisan Nasional). 
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period. But for the non-Malays, it is not the kind of 
experience that one can expect to make their relation with 
the Malays a more satisfactory one with regards to the Malay 
political domination. It is not the kind of experience that 
they may have expected from initial power bargaining, or 
sharing consociationalisms. Without giving consideration to 
the cause of non-Malays' political frustration and the 
marginalisation of their ethnic identity and rights in the 
process of nation building, one cannot ensure that the post- 
1969 period has found a solution to ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia, or has undermined the importance of ethnicity in 
Malaysian society. Politically, and to a certain extent 
culturally, ethnicity in Malaysia has strengthened the 
salience of ethnic allegiance among peoples. More 
importantly, ethnic allegiance in post-Independent Malaysia, 
as the above discussion tries to emphasise, is strongly 
mobilised at the macro level where political decisions and 
public policies are made on the basis of power relations 
between Malays and non-Malays. 
6 'Consociationalism', Stephen Chee wrote, '... refers to inter 
ethnic power-sharing, rather than winner-takes-all political 
confrontation, - by, compromise or accommodation of conflictual 
claims through elite transactions on behalf of their communities' 
(1991: 54) 
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Chapter 2 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND CONCEPTUALISATION OF ETHNICITY 
Introduction 
The present research concerning Malaysian ethnicity has its 
origin in Michael Banton's rational choice model of 
ethnically salient behaviours. This model is applied in this 
study with the aim of assessing the importance of ethnic 
identity and ethnic conflict in Malaysia in relation to 
Chinese ethnic alignment. The research is partly motivated 
by an interest in testing the suitability of this model, in 
particular the individualistic approach implicit in the 
rational choice theory. The study will be able to 
demonstrate the usefulness of this method in understanding 
ethnicity in a society like Malaysia. The study will also be 
able to ascertain whether this individualistic approach 
allows us to make a conclusive and comprehensive 
generalisation about the sharpness, or otherwise, of 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Malaysia. 
The resurgent interest in ethnicity and the way in which 
scholars try to understand the salience of ethnicity in 
different societies have been influenced by the notion of an 
ethnic revival. The development of ethnic groups' 
consciousness and movements in many societies has produced 
what we may refer to as 'ethnic phenomena' to use Depres' 
term (1975). In the present world, ethnicity plays a central 
role in the politics of many societies. Ethnicity becomes 
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the basis either for national separatism or for political 
subordination. Ethnicity, Horowitz writes, 'is at the centre 
of politics in country after country, a potent source of 
challenges to the cohesion of states and of international 
tension' (1985: xi). Ethnic conflict is a world-wide 
phenomenon, with almost all the nations of today composed of 
multiethnic populations (Connor, 1978: 382; Wardhaugh, 
1987: 52). To put it rather differently, Wardhaugh says, 
'Fewer than 10 per cent of the states of the world are also 
nations if we insist that a nation be virtually monoethnic 
in composition' (1987: 52). The problem of, ethnicity has 
been looked upon primarily as an issue of the modern world 
(Smith, 1986). This does not at all mean that in the old 
world all societies were homogeneous. Even before the rise 
of modern nation-states since the 1500s, there have been 
multiple 'ethnic groups' in many societies, areas and 
civilisations. But what is rather new are certain types of 
states, and Malaysia being an example, which have become 
multiethnic societies because of their recent colonial past. 
In these societies, the problem of ethnicity has become more 
crucial. The political stability of many states has been 
weakened by the emergence and persistence of ethnic 
conflict. 
The increase in the salience of contemporary ethnic 
phenomena has its impact on the resurgent interest in the 
study of ethnicity (Yinger, 1976). It has even been referred 
to by Basham & DeGroot as 'an academic ethnicity industry' 
(1977: 423). This scholarly interest has prompted discussions 
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which challenge the existing theoretical premises of 
theories of class conflict, development, urbanisation, and 
modernisation (Burgess, 1978). These theories predicted that 
the importance people attach to ethnicity will eventually 
diminish. Marxists have argued that ethnic attachments would 
be replaced by class attachments (Anderson, 1983; 
Wallerstein, 1974)). Liberals arguments state that general 
value placed on the universalistic concept of the citizen, 
means it is important that all are regarded as free and 
equal citizens rather than as people belonging to one ethnic 
group. These theories suggest that as specific features of 
the modern world create new forms of consciousness and 
generate a need for the people to identify themselves with 
the symbols of a wider social system like class and 
citizenship, the ethnic attachment will be weakened. But, 
contrary to the notion of ethnic revival, few others feel 
that the revival of ethnicity is more of an exaggeration, or 
a created myth, rather than real. They have expressed 
disbelief, or doubted the genuineness of its emergence, its 
impact, and its ability to persist, with reference to 
advanced societies like America (Gans, 1979; Patterson, 
1979; Steinberg, 1981; Waters, 1990). Gans, for example, 
argues that the current importance attached to ethnicity by 
the White 'ethnic' in the United States is, in fact, no more 
than an increase in the ethnic visibility owing to the 
upward mobility that obtains among them. He sees the 
identification of Whites with an ethnicity as merely a 
'symbolic identification' with their ancestry. Waters (1990) 
sees the 'symbolic ethnicity' as an option available to a 
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group or individual to enjoy the traditions of one's 
heritage without any social costs associated with it. 
It is not easy to understand the rise and the persistence of 
ethnic conflict in different societies. Multiethnic 
societies differ in internal diversity, intensity of ethnic 
conflict and in their historical development. Laczko (1994) 
for example, in his comparative study shows that Canada, 
Belgium, Switzerland and the United States are a few 
exceptional cases of societies of higher level of pluralism 
in relation to their high level of socio-economic 
development. But on the other hand, he describes Canada as a 
country with more internal diversity than the United States. 
The intensity of ethnic problems in these advanced societies 
may also differ from that of the third world countries. 
Horowitz observed that ethnic divisions in Third World 
societies are more serious than in these of the western 
world (1985: 18). In many countries, Malaysia being one of 
them, ethnic divisions have become politically important but 
on the whole the situation in Malaysia is not violent 
compared to what obtains in some other societies in Asia and 
Africa where political violence is more common. Horowitz 
(1989) for example, compared the situation of serious ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka with the relatively harmonious inter- 
ethnic situation in Malaysia. Ethnic conflict has also 
increasingly become prominent in Western countries in recent 
years (Rattansi and Westwood, 1994). In former Yugoslavia, 
ethnic divisions have resulted in political conflict leading 
to all-out war and the atrocities that attend it. 
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This world-wide phenomenon and variations among societies 
made the application of the concept of ethnicity very 
ambiguous. As Glazer and Moynihan pointed out: 
The phenomenon seems everywhere to be encountered, but 
somehow, everywhere, also, varies. Does a single term 
(ethnicity) help? ' Some might even wonder as they 
continue, 'Would it not be better to separate the very 
different problems of old nations from those of the 
new? Of the developed world from those of the 
developing? Of heterogeneous empires from homogeneous 
nation-states? Are these not, in truth, age-old human 
characteristics and sentiments, expressing themselves, 
perhaps, in new settings, but in themselves nothing 
new? (1975: 2). 
Understanding the nature of ethnicity in these societies 
involves the interrelation of culture, history, politics and 
psychology. More importantly, social scientists may not be 
able to comprehend, nor to write comparatively about on a 
global scale, this phenomenon within a unified or universal 
theoretical framework. Although a few scholars have 
attempted to do so, one scholar admits that '... the scale 
of comparison is too ambitious, the unified theory is 
destined to continue to escape us, and the class of 
phenomena is highly elusive' (Fenton, 1987: 277). The 
differences that various societies experience in the 
intensity of ethnic divisions and conflicts, their changes 
and persistence over time, place and generations, have 
produced different views on the nature of ethnicity and the 




Ethnic attachment, according to one general argument, is 
seen as the way in which people are engaged in preserving 
some sense of Gemeinschaft (community) which has been lost 
in the rapidly changing modern, large and heterogeneous 
society (Parson, 1975: 68-69). As Yinger says, 'An ethnic 
attachment ... helps one to preserve some sense of 
community, to know who one is, to overcome the feeling of 
being a 'cipher' in anonymous world' (1981: 258). Van den 
Berghe (1978,1981) and Coon and Hunt (1965) present 
ethnicity as having a strong biological basis. Over the 
years, two main theoretical perspectives have emerged in the 
sociological attempt to understand and explain the problem 
of ethnicity, its emergence and persistence. These main 
theoretical debates have revolved around what has become to 
be referred to in sociology as the primordial and 
circumstantial or situational approaches. The first views 
ethnicity as a consequence of 'deep' division among men in 
history and experience, while the other tries to understand 
ethnicity as a consequence of 'specific and immediate 
circumstances' (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: 19-20). The 
primordial approach emphasises the organic nature of ethnic 
group, while the circumstantial approach emphasises the 
organisational or strategic nature of ethnicity. The 
following discussion will focus on these two main 
approaches, and not on the ongoing debate about the 
strengths and deficiencies of these approaches, or on the 
synthesising efforts by some scholars. The discussion will 
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instead focus on how these approaches have characterised the 
nature of ethnicity and ethnic identity in multiethnic 
societies of the modern world. It will also be looking at 
the ways in which these approaches will lead one to explain 
the salience of Malaysian ethnicity. 
The above competing claims of primordialist and 
circumstantialist can also have their ideological and 
policy-making ramifications. Within the structure of 
Malaysian pluralism, primordial ethnicity would stress 
ethnic group identity and sentiments as the core and 
persistent features of the Malaysians' everyday social and 
cultural lives. The circumstantial approach would emphasise 
the political mobilisation of ethnic group allegiance. This 
theoretical debate in some respect also reflects the 
controversy that has arisen over what should the identity of 
Malaysians be, that is, should the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians progress towards identifying themselves as 
Malaysians based on their political citizenship label and 
national loyalty, or should they continue to reinforce their 
separate ethnic identity? At one level, the government's aim 
is to develop national unity, national culture and national 
identity; but at the same time, the leaders of the ethnic 
groups also lay firm stress on the importance of ethnic 
group unity, identity and culture. At another level, the 
Malay political leadership of the Government is attempting 
to forge a national culture and national identity based on 
Malay culture and the Muslim religion, reflecting a strong 
tendency towards assimilationist view. But the non-Malays' 
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aspiration is to see Malaysia adopt the integration model 
rather than the assimilation model in forging Malaysian 
national identity. 
a. The Primordial Approach 
The term primordial, or primordial view of ethnicity, refers 
to a kind of core, strong, primary and emotional attachment 
in ethnic group ties. This is believed to be the underlying 
causes in much of the ethnic group solidarity, mobilisation, 
behaviour and identity. The power of primordial ties has 
been a major emphasis in the earlier observations and 
writings of some scholars on ethnicity (Geertz, 1963; 
Gordon, 1964; Greeley, 1971; Novak, 1972; Gambino, 1975; 
Isaac, 1975; Epstein, 1978). The bond of primordial 
ethnicity has been clearly reflected in the title of 
Gambino's writing as 'Blood of my blood ... ' and in Novak's 
as 'The rise of the unmeltable ethnics'. 
The quotation that defines primordial ethnicity and carries 
with it the idea of a powerful emotional link of 'my 
people', 'my ancestors' and 'my culture' was expressed by 
Clifford Geertz. He states, 
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from 
the 'givens'.. of social' existence: immediate 
contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them 
the givenness that stems from being born into a 
particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language... and following particular social practices. 
These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, 
are seen to have an ineffable and at times over- 
powering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is 
bound by one's kinsmen, one's neighbour, one's fellow 
believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of 
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personal affection, practical necessity, common 
interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in 
great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute 
import attributed to the very tie itself (1963: 259). 
Words like 'given of social existence', 'ineffable' and 
'coerciveness', used in the above quotation, when applied to 
the ethnic group, brings about the notion of ethnicity as an 
inevitable, permanent, unalterable and powerful nature of 
social identity. It is seen as beyond the control of 
individuals within the relatively closed organic group 
membership of people that is bound by similarity of origin 
in race, religion, or culture. 
This primordial approach indeed tries to apply the earlier 
primordial view of family attachment in understanding ethnic 
group solidarity, identity and behaviour. Ethnic groups are 
seen as a large-scale family or organic group, or as one 
which is founded upon or grounded in kinship ties. Edward 
Shils who introduced this primordial concept in 
understanding kinship groups writes: 
As one thought about the strength and tensions in 
family attachments, it became apparent that the 
attachment was not only to the other family member 
merely as a person but as a possessor of certain 
especially 'significant relational' qualities which 
could only be described as primordial. The attachment 
to another member of one's kinship group is not just a 
function of interaction. ... It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of 
blood (1957: 122). 
Primordialism, as one recent writer emphasises, refers to 
the belief about: (i) the significance of nativity (ii) the 
significance of the kinship and blood ties and (iii) the 
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creation and transmission of life (Grosby 1994: 164). These 
beliefs create the very primordial ties, the strong bond and 
attachment to the family and other larger groups in which 
the individual may share similarities in their physical 
appearance, cultural and religious values and practices. 
Harold Isaac, in developing the primordial view of the 
ethnic group, sees ethnic group identity as consisting of a 
ready-made set of endowments and identifications (legacies) 
which every individual shares with others from the moment of 
birth. These legacies in turn create a sense of belonging, 
self-esteem, self-acceptance and self-respect among group 
members (1975: 30-35). By viewing ethnic character as the 
first and basic source of social identification for an 
individual, primordiality, as Fishman explains, 'denotes 
both primacy, in sense of a presumably original essence, as 
well as primitivism or irreducibility ... ' (1977: 17). 
The primordial approach views the nature of ethnic group 
solidarity and membership as a show of strong and persistent 
emotional attachment to time and place. The emergence and 
the persistence of strong emotional ethnic ties, behaviour 
and identity among members are seen as unavoidable and 
unaffected by the social processes of development, 
modernisation and urbanisation. As Birch states, ethnic and 
local loyalties are enduring features of social life. No 
elaborate reasons are necessary to explain why people retain 
an attachment to their own ethnic group.... These attachments 
may be overlaid by an acquired loyalty to a wider society 
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and its political institutions, but the attachments remain' 
(quoted in Edwards, 1985: 195). This is because primordial 
ties are perceived as inherited 'ineffable affective 
significance' which according to this approach, bring the 
people to believe and to share, through socialisation, a 
distinctive common trait, common ancestry, and sometimes a 
common religious view of their cosmic destiny. 
For writers like Van den Berghe, the undiminishable 
primordial nature of ethnicity is viewed rather differently. 
He sees ethnic and race relations as an extension of the 
idiom of kinship and stresses the primordiality of ethnicity 
as 'blind ferocity' and 'orgies of passion'. His basic 
argument for the primordial nature of ethnic identity is 
derived rather from the socio-biological perspective which 
rests on the notion of biological or genetic origin of 
ethnicity to explain the in-group attachment and out-group 
conflict among ethnic groups (Van den Berghe, 1978; 1981). 
By contrast, the sociological view of the primordiality of 
ethnicity stresses, as Fishman puts it, the importance of 
'paternity... the recognition of putative biological 
origins.... A vast number of traits and behaviour have been 
taken to reflect the paternity aspect of ethnicity ... ' 
(1977: 17-18). Because of its central recognition of 
inherited visible traits and behaviour, the primordial 
definition of ethnicity could have been strongly influenced 
by the objective characteristics of ethnic groups based on 
linguistic, racial, geographical, religious and ancestral 
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ties. Nash called these 'the building blocks of ethnicity' 
(1989: 5). These in his view also include 'body, a 
biological component expressed as blood, genes, bone, flesh, 
or other common 'substance' shared among group members'. 
These objective ascriptive elements of ethnicity are 
perceived as something 'given' and inherited involuntarily 
through socialisation. Ethnic group membership is perceived 
as an involuntary identification which members of an ethnic 
group come to acquire through the common socialisation of 
cultural practices and kinship relationships. Because of the 
perceived link between ethnicity and kinship, early 
socialisation and primary group membership are stressed by 
primordialists as important elements in the development of 
various individuals' strong ethnic identity. It is important 
that we distinguish between family and blood ties as a fact 
of life and as a 'language' of ethnicity which picks up 
kinship metaphors as ideological appeal. 
Family kinship relationships and socialisation are real 
powers that exert influence on the individuals' life. 
Kinship relationship may be so extensive and meaningful that 
they come actually to constitute the social system itself. 
In the family, individuals learn their ethnic language, 
eating habits including the foods used, cultural and 
religious practices and taboos, and form relationships with 
others who are related through blood-ties and marriage 
within and outside their immediate family. All these are 
real family experiences that can reinforce a person's ethnic 
identity. This learning process can make a deep impression 
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and bring out the importance of their ethnic identity that 
will last long in their minds. Gordon called it an 
'inalienable ascription from cradle to grave, (which) 
becomes incorporated into the self' (1978: 73). However, the 
processes of socialisation which inculcate ethnic identity, 
and other ethnic sentiments, may themselves be modified, 
thus weakening the 'learning' by new generations of these 
deep-felt allegiances. 
'Language' of ethnicity is a different matter. Because of 
the view about the emotional ties and sentiments 
primordialists present in their conceptualisation of ethnic 
group solidarity, this approach has its ideological 
ramification. The approach possesses a subjective utility, 
an appealing power among people for finding self '... a 
home, with a past, a present, and a future transcending the 
fragile biological vessel that is its container', to quote 
Nash's phrase (1989: 4). Political leaders may use the 
kinship metaphor of 'primordial ethnicity' to mobilise 
ethnic group solidarity and struggle against other groups by 
relying on factors related to origin and sharing the same 
blood'. Thus, ethnicity differences are charged with emotion 
and infuses members with moral obligation. This may be an 
ideological appeal, nonetheless powerful of course, even 
though the 'real' ascriptive, cultural and socialisation 
basis are weakened. 
In general, it can be said that primordial attachments are 
more or less similar to the gemeinschaft- like sentiments and 
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relationship. Many scholars have argued about the importance 
of primordial sentiments in the persistence of ethnic 
diversity, tensions and conflicts, and the emergence of 
ethno-nationalism in many parts of the world. Connor, in 
trying to understand the world-wide phenomena of ethno- 
nationalism where movements among ethnic groups seeking 
redistribution of the power of the state or, in some cases, 
complete separation from the state, states that 'an 
intuitive bond' among people is more profound and potent 
than the ties that bind them to the formal and legalistic 
state structure (1978: 377). He believes that the core to 
ethno-psychology that promotes ethno-nationalism is a 
conviction that members of a nation are all ancestrally 
related (1993: 373). 
Clifford Geertz (1963) perceived primordial loyalties as the 
main cause of the failure in fostering national civil 
consciousness among the citizens of post-colonial societies, 
because loyalties of the people are bound by primordial 
loyalties based on kinship, race, region or culture. 
Geertz's views of primordial ties appear to refer 
particularly to the conditions in new societies that have 
emerged out of colonialism. One can suspect the influence of 
Furnivall's (1948) earlier idea of a multiethnic society on 
the view of Geertz and others on primordiality. Furnivall's 
pluralistic model of a multiethnic society emphasised the 
rigidity of institutional divisions among the people of 
different ethnic origin. Consequently, the concern of early 
scholars on the political integration of people of different 
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ethnic and racial origins in these new modern states was 
viewed mainly as a process of transforming parochial 
primordial loyalties based on ethnic, cultural and 
geographical origins to a new national consciousness within 
a wider central political system of new nations (Almond & 
Powel, 1966; Weiner, 1965). The primordial loyalties are 
looked upon as social influences that do not correspond with 
the new allegiance based on common citizenship. Geertz views 
the conflict as a contradiction between primordial 
sentiments and civil politics. He believes that although the 
conflict between these two forces in these societies can be 
reduced, it cannot be done away with completely(1963: 128). 
From the point of view of the primordial conception of 
ethnicity, it could be suggested that the ethnic identity, 
culture and religious allegiances of the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians in Malaysia are really bound into the very closely- 
knit and tightly organised and extended family life. A 
further question is, what are the 'building blocks' that 
would make one believe in the existence of primordial 
ethnicity among these groups? There are two reasons that 
could support the argument that in Malaysia there are ethnic 
groups who have powerful primordial ties. Firstly, these 
groups differ significantly in their cultural and religious 
values and practices. They regard themselves as possessors 
of a distinctive traditional culture, and to a large extent, 
this is shown in their religious beliefs. Each group, for 
example, realises the distinctiveness of its mother tongue 
which may encompass various dialects. They also use their 
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own ethnic language widely within their family and extended 
family circles and with other ethnic group peers. 
Other cultural and religious characteristics or symbols 
which may strengthen the view of primordial ethnic 
attachments include foods, traditional dress for certain 
occasions, and the festivals that they celebrate. All these 
are very visible forms of cultural and religious practices 
of Malaysian life. These same practices could enhance their 
ethnic group consciousness and identity, thus creating a 
strong urge to maintain their ethnic boundaries. In this 
regard, intermarrying outside one's ethnic group is rare in 
Malaysia. This endogamous norm becomes the most important 
measure which indicates that in Malaysia there are ethnic 
groups with strong primordial attachments. In describing the 
importance of these boundary-maintaining mechanisms in 
Malaysia Nash states, 
The boundary mechanisms of bed, board, and cult are a 
recursive metaphor underlying self-other in term of 
substance, behaviour, and belief.... they communicate, 
create, and constitute the socially important aspect of 
persons as members of collectivities thought to differ 
in human substance,.. in conduct,.. and in purpose and 
destiny.... All of this is socialized in individuals as 
a particularly precious heritage, as a personal 
identity, and in the conditions of con temporary 
Malaysia as somewhat in peril, in a state of siege 
against hegemonic cultural and religious others (1988: 
38-39). 
The second reason that helps account for the strong ethnic 
attachment among Malays, Chinese and Indians often surrounds 
the images of the ethnic groups' distinctive past. This 
provides a historical reason for their belief in the 
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primordial ties and distinctiveness of their ethnic origin. 
Malays, Chinese and Indians are regarded, both by themselves 
and others, to have a totally different descent. There are 
two factors that could strengthen this belief among the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians. First, they all came from 
different regions that are regarded as areas of different 
culture and civilisation. The Malays came from the Malay 
Archipelago, whereas the Chinese clearly came from China and 
the Indians from India and Sri Lanka. Second is their 
appearance. The three groups basically have distinct 
physical features. This supports their belief that they are 
born as Chinese, Indians and Malays, and will continue the 
distinctiveness of their ethnic origin and self-concept. The 
absence of some of the cultural and religious traits among 
individuals may not deny the persistence of their belief in 
the difference of descent. The Baba community, for example, 
who have adopted the Malay culture to a large extent, are 
still considered both by themselves and others as basically 
Chinese because of their Chinese descent (Clammer, 1975). 
All the above mentioned factors may enhance the sense of 
belonging of the Malays, Chinese and Indians to their 
respective groups and, the individual's self-identification 
which may be referred to as a primordial bond. But we cannot 
deny the importance of the structural and historical 
features of Malaysian society that play a major role in 
shaping the ethnic sentiments and identities of the Malays, 
Chinese and Indians. 
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As Glazer and Moynihan pointed out, '... in a world of rapid 
change and shifting identity, we tend to shy away from any 
fixed notion of the primordial, of basic ties and 
connections that create groups, as against any rational 
interest' (1975: 19). The primordial approach runs into 
difficulty in explaining the changes, how ethnic identity 
may be recovered or constructed after long periods of 
assimilation or acculturation, or lost altogether, as in the 
case of the Maltese in Britain (Dench, 1975). The inadequacy 
of the concept is evident in explaining socially constructed 
ethnic identity, and why people may want to abandon or 
become more conscious of their ethnic identities at 
different times or situations. Roosens, for example 
observed, 'There is more chance that the Flemish in 
Brussels, who always have to speak French, will become more 
'consciously' Flemish than their ethnic brothers and sisters 
in the rather isolated rural areas of West Flanders or 
Limburg' (Roosens, 1989: 12). If this is the case, then a 
more modernised section of the Malay, Chinese and Indian 
population who live in the metropolitan areas in Malaysia 
ought to have a higher degree of ethnic consciousness 
because of their frequent exposure and contact with one 
another. 
The primordialist view of ethnicity stresses human 
psychology and tries to explain ethnic group consciousness, 
conflicts and the behaviours of their individual members by 
stressing the strength of emotion and primordial 
attachments. The approach pays less attention to the 
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importance of different social circumstances where different 
ethnic groups come to interact. James McKay summarises, 'a 
primordial perspective is extremely useful for understanding 
the emotional basis of ethnicity and the tenacity of ethnic 
bonds. But because of its psychological reductionism, its 
inability to account for social change, and its disregard 
for political and economic influences, it fails to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical explanation of ethnic phenomena' 
(1982: 399). 
b. The Circumstantial Approach 
In different parts of world there are some ethnic groups who 
appear to display strong primordial tendencies. In McKay's 
term, such groups of people, whose identification is 
socially and culturally rooted in the symbols and primary 
relationships, may fall into what he refers to as 'ethnic 
traditionalists'. His examples include the Tunisian Jews in 
Israel, the Ukrainian Catholics in Australia, the Hutterite 
communities in North America, and minority groups like the 
Armenians, Assyrians, Copts, Kurds, Shiites, and the 
Lebanese Christians in the Middle East. (McKay, 1982: 403). 
On the other hand, there are many cases which demonstrate 
that the solidarity and identity of ethnic groups fluctuate 
depending on social contexts at that particular time, place, 
and generation. A few examples can be considered to verify 
this. 
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Today the native American Indians identify themselves 
politically as native American rather than with their tribal 
groups as Sioux, Navajo, Oneida, or Kwakiutl. This new 
emphasis on their native American identity is created in the 
context of their relationship to the dominant 'white' ethnic 
population (Yinger, 1981: 258). In Malaysia, the non-Malay 
Muslims of Chinese and Indian ethnic origins may play down 
their Chinese and Indian identities for the purpose of 
claiming equal rights with the Malays. They may align 
themselves with the interests of the Malays, or Muslims of 
the country, or even make demands from the government to 
recognise them officially, or more importantly, their 
children, as Malays or Bumiputra (The Star, 25.10.94; 
Nagata, 1978). The white people of European origin have also 
developed distinct identities in different parts of the 
world, for instance, as Afrikaners in South Africa and 
Pakeha in New Zealand. In other countries, like Malaysia and 
Fiji, Malay and Fijian identities have gained new political 
strength through the mobilisation of the ideology of 
indigenousness. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
and the Socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, 
ethnicity has emerged with unprecedented force among 
ethnically-based nations. Most importantly, the contextual 
character of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict has become 
strongly influential which is said to be due to the shifting 
of political conditions, or conflicting political interests 
among different cultural groups in the society (Horowitz, 
1985). 
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In many sociological works, the likely persistence of deep 
primordial ties has been viewed with suspicion by writers of 
both liberal and Marxist persuasions. The Marxists believed 
that local cultures and ethnic attachments would give way to 
wider and more embracing loyalties or interests with the 
strengthening of class consciousness. The liberals, with a 
few exceptions like Gellner (1983), believed that the 
granting of equal citizenship, rights and freedom of 
personal choice in modern states would play an important 
role in undermining loyalties and interests that are based 
on membership of a particular ethnic group. Thus, according 
to scholars like Schlesinger (1993), multiculturalism is 
viewed as enhancing ethnicity and, inconsistent with 
individual freedom, political democracy, and human rights of 
a liberal society like America. Gans, who sees ethnic 
'revival' in the United States as a kind of nostalgic 
expression, or 'symbolic ethnicity' as he calls it, believes 
that it will eventually fade in the society of future 
generations because no great deal of instrumental values 
would be attached to ethnicity (Gans, 1979). As he says, 
'... even if I am right to predict that symbolic ethnicity 
can persist into the fifth and sixth generations, I would be 
foolish to suggest that it is a permanent phenomenon' (1979: 
18). Much earlier, the melting pot theory also predicted 
that the acculturation and assimilation processes in modern 
societies, like the United States of America, will 
eventually absorb different ethnic groups into one larger 
society and culture. It is important to take note that while 
ethnic groups and ethnic nationalism, as Smith (1981) 
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pointed out, may have existed in one form or another since 
pre-idustrial times, the emergence of ethnicity as a 
powerful political force in many contemporary societies 
tends to indicate that the ethnic category-making processes 
are chiefly a modern phenomenon. Some scholars while 
agreeing on the importance of modernisation and the 
liberalisation processes in society, have regarded ethnicity 
and ethnic conflict as a direct or indirect consequence of 
modernisation and industrialisation (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 
1981). They rejected the view that ethnicity will diminish 
as rational universalistic norms take precedence over 
traditional particularistic ethnic norms. 
However, the main argument of the circumstantial approach 
that 'contradicts' the primordial approach's persistence of 
ethnic identity and solidarity, is the fluctuating and 
contextual nature of ethnic identity and solidarity. But 
both approaches are not necessarily to be viewed as 
advocating conflicting views about the nature of ethnicity. 
Ethnic ties and sentiments may be grounded in kinship life, 
but the circumstances in which they invoke or take on a 
wider significance is another question. 
It is quite reasonable to argue that ethnic identities are 
grounded in kinship. It has been discussed earlier that 
kinship and blood ties are tangible factors. If we take 
Malaysia for example, we can argue that those who identify 
themselves as Malays, Chinese or Indians do so because they 
are born to parents who are also Malays, Chinese or Indians. 
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Their ethnic origin as each of these is primordial in that 
sense, because it is part of the very basic fundamental 
ties. Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnicity in Malaysia partly 
survives because of the power of family ties in which the 
young child learns to speak its mother tongue, and assumes 
other cultural and religious traits. The child learns that 
his or her own identity as an individual is closely bound up 
with being Malay, Chinese or Indian. 
But at the same time, its ethnic consciousness and 
importance of its ethnic identity is also subject to 
fluctuating circumstances. The presence of the Chinese and 
Indians in Malaysia goes far back. Their arrival during the 
colonial period created different political and economical 
situations in which the importance of ethnic identity has 
taken on a significant role. It becomes even more important 
politically with the removal of British rule. Under the 
colonial regime, these ethnic groups were kept apart by and 
large in different economic sectors and regions. The British 
have avoided direct conflict between these ethnic groups by 
keeping them apart within the economy and society and with 
regards to access to political power. With decolonialisation 
and the granting of independence, different power relations 
between these groups came to exist. Under this new 
circumstance of Malay political hegemony, the ethnic 
divisions and consciousness and identity have been deeply 
felt. With the change of circumstances, the same primordial 
base of the Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnicities may have 
been provoked to take an important role in the lives of 
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Malaysians. As one scholar puts it, '... primordial 
sentiments have to be tied to the circumstances under which 
they are aroused or maintained... the circumstances in which 
this most often occurs is when the members of an ethnic 
group face opposition from another group on the basis of 
their ethnic, or ethno-religious, distinctiveness (Scott, 
1990: 167). 
Because of these very experiences of flexibility and 
fluctuation in the expressions of ethnic identity and group 
solidarity in many societies, the circumstantial approach 
has become more popular among social scientists (of Marxist 
and non-Marxist persuasions) of ethnic and racial studies, 
(e. g. Bell, 1975; Cohen, 1974a; Halsey, 1978; Hechter, 1974; 
Horowitz, 1975; Nagata, 1974; Olzak, 1982). As James Mckay 
stated, 'there has recently been a trend away from 
primordial explanations toward a more dynamic perspective 
which stresses change, contextuality, and competition among 
ethnic populations for scarce resources' (1982: 399). Or, 
for others like Burgess, this trend is viewed as 'a general 
rejection of traditional anthropological or sociological 
definitions of ethnic groups ... as being static, overly 
descriptive, or additive. The search is for more inclusive, 
dynamic, and analytically useful definitions' (1978: 265). 
Starting from Barth's observation of an ethnic group as a 
social vessel (1969), studies of the dynamic nature of 
ethnic group boundaries and identities have suggested that 
these boundaries and identities can be soft, malleable, 
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permeable, shifting and dissolved. Ethnicity may be acquired 
or divested depending on the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of ethnic identity as an instrument in the 
defence of social, economic and political interests. Its 
very nature is looked upon rather as a strategic choice of 
behaviour to pursue material, or some other social 
interests, individually or collectively as a group. This, 
however, need not be seen as a straight choice between 
viewing ethnic identity as primordial or purely strategic. 
Both primordial and circumstantial approaches are only 
different ways in which sociologists try to understand the 
same problem (ethnicity). One emphasises the way in which 
ethnicity may have been grounded in family life and, the 
other emphasises the way in which ethnicity may take greater 
importance, or otherwise. 
As demonstrated in many writings, and through case studies 
(e. g. Barth, 1969; Isajiws, 1970; Nagata, 1974; Patterson, 
1975; Roosens, 1989), much attention has been given to the 
subjective and situational definition of ethnic belonging. 
The manipulation of cultural or ritual symbols in the 
expression of ethnic feelings and behaviour has been 
stressed. As Barth observed, 'It is important to recognise 
that although ethnic categories take cultural differences 
into account, we can assume no simple one-to-one 
relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities 
and differences. The features taken into account are not the 
sum of 'objective' differences, but only those which the 
actors themselves regard as significant. ... some cultural 
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features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of 
differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships 
radical differences are played down and denied' (1969: 14). 
In some circumstances and societies, ethnic identity will be 
assigned an important and comprehensive role, yet in others 
it may not be given importance but rather assigned a limited 
value, if not ignored altogether. 
A good example in recent times to . comprehend the recovering 
and intensification of ethnic identity, mobilisation and 
consequently interethnic conflict, is the situation in 
former Yugoslavia. Here, with the collapse of central 
Communist power in this region, the new situation prompted 
political manipulation and organisation of new strength in 
ethnic group consciousness and conflict between the Bosnian 
Serbs and Muslims. Although the ethnic divisions between 
these groups may be an old one, it never emerged as a 
salient force, or resulted in any form of aggression or 
ethnic cleansing under the previous state of Yugoslavia. In 
portraying the contextual and changing nature of ethnicity, 
the circumstantial approach emphasises ethnicity as a 
variable that depends both on the structural conditions 
which may suppress or actuate ethnicity, and the 
individuals' ability or wish to express it as one of their 
cognitive choices and strategies (Okamura, 1981). 
Presently, similar to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
many ethnic conflicts are obviously related in one way or 
another to the defence of social, cultural, and more 
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importantly, economic and political or territorial 
interests. In such situations, the affirmation of ethnic 
identity and the mobilising efforts of ethnic group 
solidarity has become a very important organisational aspect 
of social grouping, rather than disregarding the importance 
of ethnicity. It has been an appropriate and effective 
instrument in applying pressure in the defence of various 
interests. Its strategic strength in such instances lies in 
the positive self-image that ethnic identity can create for 
individuals in the struggle for these interests. In 
comparing it with the class strategy, Roosens says, 
In a world where a reevaluation of 'oppressed' cultures 
is in vogue in many circles, this (ethnicity) is a way 
of self-valorization that cannot be achieved by 
considering oneself, for example, a member of the 
working class or the lower middle class.... The class 
division is vertical and is thus a hierarchical 
division of groups of people; the ethnic division is 
horizontal, and it creates equivalencies rather than 
hierarchies. ... politicians can hardly say no to an 
ethnic group without running the risk of being branded 
as racists. ... Militant ethnic groups can thus be 
considered pressure groups with a noble face ... (1989: 14). 
The strategic conception of ethnicity clearly stresses the 
'mobilisation', and 'organisational' aspects of ethnicity. 
By doing so, the circumstantial approach has evidently 
shifted away from the notion of affective desire for a 
primordial type of ethnic identity to a conception of 
strategic choice of ethnic affiliation or allegiance. The 
circumstantialist arguments have clearly taken into 
consideration two fundamental realities. First, the 
circumstantial approach recognises individuals as having 
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more than one social identity, or attachment, in order to 
cope with the various roles that they may have to play in 
different social circumstances. He or she may belong to 
several social categories, networks, associations, and 
groups based on age, gender, locality, family, profession, 
class, political and religious organisations, ethnic and 
racial groups. 
Ethnicity, as such, is seen only as one particular form of 
collective identity. Its very development as one of the 
collective social identities is argued to be of a 
consequence of social interaction between groups. 
Individuals of either sex may have an early exclusive ethnic 
identification with their own ancestral community. Yet in 
their subsequent interactions and transactions in a more 
heterogeneous social world which includes members of other 
groups, the need for dual or multiple identities develop. 
These identities may be overlapping or conflicting, 
depending upon the roles they play, the individual 
preference and the ability to express any particular social 
identity in a given social context. The plurality of social 
identities forces one to attach different values to 
different social identities in varying social situations, 
and consequently, influence the individuals' choice of group 
allegiance. 
The second reality on which the circumstantial view bases 
its argument is the relationship between structural 
conditions of inequalities and ethnic resources mobilizing 
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the acts of man. Man is seen as an active mobilizer of 
ethnic features and symbols in the pursuit of power, 
economy, status and upward mobility in society. It comes as 
no surprise to learn that the circumstantialist view of 
ethnicity is also referred to as the 'mobilisationist' 
perspective (McKay, 1982). Ethnic identity and group 
mobilisation are basically seen as resource mobilisation 
strategies; this is mobilisation of ethnicity as an 
effective instrument in the competition for power, status, 
and economic benefits as well as for the survival of ethnic 
group culture. Mobilisation of ethnicity refers to the 
process by which the solidarity of the group is organised 
based on some feature of ethnic identity (skin, language, 
customs) in the pursuit of ethnic group interests (Olzak, 
1983: 355). Glazer and Moynihan call it the 'strategic 
efficacy of ethnicity' (1975: 11). Similarly, James McKay 
stresses, 'renewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the 
result of any primordial need to belong, but are due to the 
conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing 
ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, 
political and material resources' (1982: 399). 
In the case of contemporary Malaysia, the mobilisation of 
ethnicity has also been institutionalised to a greater 
extent in the political structure . The factor that made the 
persistence and the salience of ethnicity important in 
Malaysia is the very constitutional definition of Malay 
ethnicity. This official definition has created a strong 
division in society between the Malays and non-Malays. 
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Because the constitutional definition of Malays itself was 
created as a political device to protect the Malays' special 
rights and their political hegemony, the political 
mobilisation of ethnicity in the society has been structured 
and enhanced politically. As has already been discussed in 
Chapter 1, the public policies which have been formulated in 
accordance with the Malays' constitutional special right 
have further reinforced the divisions and mobilisation of 
ethnic group consciousness and identity in Malaysia. 
We should realise that the mobilisation of ethnic identity 
is not necessarily confined to political and economic 
interests alone. Some scholars strongly argue that ethnicity 
simultaneously serves both political interests and 
psychological desires for belongingness and meaning in life 
(Bell, 1975; Cohen, 1974b). As Bell notes, 'ethnicity has 
become more salient because it can combine an interest (of 
circumstance) with an affective tie.... for values of the 
society to be realized politically... '(1975: 169). Michael 
Banton pointed out that, 'there are remarkable variations in 
the extent to which groups use their resources to build up 
their collective power' (1987: 135). 
So far the sociological debate between the primordial and 
circumstantial views of ethnicity has been discussed. The 
different emphasis of the primordial and circumstantial 
approaches on the nature of ethnic solidarity and membership 
- one on persistence and emotional psychological content, 
and the other on fluctuation and social organisation of 
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ethnicity - may be viewed by some scholars as reconcilable. 
Some efforts exist in synthesising both these approaches 
(Mckay, 1982; Scott, 1990). There are different dimensions 
and meanings that both the primordial and circumstantial 
approaches offer in understanding the very nature of 
ethnicity. Both approaches indicate that ethnicity not only 
involves a number of interrelated variables (psychological 
and circumstance), but also indicate the way in which 
ethnicity may be mobilised and expressed at different levels 
(individual and societal). 
Methodological Implication 
The circumstantial approach, in contrast to the primordial 
approach, suggests that ethnic group awareness and 
identification are conscious, voluntary, calculated and 
goal- oriented behaviours on the part of ethnic group 
members. Since the expression of ethnicity is implicitly 
viewed in the circumstantial approach as a rational act, and 
voluntary in nature, some other scholars have also focused 
on the 'rational' action of individuals in their study of 
ethnicity. The issue that particularly interests them is how 
ethnic members as actors in society will solve the 
conflicting identities and interests. These social interests 
and identities arise as a result of the individuals' group 
attachments based on class, religious, sexual, ethnic, 
national and regional differences. The way in which 
individuals choose to act motivated by certain interests may 
coincide with or contradict one or the other in any 
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particular social context. This has been given priority in 
the methodological framework of some scholars in their 
attempt to explain the dynamics of ethnic identity and 
behaviour. 
By giving priority to the individual's preference for 
different interests and identities, and the changing nature 
of social contexts in which individuals participate, a 
different type of argument and method of assessing the 
salience of ethnicity in a society has been advocated within 
the circumstantial approach. This has resulted in the 
anascopic view of ethnicity. The method has been referred to 
as methodological individualism, or actor model to 
differentiate it from the catascopic view which emphasises 
methodological collectivism, or observer model (Banton, 
1994; Birnbaum and Leca, 1990). Generally, those in favour 
of methodological individualism argue that an individual's 
behaviour is goal-oriented and a calculated one, capable of 
making rational choices based on availability, subjective 
value and marginal utility of actions as a means to an end 
(Banton, 1983; Blau, 1964; Heath, 1976). In studies like 
Laitin's (1992), the same argument of maximizing goal or 
pay-off through rational calculation is founded in the Game 
theory. 
According to the anascopic view, ethnic behaviour, identity, 
solidarity and survival depend on the individuals' own 
choice of whether to act according to his or her ethnic 
sentiments or on other social and personal self interests. 
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In accordance with the situational definition and individual 
choice of ethnicity, Michael Banton has developed a new 
theoretical approach which he calls the 'Rational Choice 
Theory' of race and ethnic relations. The autonomy of 
individual members in a society to align ethnically, or 
otherwise, as stressed by the Rational Choice Theory, is 
seen as a consequence of their own choice of actions based 
either on ethnic sentiments, or other personal and social 
interests. The 'rational choice theory' which is founded on 
contextual, circumstantial approach, need not be seen as an 
essential methodological strategy to the circumstantial 
approach. But it offers a new way of conceptualising and 
studying ethnicity. 
Rational Choice Theory and its Application in Malaysia 
In formulating the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), Michael 
Banton first wrote his article on ethnic groups, and the 
theory of rational choice for the UNESCO book (1980: 475- 
499), and later in two of his books (1983; 1987) with an 
extensive explanation and clarification of this theory. 
Since coming to the arena of discussion, this theory has not 
only been associated or grouped with other related 
theoretical arguments (Blau, 1964; Heath, 1976; Hechter, 
1982; Rabushka, 1974), but its potentiality for analysing 
racial and ethnic relations has also been open to criticism 
(For eg. see special issue published on 'Rational Choice 
Revisited' in the Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 
8 (4), 1985). To note some comments, the review article by 
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Chivers on the discussions by various writers on Banton's 
Rational Choice Theory states, 'none of the papers goes as 
far as total rejection of r. c. t. .... There is some feeling 
that the approach has potential and desire to see it 
clarified. Equally ... there is doubt. So much that requires 
explanation in action falls outside Banton's theory, while 
even where his r. c. t. might claim to be applicable, the 
influence of less than rational forces seems unintegrated in 
the analysis' (1985: 470). 
Generally, the idea of rational choice can be seen as an 
approach which tries to apply the economists' simplistic 
notions of gain and loss as basic motivations for much of 
human behaviour, including the sphere of ethnic relations. 
Banton argues that ethnic group (or identity), its creation, 
maintenance and dissolution, as any other group, can be 
understood only through the responses of individuals. This 
according to him can only be properly assessed through the 
framework of methodological individualism to measure the 
aggregate tendency for ethnic alignment, as it can be done 
in examining the aggregate demand for labour, profit, 
attitudes, strikes, elections, etc. (1991; 1994). 
The recent research by Mansor (1992) shows how the idea of 
individuals' rational behaviour can be used as a model in 
studying ethnic alignment. He used the model to investigate 
the relative strength of Malay ethnic alignment in Malaysia. 
In an article consequently published in 1992, Banton and 
Mansor (and in another article by Banton in 1994) maintained 
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the individualistic approach that Mansor deployed in his 
study to offer a new technique to measure empirically the 
strength of ethnic alignment in a multiethnic society like 
Malaysia. 
The key statement which is an important ingredient for an 
actor model in RCT and which forms the basic tool in the 
study, is 'individuals act so as to maximise their 
advantage' (Banton, 1983: 104-109; 1987: 121-127). They 
ascertain in the above article that, 'Ethnic boundaries do 
not maintain themselves. It is the actions of individuals in 
choosing whether or not to align themselves with others of 
similar ethnic origin that strengthens, maintains, or 
weakens ethnic boundaries. Sometimes individuals feel that 
they have no real alternatives but to align themselves in a 
particular way, but there is still an act of will on their 
part.... Changes in alignment came about as a result of 
individual choices. The individual has to assess whether he 
or she can best attain his or her ends by aligning with 
others.... they can sometimes be pursued best by aligning 
with others with whom ends are shared, but that on occasion 
their pursuit requires the individual to weigh the benefits 
of self-interested action relative to the costs of deviating 
from the expectations of the peer group, (1992; 599,601). 
However, it is rather a different view that Daniel Bell 
observed much earlier. He says, 'A 'pure' market economy is 
one where demands (purchases) are made by individuals acting 
independently of each other, and where the responses by the 
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producers of goods and services are an aggregate of 
multiple, competitive supply decisions at relative prices. 
... A market is dispersed, and the actors largely 
'invisible'. In politics, decisions are made in a cockpit, 
and confrontation is direct. Inevitably, therefore, the 
spread of political decision-making forces the organization 
of peoples into communal and interest groups, defensively to 
protect the places and privileges, ... '(1975: 144-145). As 
Jenkins sees it, the influences of power and authority that 
are beyond the individual's level, or sphere of control also 
play a role as important practical forces of external 
definition in the production of ethnic identity in any 
society (1994). 
As a newly-proposed general theory of race and ethnic 
relations, one might be doubtful about the potentiality of 
RCT and wait and see its future development. One may want 
to know in what sort of situations, or levels of interethnic 
relations the theory might give a better explanation than 
the others. This is crucial because, as Jenkins sees it, 'in 
the practical accomplishment of (ethnic) identity, two 
mutually interdependent but theoretically distinct social 
processes are at work; internal definition (at lower level 
of individual choice) and external definition (at the higher 
level of power determinant). These operate in different ways 
at the individual, interactional and collective levels' 
(1994: 218). 
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Nevertheless, Mansor's study in Malaysia does represent an 
early attempt to employ RCT to derive useful concepts and 
working variables to study empirically individual ethnic 
preference in relation to other interests. Through the 
framework of the individualist approach of RCT, concepts 
that represent norms, values, or interest, and situations 
that represent value conflict have been devised to assess 
the relative strength as well as the patterns of individual 
ethnic preference in different social contexts of everyday 
life in Malaysia. In this present study, a similar technique 
of conceptualisation of rational choice 'ethnicity' in the 
situations of value conflict in different hypothetical 
social contexts in Malaysia will again be put to the test. 
In addition to replicating Mansor's study, this thesis also 
attempts to develop a critique of rational choice theory. 
This critique will locate the data within the wider 
Malaysian society and make use of another type of 
theoretical approach. In this, the idea of different levels 
of ethnic relationships will be outlined and explored. This 
means that this study, while taking into account the micro 
level exprience of ethnicity where people may make ethnic 
preference choices in their everyday interethnic 
interaction, goes beyond it to consider the entrenchment of 





In this chapter, the formulation and clarification of 
research objectives, the characteristics of the respondents 
chosen for the study, the method of sampling and data 
collection, the definition and operationalisation of 
concepts and tools of measurement will be described. The 
present study is a replication of Mansor's earlier study in 
assessing the strength of ethnic alignment of the Malays in 
particular and in Malaysia in general, and has employed the 
same sort of questions as were used in Mansor's to measure 
the strength of Malaysian Chinese ethnicity. These questions 
were used as a tool to measure the relative strength of 
ethnicity in comparison with other interests, in particular 
that of material and status self-interests and personal 
obligation. 
The core of the present questionnaire survey is the 
hypothetical questions concerning an 'ethnic representative 
actor'. These hypothetical questions described some possible 
social interethnic situations of Malaysian life; they were 
designed according to the rational choice principle 
embracing an individualistic approach to ethnicity. Ethnic 
identity is studied as a matter of choice that individuals 
in a society may, or may not, choose depending on how they 
perceive its utility compared to other available interests. 
The study deployed a research technique which depends upon 
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the subject's prediction of how an ethnic representative 
actor will act in various hypothetical situations of value 
conflict. This technique, according to Banton and Mansor, 
offers a new method in studying the salience of ethnicity in 
a society like Malaysia (1992). 
Firstly, the application of the technique and question will 
be presented as it is defined in Mansor's study. Being a 
second study, some critical assessment of the technique and 
its theoretical assumptions has become essential. This is 
vital to assess the effectiveness of the individualistic 
approach and the hypothetical questions employed in both 
Mansor's and present studies, in measuring and understanding 
the way in which people might express their ethnicity in 
Malaysia. One would be able the assess the strength and 
weakness of methodological individualism in measuring and 
understanding the relative importance of ethnicity and 
ethnic conflict in Malaysia by looking at the way in which 
Malaysians are believed to express their choice of ethnic 
preference at the individual level. 
Prediction Technique and Focus of Study 
Focusing on the way in which members of the society make 
sense of particular social situations to understand human 
society is not a new perspective in sociological analysis. 
The theory of symbolic interactionism, for example, has 
emphasised the very same principle. Ethnicity has both 
objective and subjective attributes. The methodological 
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importance of the subjective definition of ethnicity is that 
it emphasises the way in which people think of the 
importance of their own ethnic identity, as well as that of 
others, in their relation with others in different social 
contexts. The 'social distance' studies, for example, have 
concentrated in these areas of race and ethnic relations 
with the aim of investigating the possible behaviour of 
interethnic association or dissociation from the way in 
which people may perceive their social distance from others. 
This individualistic approach is trying to look at the way 
in which members of ethnic groups may choose, or prefer not 
to, act in relation to others in terms of their own ethnic 
identity and their perception of the social distance from 
other ethnic groups. 
The basic theoretical assumption on which Mansor's and the 
present research method was based is that individuals are 
believed to make rational choices based on one of a range of 
interests, including the choice of ethnic preference. 
Theories, mainly those drawing upon economic reasons for 
human behaviour, have been most explicit about this. As 
Banton conceives, in polyethnic societies like Malaysia, it 
is possible to talk about interaction between ethnic members 
as a competitive exchange in market-like situations that 
require individuals to make a choice between alternative 
values or interests to determine the behaviour which will 
relatively benefit them most (1987: 121-127). As Banton and 
Mansor stress, 'The rational choice theory of racial and 
ethnic relations presupposed that individuals act so as to 
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obtain maximum net advantage.... It is a general theory of 
aggregate behaviour which tries to ascertain the costs and 
benefits of choices between available alternatives, and 
presumes that over time people will favour the kinds of 
choice which produce optimal results' (1992: 601-2). 
The way in which people think, believe or perceive 
themselves or others, however, may not necessarily be 
consistent with their own action, although there may exist a 
strong correlation between attitudes and actions in some 
instances. The discrepancy, as one observer pointed out, 'We 
still do not know much about the relationship between what 
people say and what they do - attitudes and behaviour, 
sentiments and acts, verbalisations and interactions, words 
and deeds' (Deutscher, 1966: 242). This, as such, can well 
be the dilemma for the subjects when they are asked to 
indicate their own ethnic alignment. 
To increase the consistency between the subjects' attitudes 
and the prediction of actions they may take, some measures 
of improvement in the technique of data-collection is 
essential. This can be done by not directly asking them to 
indicate their preferred choice of action, but by using the 
indirect method of others' predictions of the behaviour of 
an 'ethnic representative actor'. This is the technique 
employed in Mansor's and the present study. In this 
technique, the respondents chosen for the study will not be 
asked to indicate or provide any information on their own 
individual ethnic preferences in the various social 
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situations presented. Instead they will be asked to predict 
the possible action that an imagined ethnic representative 
will choose to perform in different hypothetical social 
situations (Banton and Mansor, 1992: 599-601). The technique 
invites subjects to make an estimation of how another person 
might behave in certain given situations. This technique 
possibly will lessen the constraints on the minds of the 
subjects in deciding and displaying what they may believe is 
their preferred action in certain interethnic situations. As 
Banton and Mansor claim, "this technique has some advantages 
over the other because it makes less 'demand upon the 
subjects' imagination and it increases the range of 
situation that can be included in the study" (1992: 600). 
By asking subjects to predict the reactions of the ethnic 
representative actor, they could well be demonstrating 
indirectly their own attitudes and possible choice of action 
in various circumstances. This may vary in a number of ways. 
Thus, a subject may predict a particular choice of action 
for fellow ethnic members, or for their 'ethnic 
representative actor', because they themselves may act in 
such a manner in the given circumstances. This is possible 
because an individual will take into consideration his or 
her own attitudes and sentiments as well as their belief in 
how their peers would evaluate their behaviour. The 
possibility of the subjects projecting how they themselves 
will act in these hypothetical circumstances can happen only 
as far as the prediction of own ethnic group members are 
concerned. In this study which concerns Malaysian Chinese 
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ethnicity, both the Chinese and Malay subjects' views of 
Chinese ethnicity will be assessed. This means only the 
Chinese subjects can respond on ethnic basis but the Malay 
subjects may also respond personally on the basis of other 
factors. such class, work and gender. 
In this study, the Chinese and the Malay subjects were asked 
to predict how an imagined Malaysian Chinese ethnic 
representative actor would act in various hypothetical, but 
possible, social situations of value conflict. The 
hypothetical situations of value conflict in which an 
imagined Chinese ethnic representative is involved will be 
clarified in the section under operationalisation. For the 
ethnic representative actor in this study, an imagined 
person named Tan Seng Seng has been introduced to represent 
the Chinese in Malaysia. Like the ethnic representative in 
Mansor's study (Husin Ali), Tan Seng Seng is presented to 
the subjects as a clerk attached to a multinational 
engineering firm. Among the Malaysians, particularly in 
relation to interaction between the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians, proper names of these individuals are in themselves 
a reliable indication of their ethnic origin. People in 
Malaysia will be able to tell without any doubt whether a 
person is of Chinese, Malay, or Indian origin just by the 
sound of his name. A person's proper name symbolises ethnic 
identity, and as such can invoke different expectations from 
one's own and other ethnic group members of how an 'ethnic' 
person would act in a particular social circumstance. The 
expectation of ethnic role behaviour may also include the 
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act of ethnic preference. This act may be culturally and 
politically defined and expected from a member of a 
particular ethnic group. This act of ethnic preference, or 
alignment, could indicate the presence of ethnic sentiments 
and attachment, and its salience in the society. Politically 
this is a pervasive fact in Malaysian society. A person with 
a Chinese, Malay, or Indian name would be expected 
generally, for example, during the general, or by-elections, 
to show a more favourable attitude of 'ethnic loyalty' by 
choosing his own ethnic candidate in preference to others. 
The expectation of the act of ethnic preference could also 
be reinforced by the religious background of a person. In 
Mansor's study, the 'ethnic representative' actor's name 
Husin Ali, not only indicates his Malay ethnicity but also 
his Muslim religious identity. In a similar way, the name 
Tan Seng in the present study not only indicates Chinese 
ethnicity but also indicates his religious identity as a 
non-Muslim and a non-Christian Chinese. He would be instead 
identified as belonging to the mainstream of the Malaysian 
Chinese, whose traditional religious belief encompasses the 
element of beliefs and practices of Buddhism, Taoism, 
Confucianism and ancestral worship. A point of clarification 
has to be made here: if a Chinese person converts to Islam, 
he or she normally will adopt a Malay-Muslim name either 
totally (eg. Razali bin Abdullah for a male, or Hafsah binti 
Abdullah for a female), or partially (eg. Mohd. Lee 
Abdullah). Abdullah, as we can see in the examples, will be 
the common ending in their names to indicate, or to stress 
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their new Muslim identity. If a Chinese is a Christian, then 
their Chinese name will normally be preceded by an English- 
Christian name, if not totally, in most cases (eg. Raymond 
Lee Ong Seng or Wendy Ong Siew Gaik). The name Tan Seng Seng 
as such is relevant to indicate a 'mainstream' Chinese 
Malaysian. 
Objectives 
This study covers both wider general and specific 
objectives. From a wider perspective, the focus of the 
present study on the Chinese ethnic alignment would, as a 
consequence, be related to, and form a wider general 
objective for this study. This wider objective is to 
understand trends and factors that may have strengthened, or 
otherwise, Malaysians' ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the 
society since independence. This objective is relevant to 
this study because one may argue that the 'building blocks 
of ethnicity', as Nash (1988) sees it, between the major 
ethnic groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians - in Malaysia 
have become hardened in the historical process of the modern 
Malaysian state. In this context of general objective, as 
mentioned earlier, this study would be able to assess the 
suitability or the extent of the individualistic approach 
employed in this study to investigate and tell one about the 
sharpness, or otherwise, of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia. 
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Second, the specific aims of this study that related to the 
wider objective are as follows: 
To assess the strength of Chinese ethnic 
preference or alignment in Malaysia in relation to 
other interests, in particular to self-interests 
of material and status kinds, and of personal 
obligations. Ethnic preference will be posed as an 
alternative to the material and status self- 
interests and personal obligation, or vice verse. 
[The other two following objectives are related to 
this objective in the sense that it shows the way 
in which this will be measured and counter- 
checked]. 
(ii) To compare and analyse the 
Chinese ethnic members and 
believe an imagined Chinese 
act in different situations 
ethnic preference seem to 
self-interests of material 
personal obligation. 
way in which his own 
Malay ethnic members 
person will choose to 
where the choices of 
be in conflict with 
and status kind and 
(iii) Assessment of relative strength of ethnic 
preference at the interpersonal level, as 
undertaken in this study, cannot be understood 
without reference to developments in the wider 
social systems that have a direct impact on the 
experiences and attitudes of the people. These 
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macro-level processes cannot be ignored as they 
may strengthen or weaken the importance of 
ethnicity, and consequently, ethnic conflict in 
the society and affect the way in which people may 
express their ethnic identity, or sentiments at 
the face to face personal level of interaction. 
For this purpose, we will also investigate in this 
study the strength of similarities and differences 
between the Chinese and Malay subjects in the 
usage of language, interethnic contact and their 
political attitudes concerning some important 
social issues and problems in the society. By 
looking at the subjects' own experiences and 
social and political attitudes, we will be able to 
counter-check the validity of the results from the 
survey based on the hypothetical questions and the 
ethnic representative. 
Operationalisation of Concepts and Measurements 
(i) Situations of Value Conflict and The Choice of Ethnic 
Preference 
The choice of ethnic preference and situations of value 
conflict are two of the most important concepts which have 
to be understood clearly. Both respectively indicate the 
way in which the act of ethnic alignment is measured and 
interpreted from the choices subjects make. Situations of 
value conflict in general can be referred to specific social 
contexts of interethnic situations where interests of ethnic 
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preference are in competition with other interests as 
factors that will determine the type of action a person 
might take in a particular social situation. In this 
particular survey research, however, other interests that 
are taken into consideration for observation are limited to 
self-interests of material and status kinds and personal 
obligations. In the present study, these situations of value 
conflict are hypothetically constructed based on possible 
social interethnic interactions that might occur in the 
Malaysian scene. 
The situations of value conflict as posed to the subjects in 
this study do occur in the course of everyday life. 
Situations where ethnic preference and other considerations 
are in competition can be considered as part of interethnic 
interactions in a polyethnic society like Malaysia. The 
assumption that ethnic influences could be challenged in 
some social situations cannot be totally rejected. The 
importance individuals attach to ethnic preference may vary 
from situation to situation depending on the nature of 
matters in each social context. In this survey, various 
possible social contexts have been included to enable us to 
observe the consistency, or variability in the pattern of 
the choices the subjects make in different situations. This 
is vital in order to derive a meaningful conclusion about 
the relative importance of ethnicity to the Chinese in 
Malaysia. 
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Different symbols have been selected to represent choices of 
ethnic preference presumed to be in conflict with other 
interests in different social situations. These concepts 
have, as mentioned earlier, been derived from the general 
theory of rational choice in ethnic relations, that is that 
alignment with an ethnic group is something which is a 
rationally chosen, alternative alignment. Ethnic preference, 
and alignment are seen as patterns of behaviour resulting 
from the actions of individuals who constantly seek 
alternative actions that will benefit them most. An act of 
ethnic preference, as it is conceived here, can be seen as a 
reaction to ethnic symbols that are designed as stimuli to 
indicate whether or not an individual's behaviour would be 
influenced by ethnic interests, sentiments, loyalty, or even 
ethnic prejudice. However, in Mansor's study the term 
'ethnic loyalty' was used to represent the influence of 
particularistic ethnic norms against the influences of 
universalistic norms that were represented by material and 
status self-interests and personal obligations. While 
'ethnic loyalty' is a value in its own right, in Mansor's 
study this influence has been posed as a non-material 
interest. But in reality, the showing of ethnic solidarity 
and other acts of ethnic preference can also be 'material' 
if such acts are considered by individuals as vital in 
their interethnic interaction. 
This preference comparison between two or more conflicting 
values to measure the strength of ethnic alignment is 
possible only if specific social situations of value 
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conflict can be identified. Thus, ethnicity in this research 
is defined and measured in the social contexts of value 
conflict where ethnic preference is believed to be in 
competition with other interests. It is important to 
understand that in reality ethnic preference is not 
necessarily a matter that will always be in conflict with 
other interests. In the present survey, as one already 
knows, these situations of value conflicts were presented to 
subjects through different hypothetical social scenarios. 
From the observer's interpretation, these hypothetical 
situations appear to pose such a conflict. This gives rise 
to the issue of validity of measurement and this will be 
clarified later. 
The theoretical assumption of rational choice behaviour 
forms the basis of the operationalisation of different 
hypothetical social situations. In Mansor's study, these 
hypothetical situations in which an imagined Malay person 
and his family members are involved, were formulated to 
represent everyday social interethnic interactions between 
the Malays and other ethnic group members in Malaysia. These 
hypothetical social situations were replicated with some 
small modifications to suit the objective of the present 
study so as to measure the strength of Malaysian Chinese 
ethnic alignment. They were created for an imagined Chinese 
person and his family members to represent the interethnic 
experiences of the Malaysian Chinese with other ethnic 
members. A few additional hypothetical situations of value 
conflict have been included to strengthen the observation. 
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v 
Four categories of hypothetical situations of value conflict 
have been formulated. These are as follows: 
(a) situations of ethnic preference versus self-interest of 
material kind 
(b) situations of ethnic' preference versus self-interest of 
status kind 
(c) situations of ethnic preference versus personal 
obligation 
(d) situations of ethnic preference versus religious 
obligation 
Figure 3.1 OPERATIONALISATION 
DYNAMIC OF ETHNIC ALIGNMENT 
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(ii) Questions, Choices and Interpretations 
Each of the above social contexts of value conflict was 
operationalised further in the form of observable 
hypothetical social situations. These are the plausible 
realistic everyday interethnic interactions which may be 
faced by Malaysian Chinese individuals like Tan Seng Seng. 
The subjects were presented with these situations in a 
multiple choice questionnaire of possible actions from which 
Tan Seng Seng and his family members could choose. These 
choices are taken to represent different values, norms or 
interests, including ethnic preference. The subjects were 
asked to predict what the imagined representative's ethnic 
preference would be over other values in those various 
situations. This is presumed to indicate whether or not he 
will be influenced by ethnic sentiments in these situations 
by aligning himself with a fellow ethnic, or with an act 
that will possibly support, or be consistent with his ethnic 
interest, prejudice, and sentiments. Such inclinations were 
interpreted as acts of ethnic preference, or ethnic 
alignment, in this study. 
The series of questions and choices and its interpretations 
are as follows: 
(a) For the situations of ethnic preference versus self- 
interest of material kind, the questions asked subjects 
to predict whether Tan Seng Seng or any of his family 
members would choose to: 
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(i) do shopping in Cheng San's shop (fellow ethnic) or 
in Jaafar's shop (Malay ethnic) 
(ii) leave the keys to his house with a next-door 
Malay neighbour, or leave his front door unlocked 
pending the expected arrival of his sister 
(iii) rent his house to a Malay tenant or leave it 
unoccupied 
(iv) baby-sit a Malay child 
(b) For the situations of ethnic preference versus self- 
interest of status kind, the questions asked whether 
Tan Seng Seng or any of his family members would choose 
to: 
(i) take along Nasir, a doctor's son, or Ah Chuan, a 
housemaid's son, to the zoo 
(ii) marry a fair-skinned but elder sister or dark- 
skinned younger sister 
(iii) adopt a fair looking Indian child or an unusually 
dark-skinned Chinese child 
(iv) attend first Hamid's, a Malay director's wedding 
invitation or Leong's, a Chinese shopkeeper's 
(c) For the situation of ethnic preference versus personal 
obligations, the questions asked whether Tan Seng Seng 
or any of his family members would choose to: 
(i) go to his Indian workmate's wedding 
(ii) support his boss who is a Malay or a Chinese 
replacement 
(iii) allow his two year old daughter to be taken by his 
Malay neighbour to play with her child for an 
afternoon 
(iv) agree to marry a Malay person 
(v) allow his son to bring home his Malay friends as 
playmates 
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(vi) offer Abdul Taha, a Malay or Lim Wong Peng, a 
Chinese the post of office boy in his company 
(d) For the situations of ethnic preference versus 
religious obligations, the questions asked whether Tan 
Seng Seng or any of his family members would choose to: 
(i) vote either for Ah Huat or for Ah Chong (who seem 
to be committed towards religious obligations) or 
for Ah Hock who seems to be active in his 
religious commitments 
(ii) vote either Chuan or Yap (who are not backed by 
the Chinese religious group) or Lee (supported by 
the Chinese religious group 
The above alternative choices of acts provided in each 
question that represents different values, or interests are 
summarised in Table 3.1. 
(iii) Prediction of Tan Seng Seng's Mother's Reaction 
For all the situations mentioned above, the subjects were 
also asked to predict what Tan Seng Seng's mother's choice 
would be. The sociological significance of Tan Seng Seng's 
mother's choice is to see whether the subjects perceive any 
significant differences in the strength of ethnic preference 
between the Chinese of older and younger generations. 
4. Validity of Measurement 
A point of clarification has to be made here regarding the 
measuring of ethnic alignment through the choices presented 
to the subject. Uncertainty as to whether the given choices 
actually measure the presumed interests can arise. As a 
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result, one can be doubtful of this measurement truly 
reflecting the relative strength, or weakness of ethnic 
alignment even at the individual level. We need to be 
assured that when the subjects choose the given non-ethnic 
choices for the ethnic representative, it truly indicates 
the relatively weak ethnic alignment among individuals. We 
certainly cannot deny the possibility of these choices not 
indicating the interests that are presumed, or that other 
interests might overlap, or be consistent with the choices 
of ethnic interests itself. To put it plainly, we do not 
know why the subjects make the choices they do. 
What inferences may be drawn on the problem of validity of 
measurement and interpretation is in fact acknowledged by 
Banton and Mansor. In some situations, as they disclose, 'a 
subject may acknowledge that in a particular situation, he 
or she is expected to manifest group loyalty, but maintain 
that in these circumstances he or she is also bound by 
another obligation which has to take precedence' (1992: 
601). In such a situation, one is not sure about the actual 
reason or reasons for them to choose to act, or predict 
another person to act in a given way. It is important to 
note here that the present study, like Mansor's, in general 
does not really reveal the real reasons for the choice the 
subjects make. The choices that are provided in the 
questionnaire enable us only to make some general 
speculation about the possible reasons that might have 
influenced them. 
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Table 3.1: Situations of Value Conflict, Choices of 
Ethnic Preference and Other Interests 




1. Shopping At Cheng San's 
2. House keys Door unlocked 
3. Renting out House Unoccupied 
4. Child-minding No to Malay 
b. Ethnic Preference Versus Self-Interest (Status Kind) 
Question Ethnic Self-interest 
Concerning: Preference (status) 
1. The zoo trip Ah Chuan Nasir 
2. Skin complexion Darker-skin Fairer-skin 
3. Child adoption Chinese child Indian child 
4. Wedding invite Leong's Hamid's 
5. Ah Siew-Malay Disapprove Approve 
manager relationship 
c. Ethnic Preference Versus Personal Obligation 
Question Ethnic 
Concerning Preference 
1. Indian friend's No 
party 
2. Support Malay No 
boss 
3. Child's playmate No 
4. Mix marriage No 
5. Bringing Malay No 
friend home 























1. The treasurer's 
post 








Here one may consider how the measurement can be 
inconsistent or inaccurate contrary to the 'face value' of 
the choices provided in this study. First, take for example 
the choice of shopping. The subjects may predict that Tan 
Seng Seng or his mother would shop at Cheng San's, who is a 
Chinese, and not at Jaafar's, who is a Malay. This 
prediction does not necessarily mean that the act is 
motivated by the Chinese ethnic preference of Tan Seng Seng 
or his mother. This choice of action, on the contrary, can 
be because Tan Seng Seng and his mother might think that 
they can easily purchase products that suit their Chinese 
taste and cultural tradition when they shop at their own 
ethnic shop. If this is the actual reason, then it cannot be 
looked upon as showing favouritism towards his own ethnic 
person, and or dislike of different ethnic members, although 
it does indicate a taste for food of an ethnically defined 
kind. It could also be 'materialistic' if he thought he 
would be treated better in the long run by his co-ethnic 
shop owner, for example, in matters of credit. 
In the same manner, in deciding whose wedding invitation to 
accept first, Tan Seng Seng might decide to go to Leong, who 
is a Chinese but only a storekeeper in status and later to 
Hamid's, who is a Malay, but a company director. Tan Seng 
Seng might find that this arrangement goes well with his 
intention to save time and energy, or with other 
arrangements, like wanting to spend more time at Hamid's 
house for some other reasons. This shows that the underlying 
reason for Tan Seng Seng's decision to go to Leong's first 
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may not necessarily be influenced by his ethnic 
consideration, and as such cannot be interpreted as an act 
of ethnic loyalty. In the same way, it is either a 
straightforward indication of a status consideration 
overpowering ethnic preference if Tan Seng Seng chooses to 
give preference to his Malay friend, who is company 
director. 
The above examples certainly demonstrate that though the 
actions of any person like Tan Seng Seng may outwardly look 
ethnically motivated, in actual fact it may not be the case. 
Similarly, in other contexts, an act that outwardly does not 
look ethnically inclined, does not necessarily mean that 
ethnic sentiment or the identity of a person has become weak 
with comparison to other practical individual interests. 
The reasons and the ways in which people choose to act in 
various real interethnic situations at the personal level 
can be a complex situation for one to identify unequivocally 
the real value, interest or aim that motivates one's choice 
of action. This means that the observer's speculative reason 
for ethnic preferences and other choices can nevertheless be 
a wrong judgement. 
The above problem of measurement probably cannot be 
eliminated totally in this kind of questionnaire-based 
survey. Some measures that can minimise to some degree the 
difficulty in interpreting the choices among the subjects 
have been taken. First, by explaining to the subjects in a 
covering letter the general aim of the research and the 
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conflicting interests that are presented in the hypothetical 
social situations, a general guidance is provided in 
understanding the conflicting interests presented in each 
question. By explaining the general context of the 
hypothetical situations, it is hoped that the subjects would 
make an interpretation, without drifting too far from the 
actual meaning of the choices represented, or more precisely 
of the influence they believe would take priority on Tan 
Seng Seng's choice of action in "a particular social 
situation. With these guide-lines the subjects are expected 
to predict Tan Seng Seng's choice of action in the proper 
intended social context of this research. 
Secondly, the hypothetical situations have also been 
formulated in such a way that the inherent context of the 
situation of value conflict can be conveyed. Apart from 
clarity in understanding the conflicting values, the 
formulation of different interethnic hypothetical situations 
have also taken into consideration that these situations can 
actually happen. This is important to avoid any unrealistic 
impressions from the subjects on the situations, and 
consequently, on their reactions. 
5. General Propositions 
Some kind of general proposition on how Malaysians of 
Chinese ethnic origin in general will align themselves in 
the above mentioned situations of value conflict can be 
useful for further discussion and understanding of 
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interethnic relations in Malaysia. These general assumptions 
provide a basic rationale which can be compared and tested 
against views the subjects actually express on the Chinese' 
ethnic preference behaviour i. e via how they thought an 
imagined ethnic representative, Tan Seng Seng and his other 
family members, would make decisions in situations where 
ethnic preference is challenged by motivations of self- 
interest or personal obligation. 
One of the factors that probably comes to the mind of other 
Malaysians about Chinese in Malaysia more frequently and 
immediately, is that they are believed to possess a strong 
motivation and ability to strive for economic success. In 
actual fact, the Chinese in Malaysia do involve themselves 
extensively in business activities and in other modern 
economic sectors, like manufacturing, construction and 
trade. These sectors obviously give them better monetary 
earnings and other material wealth, including investment 
power, compared to other Malaysians, mainly the Malays who 
predominantly work in agriculture, industrial production, 
and governmental administration. The success of the Chinese 
has a strong impact on the belief others form about their 
personality, attitudes and priority in their everyday lives. 
The success stories of Chinese individuals like Loh Boon 
Siew (a Honda dealer), the Teo family (a rice dealer, known 
as 'rice king of Malaysia'),. and many others in the various 
states of Malaysia (see Jesudason, 1990: 34-36) are in fact 
a constant reminder of how hard-working the Chinese are and 
of their strong business-minded attitude. In general, it can 
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be said that the Chinese are closely associated with a 
strong materially-minded personality. 
It will not be much of a surprise in Malaysia if someone 
from the other ethnic communities say that 'If you throw a 
Chinese anywhere, he will surely survive'. Many Malaysians 
are aware of the existence of 'China towns' as business 
centres in other countries. This strengthens the above 
belief about the Chinese in general among many Malaysians, 
so much so that quite often any Chinese man in Malaysia may 
generally and humorously be referred to as towkays. 
Colloquially, the term means a person who runs a business. 
This implies that the businessman identity has been 
perceived as an integral part of Chinese personality. The 
Chinese economic self-interest of a material kind could have 
been perceived by others as being the foremost factor in 
their lives to guarantee their success in doing business in 
other countries as well as in Malaysia. The Chinese have 
also been observed to encourage and train their children to 
participate continually in family businesses and to improve 
them. 
For this reason, not only may others strongly believe that 
the Chinese possess a very strong materially-minded 
personality, but they themselves may also think so. With 
such beliefs about the Chinese, one could predict that the 
latter's choice for self-interest of a material kind may 
strongly influence and take preference whenever it comes 
into conflict with their ethnic preference. 
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However, it is rather difficult to think that Chinese ethnic 
preference will always take second place. It is not too much 
to think otherwise about members of an ethnic group which 
has strong pride in its cultural tradition and civilisation, 
as well as practising them for generations and continuously 
trying to defend them via political mobilisation. Ethnic 
identity and sentiments do strongly influence them and play 
an important part in their everyday life. In reality, 
political power, cultural survival and economic success are 
all connected. In Malaysia, the Chinese always feel strongly 
about safeguarding their cultural tradition as well as their 
political survival via their representative political 
parties and associations. One would have seen this from the 
importance and sensitivity that the issues of language and 
education have created among the Chinese in Malaysia since 
before Independence. Socio-culturally, the Chinese religious 
teachings like Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and the 
ancient Chinese cultural tradition have always been an 
important factor in maintaining a strong family bond among 
the community. As such, the ethnic identity. and loyalty 
among the Chinese in Malaysia is not necessarily diminishing 
in all areas of interethnic relationships. One cannot 
anticipate that it will always take a marginal role among 




In this study, apart from using a different imagined ethnic 
representative (Tan Seng Seng) to estimate the strength of 
Chinese ethnic loyalty, or identity, the nature is 
distinctly different from Mansor's in terms of the sample 
and the method used for data collection. 
Sample 
The present research chooses to study the perceptions held 
by the Malays and the Chinese in Malaysia. This is because 
these two ethnic groups together form about 80% of the total 
population of the country. Divisions and relationships 
between these two groups have been major influences on the 
issues and discussions of ethnic relations in Malaysia. They 
hold the core position in the issues concerning ethnic 
relations between the bumiputra and non-bumiputra, or 
between the Malays and non-Malays in the country. 
Mansor, in his study of Malay ethnic alignment, has used a 
sample of Malays and Chinese from the suburban residence of 
Petaling Jaya. In contrast, with the intention of drawing a 
group of samples from a wider society, the present study has 
chosen Malay and Chinese off-campus degree course students 
who were studying in 1992 at the University Science 
Malaysia, Penang. These students, who are pursuing courses 
in Social Science, Humanities and Science, come from 
different parts of Malaysia, and they represent the Malay, 
Chinese, Indian and other indigenous groups in Malaysia. 
111 
They enrol as part-time mature students, after securing a 
job and income. They are employees in the public and private 
sectors, mostly in the former, and a handful are engaged in 
their own businesses. 
As mature students with a relatively better educational 
level and wider exposure to modern-urban lives and 
occupations, they generally can be said to represent the 
characteristics of the modern-urban population of Malaysian 
society. As such, they are relatively better aware of the 
politically sensitive nature of ethnic relations in 
Malaysia. Through their everyday personal lives in the 
workplace, and as students which encompass interactions with 
different ethnic groups, they are in fact at the forefront 
in experiencing interethnic relations in Malaysia, as well 
in understanding, assessing and estimating one another's 
behaviour in various social situations of value conflict. 
Taken from the university's off-campus student registration 
list, Malay and Chinese students were listed according to 
their ethnic names and their sex before the systematic 
random sampling method was employed to select a sample of 
500 of them, with equal numbers of Malays and Chinese, males 
and females (125 in each category). Out of this, 318 
students (Malay males, 85; Malay females, 77; Chinese males, 
79; Chinese females, 77) have responded to the study based 
on mail questionnaires 1. The questionnaires were sent out 
1 There are 5 other replied questionnaires which have not 
been included because they are from individuals of Indian 
ethnic background which is not part of this study. Since 
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during the first week of July, 1992 and continually 
collected till the end of September 1992. 
Questionnaire 
After considering the sensitivity of the subject matter 
studied there seems little doubt of the advantage of using 
the mail self-completion questionnaire instead of the face- 
to-face interview method to collect data. My own earlier 
research experience in studying the subject of mixed 
marriages (1983), has convinced me that issues related to 
ethnic relations in Malaysia are not an easy matter for the 
subjects to expose their views openly. More often, the 
respondents would take a moderate attitude in their 
responses in a formal, face-to-face research contact. 
People's 'true' ethnic feelings and attitudes cannot be 
measured directly but can only be inferred from what they 
say and do. But their behaviour too can be a pretence. It is 
probably common in any multiethnic society that some issues 
may be considered a personal or private matter. As far as 
the Malaysian experience is concerned, ethnic issues in 
general have also come to be treated as personal secrets to 
a certain extent because of their political sensitivity. A 
brief clarification of the sensitivity of the subject matter 
would justify why the mail questionnaire method was used. 
these 5 are Muslims, and carry Malay-Muslim names in the 
registration list, I could not foretell their ethnic origin 
before sending the questionnaires out. 
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Since the incident of the communal riots of May 13th. 1969, 
the Government of Malaysia has officially defined ethnic 
issues as politically sensitive, and believes that the 
people's freedom of expression in this matter should be 
limited or controlled. The incident, which was partly caused 
by free expressions of slogans of hatred, encouraged the 
government of Malaysia to introduce "Limited Democracy" in 
order to accommodate existing ethnic diversity, interest 
and sensitivity in the country (Goh, 1971; Malaysia, 1969; 
1971)2. 
Together with this official view, real measures are taken 
for the purpose of monitoring and maintaining the "Limited 
Democracy". These include the implementation of the Sedition 
Act, more vigorous actions under the Internal Security Act, 
and controlling of the media. It can be said that these 
forceful measures have caused the people to be extremely 
cautious in expressing their views and attitudes concerning 
issues of ethnic relations. Open views and attitudes of 
animosity between ethnic groups become unacceptable in order 
to maintain political stability and economic growth in 
implementing the ethnically sensitive New Economic Policy. 
In any direct face-to-face everyday life contact, 
expressions of a more tolerant attitude and view have become 
important strategies of communications among people. 
2 National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report 
(Kuala Lumpur: National Operations Council, 1969). Malaysia, 
Towards National Harmony (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printers, 
1971). Goh Cheng Teik, 1971: The May Thirteenth Incident, 
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press). 
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One may say' that academic research is not a political 
activity of which to be suspicious, and as such, it should 
enable people to express freely their opinions relating to 
ethnic matters. But for the people of Malaysia, this may not 
be the case. As a civil rights Malaysian scholar has put it: 
'... neither Parliament nor the public is allowed to discuss 
certain sensitive issues pertaining to ethnic relations as 
contained in the constitutional amendments of 1971. Though 
it is possible to defend the prohibition from the point of 
view of the importance of consensus on ethnically-divisive 
issues, it is nonetheless regrettable that it has led to a 
general decline in frank and forthright analysis of 
fundamental social challenges. This is not confined to 
ethnic relations alone; it covers issues on economic 
development, human rights and religion. This mood is 
reflected in the newspapers' (1981: 73)3. 
The people generally will not only become suspicious when 
questions concerning ethnicity are asked of them, but will 
also be reluctant to express their frank view openly to 
avoid being interpreted as a sign of hostility towards any 
ethnic group or nation. A person of Malay, Chinese, Indian 
or other ethnic origin has come to consider, by and large, 
his or her views on ethnic issues and relations in Malaysia 
as a personal secret and most probably will only express 
themselves forthrightly in a very informal context, 
particularly to their own fellow ethnic groups members. 
3 Aliran Speaks, Aliran Kesedaran Negara Publication, 1981, 
Penang, Malaysia. 
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Realising this fact, and to reduce tolerable kind of answers 
that please, as well as to reduce the high rate of refusals 
from respondents, Mansor has used the strategy of using an 
interviewer of their own ethnic member to question the 
Chinese and Malay subjects, respectively. However, his 
ethnic matching strategy has not been able to avoid some 
refusals (1992: 60-61), which, among other reasons, can be 
attributed to the sensitivity of the subject matter. 
Furthermore, it is also still questionable whether this 
strategy can persuade the subjects to express independently 
their views concerning ethnically important issues in 
Malaysia. The subjects interviewed by the respective ethnic 
interviewer, in a face-to-face contact, are also not totally 
in an independent position to express their views. This is 
because in the presence of someone of their own ethnic 
member (interviewer), the subjects might not want to divulge 
their personal preference or opinion if they think it does 
not coincide with that of the majority of their ethnic 
group. 
After considering the relative disadvantages of the 
interview method, and to reduce further, if not totally, 
biased responses, the mail self-completion questionnaire 
method was chosen for two reasons: 
(i) Owing to its advantage of anonymity, this method 
gives the subjects a free hand, and lets them take 
their own time to express their responses. 
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(ii) This mail survey also fitted in well with the 
present research intention of drawing a group of 
samples which covers a wider geographical area in 
Malaysia. 
The only worry that came to mind when the decision to use 
the mail questionnaire method was taken was how to elicit a 
good response. This method is generally believed to result 
in a lower return rate, although this is not necessarily 
true in all the research cases, as different factors might 
influence the rate of response (de Vaus, 1990; Heberlein & 
Baumgartner, 1978; Jobber, 1984). The response rate, for 
example, according to de Vaus, "... will be due to the 
combined effect of the topic, the nature of the sample, the 
length of the questionnaire, the care taken in implementing 
the particular survey and other related factors" (1990: 99). 
It is notable that R. K. Kelsall's study has been reported 
to have a very high response rate of 84% because the matter 
studied was both important and of vital interest to the 
subjects. But since this is not the case with the present 
study, one has to consider other ways available to 
facilitate a good response from the sample. This was done 
through a strong personal appealing and persuasive covering 
letter, a reminder, and by enclosing stamped addressed 
envelopes. As a result, 65% of the initially selected sample 
responded. This can still be considered a good response 
rate. Among the other reasons for the considerably good 
response is the subjects' own higher level of education 
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which might have also created among them a positive attitude 
towards the importance of the academic research undertaken. 
Contents and Sequence of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is made up of three parts: 
(a) Section A consists of questions which are focused on an 
imagined person, Tan Seng Seng and/or his family 
members, who are supposed to represent the Chinese 
ethnic group in Malaysia. These questions, considered 
as core questions of the study, relate to how the 
respondent believes Tan Seng Seng and/or his family 
will behave in different situations of value conflicts. 
(b) Section B, which consists of questions on interethnic 
experiences and the perceptions of interethnic 
relations and of political attitudes, is aimed at 
measuring the commonalities and differences among the 
Chinese and Malay subjects who have reacted to 
questions about Tan Seng Seng. 
(c) Section C comprises questions on the subjects' 
background, including their exposure to their own and 
other ethnic cultural influences and groups. 
The questionnaire is arranged and presented to the subjects 
in the above sequence for one reason. This is because the 
covering letter which was sent with it, besides explaining 
the purpose of the research and appealing for co-operation 
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from the subjects, also particularly explained the context 
of the core questions asked in Section A, that is, about an 
imagined person of Malaysian Chinese origin, Tan Seng Seng, 
in various hypothetical social situations of value conflict. 
For this reason, in presenting the questionnaire, it was 
decided to bring the relevant hypothetical questions to the 
immediate attention of the subjects. 
There are other factors which have been taken into 
consideration before the questionnaire survey was carried 
out. Firstly, the questionnaire was presented in the Malay 
language. Being the official and national language, it is a 
commonly understood language among the various ethnic groups 
in Malaysia. Secondly, the questionnaire was tested among 20 
off-campus students through a pilot study to improve the 
clarity of the questions before being finally implemented. 
Data Analysis 
It should be clear that as far as the survey data is 
concerned, this study will aim at comparing and analysing 
the strength of Chinese ethnic preference against other 
interests, in particular self-interest of material and 
status kinds and personal and religious obligations. This 
has been measured in terms of how Malaysians of Chinese 
ethnic origin are perceived to behave in situations of value 
conflict. However, the Malay and Chinese subjects are not 
asked to provide scores for each behaviour that they 
perceived for the imagined Chinese ethnic representatives 
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presented in the questions. Instead, by asking them to make 
a choice from categories of actions or conduct provided for 
Tan Seng Seng or his family members, the subjects have been 
counted and categorised as nominal data frequency. This data 
was summarised and analysed by cross-ethnic and gender 
comparisons, and presented in a form of 2x2 between- 
subjects (Malay and Chinese, male and female) contingency 
tables for each variable. measured. Descriptive percentage 
and chi-square statistic methods were used in the analysis 
of the data. The same procedure is employed to analyse the 
extent of commonalities and differences concerning the 




STRENGTH OF ETHNIC PREFERENCE VERSUS SELF-INTEREST 
In this, and the following two chapters, we will be 
exploring three data sets that were collected from the 
hypothetical questions. These data were collected based on 
the rational choice model of ethnic behaviour. The 
assumption is that individuals will act rationally by 
comparing the relative values of different choices of acts 
that are available in a particular social context. The 
difficulty that may be involved in interpreting the choices 
made by the subjects from the choices provided in these 
hypothetical questions were argued in chapter 3. We will 
return to this issue later in the concluding chapter. For 
the moment, however, in these three chapters the data 
analysis will be carried out with the assumption that the 
choices presented in these hypothetical questions do really 
measure the presumed values or interests (ethnic preference, 
material and status self-interests and personal obligation). 
The specific aim of this chapter is to measure the relative 
strength of the Chinese ethnic alignment i. e ethnic 
preference, in relation to the strength of material and 
status self-interests. This will be examined by looking at 
the way in which the subjects expect the Chinese ethnic 
representative actor, Tan Seng Seng, to weigh the importance 
of ethnic preference against that of material and status 
self-interests. These self-interests are measured in two 
forms. First is self-interest of the material kind where the 
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calculation of monetary or property gains and losses 
intervene as practical influences. Second is self-interest 
of the status kind where Tan Seng Seng is expected to 
consider his gain or loss in terms of social status, 
respect, or honour when weighed against his consideration of 
ethnic preference. Both these self-interests represent the 
influence of universalistic norms in society. We can expect 
these interests to grow and play an important role in the 
lives of people in a modern advanced society where 
individual freedom, economic individualism and consumerism 
are given greater importance. In the realm of ethnic 
relations these universalistic norms are expected eventually 
to weaken the particularistic ethnic-based interests among 
individuals in the process of economic development and 
modernisation in a society like Malaysia. 
(I). Ethnic Preference Versus Material Interests 
The Chinese and Malay subjects were asked the following 
questions to predict how Tan Seng Seng and his family 
members would choose to respond in a social situation where 
the choices of ethnic preference and self-interest of 
material kind are presumed to be in conflict. 
1. Tan Seng Seng has been patronizing Jaafar's grocery shop - noted 
for its cheapness and nearest to his house. Tan Seng Seng has been 
informed that in a week's time, Cheng San will be opening a second 
grocery shop in his neighbourhood. 
i) Where will Tan Seng Seng go? 
[1] Cheng San's shop 
[2] Jaafar's shop 
[3] Other 
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ii) Where would his mother go? 
[1] Cheng San's shop 
[2] Jaafar's shop 
[3] Other 
2. Tan Seng Seng has a house to rent. The house has been left 
unoccupied for the past six months. A Malay accountant with two 
young children and his wife want to rent the house. Will Tan Seng 
Seng accept the Malay tenants or will he refuse and wait for 
Chinese tenants? 








3. Tan Seng Seng has a niece whose husband works as a school 
gardener. Theirs is a big family, living in a small rented Chinese 
house next to a housing scheme. The wife supplements the meagre 
earnings of the husband by taking care of four tiny tots. One day 
a young Malay school teacher came to her house inquiring if she 
could take care of her one year old son too. 









4. Tan Seng Seng has to leave his house in a hurry to fetch his own 
family from the hospital. He has been expecting his sister to come 
any moment to assist his family, but he has waited as long as he 
can. He wonders whether to leave his front door unlocked or to 
leave the housekeys with his next door Malay neighbour. 
i) What will Tan Seng Seng do? 
[1] Leave the front door unlocked 
[2] Leave the keys with his Malay neighbour 
[3] Other 
ii) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to do? 
[1] Leave the front door unlocked 
[2] Leave the keys with his Malay neighbour 
[3] Other 
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The question on shopping choice (question 1) tries to 
suggest to the subjects that Tan Seng Seng (and his mother) 
may consider continuing to shop at Jaafar's (a Malay) shop 
and may not want to move to the fellow ethnic, Cheng San's 
shop. To shop at Jaafar's is presumed to suggest the idea 
that consideration for material interest is the primary 
factor. Cheng San's shop can provide the same convenience as 
Jaafar's only in terms of distance because the shop will be 
opened in the same neighbourhood. By not making known the 
prices in Cheng San's shop, there could be only two 
conflicting factors for the respondents to take into account 
when deciding what Tan Seng Seng's action will be. These are 
whether he will shift to his fellow Chinese' shop because of 
the possible ethnic consideration, or continue to shop at 
Jaafar's for the material benefit he may gain i. e lower 
pricing. 
If the subjects think that Tan Seng Seng will move to Cheng 
San's shop, it may appear to indicate two things. Firstly, 
Tan Seng Seng is willing to sacrifice whatever material 
benefits that he can gain from cheaper shopping at Jaafar's. 
Secondly, it also appears to indicate that ethnic 
consideration is a strong influence not only because of his 
disregard for gain, or willingness to lose materially, but 
also for another reason. Tan Seng Seng is also willing to 
disregard the social familiarity and informal relations that 
may have developed between him and Jaafar in the course of 
routine shopping in the same neighbourhood. 
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The questions on renting out house (question 2) to a Malay 
family and child-minding (question 3) also seem to pose a 
similar kind of conflict of interests between monetary 
consideration and ethnic preference. The subjects have to 
take into consideration not only the factor of losing extra 
income by not accepting the Malay tenant, but also the 
possibility of losing a good tenant considering that he is 
an accountant. The prospect for him to pay the rent without 
delay is fairly good. On the other hand, Tan Seng Seng's 
house has not been occupied for six months. This means he 
has already lost so much extra income for that period. If 
the subjects predict that Tan Seng Seng will refuse the 
Malay tenant and wait until a Chinese tenant comes, this 
will indicate his disregard for a material consideration 
that comes into conflict with ethnic preference. 
Similarly, one may expect Tan Seng Seng's niece to consider 
the extra income that she can earn from her part-time baby 
sitting job. This is because her husband, as an ordinary 
gardener, is likely to earn little but on the other hand, 
having a big family means higher living expenses. A Malay 
teacher's request for Tan Seng Seng's niece to baby-sit for 
her son is probably just what she needs to help her family 
financially. But the subjects may also take into 
consideration the possibility of Tan Seng Seng's niece 
refusing to baby-sit for a Malay child because of her ethnic 
preference, or her dislike of Malays. 
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The material consideration that presumably comes into 
conflict with ethnic preference is not necessarily confined 
to real monetary gains, or losses alone. In some 
circumstances the very thought of security for the property 
can also influence a person to behave in a manner that gives 
priority to material self-interest over ethnic preference. 
People may seek help from others regardless of their ethnic 
background to avoid any loss of their possessions. In a 
situation of emergency, or desperation, one would probably 
want to protect their property strongly at any cost, even if 
it means going against feelings of ethnic prejudice, dislike 
or sentiments. In the case of housekeys (question 4), this 
kind of conflict situation could be perceived by the 
subjects. Tan Seng Seng had to decide between trusting his 
Malay neighbour by leaving the housekeys with them, thus 
avoiding any possibility of theft, or leaving the door 
unlocked and be prepared to take the risk of a loss in his 
property. Unless his trust in a neighbour is very ethnically 
motivated, he would be expected to leave the housekeys with 
his Malay neighbour regardless of his ethnic differences. 
(II) Ethnic Preference Versus Status Interest 
People may use various symbols like material objects, life 
styles, including behaviour, attitudes, taste and speech and 
type of association, or other symbols that are culturally 
defined as status symbols. People use these status symbols 
to reflect the important position of a person in the society 
that is worthy of approval, respect, or honour from others. 
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The occupational structure constitutes an important basis 
for the main division of status among people. This is 
because one's occupational position is assigned a status for 
the amount of income it can earn, the wealth a person can 
accumulate, and other status attributes it can provide. 
People seek better, or higher status either directly, or 
indirectly through association with others who possess these 
status symbols. Status may play an important role in 
undermining the traditional ethnic sentiments. In measuring 
the relative strength of ethnic preference against that of 
their self-interest of status kind, the following four 
social situations were put to the subjects for their 
prediction: 
1) Tan Seng Seng is arranging marriage for his son to one of his 
cousin's daughters. Given a choice, whom will his son choose - the fair-skinned elder sister or her darker skinned younger sister? 
i) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's son choose? 
[1] the fair-skinned elder sister 
[2] the darker-skinned younger sister 
[3] other 
Whom would Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grandson to 
choose? 
[1] the fair-skinned elder sister 
[2] the darker-skinned younger sister 
[3] other 
2. Tan Seng Seng wants to adopt a child. The Social Welfare 
Department has sent him some forms to be filled and 2 coloured 
photographs of a fair Indian child and a dark-skinned Chinese 
child. 
i) Whom will Tan Seng Seng choose? 
[1] the dark-skinned Chinese child 
[2] the fair-skinned Indian child 
[3] other 
ii) Whom would his mother wish him to adopt? 
[1] the dark-skinned Chinese child 
[2] the fair-skinned Indian child 
[3] other 
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3. Tan Seng Seng is going to take his children to the zoo this coming 
Sunday. Tan Seng Seng's son has been pestering his father to take 
along one of his friends on this trip. 
i) Whom would Tan Seng Seng suggest to his son to take along on 
this trip? 
[1] Nasir, a doctor's son 
[2] Ah Chuan whose mother works as a housemaid 
[3] Other 
i) Whom would Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grandson to take 
along on this trip? 
[1] Nasir, a doctor's son 
[2] Ah Chuan whose mother works as a housemaid 
[3] Other 
4. Tan Seng Seng received two wedding invitations which happen to 
fall on the same day. He has to make up his mind as to which 
wedding he would give priority to attend first. 
i) Whose house will he go to first? 
[1] Hamid's. He is a company director 
[2] Leong's. He is a storekeeper. 
[3] Other 
ii) Whose house will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to go to 
first? 
[1] Hamid's. He is a company director 
[2] Leong's. He is a storekeeper. 
[3] Other 
Except the social situation concerning skin complexion (1), 
other social situations - child adoption (2), the zoo trip 
(3), and the wedding invitation (4), are presumed to pose to 
the subjects conflicting interest between ethnic preference 
and status. 
Skin colour as an indicator of social status is probably not 
a good example. It is, however, not totally wrong to say 
that people do attach some status value to skin colour in 
many traditional communities, although this may not be 
apparent among people with liberal attitudes. Fair skin has 
been regarded in many communities as more desirable, if not 
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a more beautiful complexion, compared to darker skin, and 
worthy of admiration or attention. Among other things 
Chinese, Malays and Indians in Malaysia may show some kind 
of favourable attitude and satisfaction in having a child, 
bride, or groom of fairer complexion. It can be said that 
fair skin, in this regard, has been positively valued and 
seen as a status symbol. 
The question on skin complexion was created to see whether 
the Chinese attached any preference to fair-skinned 
complexion over dark-skinned complexion as a status symbol 
within their own ethnic group. The findings will form the 
basis for measuring the persistence of such an important 
status factor, if at all it exists, as compared to their 
ethnic preference in interethnic situations such as in the 
question of child adoption (2). 
If the Chinese are presumably predicted as having more of a 
status preference based on skin colour, than the strength of 
their ethnic alignment in comparison to self-interest of 
status kind in relation to skin complexion, can be 
established much more clearly in an interethnic situation. 
The question on child adoption which appears to portray the 
conflict between ethnic consideration and self-interest of 
status kind, provides the opportunity to make this 
observation. If the ethnic representative actor, Tan Seng 
Seng, is predicted to be influenced by his ethnic preference 
as an overriding factor in his selection of child adoption, 
than he may choose a Chinese child with darker skin 
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complexion in preference to an Indian child with fairer 
skin. 
The question on the zoo trip (3) and the wedding invitation 
(4) are presumed to provide another two different social 
situations where the importance of status that is associated 
with modern occupations will be tested against consideration 
for ethnic preference. People attach different status to 
the various occupations or occupational categories. The 
higher the occupational ranking, such as the professionals 
(doctors, lawyers, engineers, company directors, etc. ), the 
higher the status attached, as compared to the workers of 
the lower strata. 
To maintain or gain higher status, it may be expected that 
people want to associate themselves with people in so-called 
more prestigious occupations. This desire for status can 
motivate people to have relations or associations not only 
with people of their own ethnic kind, but also with other 
ethnic groups. Some people of lower occupational ranking are 
expected to take an opportunity to have close associations 
or relations with people of higher occupational status 
regardless of their ethnic group background. 
For the purpose of maintaining or gaining higher status, one 
can assume that self-interest of status kind would not only 
possibly create status relations within the same ethnic 
group but also across ethnic boundaries. In Malaysia, the 
relations people form on the basis of status can include the 
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Malays, Chinese or Indians of the same, or, different 
status. But will status interest among the Chinese, like Tan 
Seng Seng, influence them so greatly to the extent that they 
may undermine their own ethnic sentiments? If Tan Seng Seng 
is expected to be strongly motivated by his self-interest of 
a status kind, then the subjects may predict that he will 
choose to associate himself with people of higher 
occupational status. But will that be with people of 
different ethnic groups? Examples of these are taking Nasir, 
who is a doctor's son, instead of Ah Chuan, who is a fellow 
Chinese, but whose mother is only a housemaid, on the zoo 
trip, and to attend first the wedding at Hamid's, who is a 
company director, instead of Leong's, who is again a fellow 
Chinese but only a storekeeper. 
Findings: Ethnic Preference Material Interests 
Shopping Choice 
In the case of shopping choice, material interest appears to 
have a relatively stronger impact than the influence of 
ethnic preference among the Chinese (Tables 4.1 & 4.2). 78% 
of the Chinese subjects have predicted to imply that Tan 
Seng Seng's ethnic preference will not take priority over 
his material interest of lower-priced shopping. The 
prediction for the Malay subjects also seem to indicate that 
greater material self-interest will not influence Tan Seng 
Seng to change his preference to his fellow Chinese shop. 
The prediction for both male and female Chinese and Malay 
subjects also runs parallel to that at group level. More 
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Malays (28%), particularly the males, than Chinese (14%) are 
of the opinion that Tan Seng Seng will change his choice to 
the Chinese shop. This indicates that the Malays have 
overestimated the influence of ethnic preference among the 
Chinese. Among the Chinese, more female subjects seem to 
indicate the ethnic influence than males. 
Table 4.1: Shopping Choice by Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Cheng San 14 28 32 68 
Jaafar 78 67 54 26 
Other 85 14 6 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.2: Shopping Choice by Ethnic Group and Gender (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Cheng San 12 17 33 23 32 33 66 70 
Jaafar 82 73 62 72 54 53 28 23 
Other 6 10 55 14 14 67 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Similarly in the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother, the 
subjects seem to think that material interest would be the 
foremost important influence, although in her case those who 
may think so reduced to 54%. In her case, rather more 
subjects (32%) predicted to imply that she would be more 
influenced by ethnic preference than Tan Seng Seng. Clearly 
among the Malays, a substantial shift in opinion seems to 
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indicate that they have overestimated the ethnic influence, 
even more so in the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother. 68% of 
them now think that Tan Seng Seng's mother will want her son 
to move to his fellow Chinese shop and this could imply that 
she is willing to forego the lower-price shopping benefit. 
No significant gender differences were observed, although 
more Chinese females and Malay males in Tan Seng Seng's 
case, and Malay males in the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother, 
incline towards greater ethnic influence. 
The results seem to show that for a majority on this 
question the ethnic preference is not an important influence 
among the Chinese, including the older generation, when its 
comes into conflict with material interests. The Malays seem 
to think alike, although in the case of Tan Seng Seng's 
mother, they predicted otherwise. 
Renting Out House 
As in the case of shopping choice, material consideration 
seem to be a more important factor than ethnic consideration 
in the case of renting out the house. In this case, however, 
nearly all the subjects, notably among the Malays, could not 
seem to perceive any challenge from ethnic consideration 
(Tables 4.3 & 4.4). 95% of the Chinese and 99% of the Malay 
subjects think that Tan Seng Seng will rent out his house to 
the Malay tenant for the possible income gained from the 
rent. In the social context that is formal and impersonal in 
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nature, self-interest seems to be absolutely the most 
reasonable and practical consideration for subjects. 
Table 4.3: Renting Out House by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Accept 95 99 73 75 
Refuse 41 21 21 
Other 10 6 4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.4: Renting Out House by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Accept 96 93 99 99 75 71 73 77 
Refuse 3711 18 24 25 18 
Other 1000 75 25 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In his mother's case, there seems to exist some degree of 
reluctance to ignore totally the possible influence of 
ethnic preference. A big majority of the Chinese (73%) and 
Malay (75%) subjects, however, still indicate that Tan Seng 
Seng's mother also will want her son to go ahead with 
renting the house to the Malay tenant. No gender differences 
were observed, although slightly more Malay males (in the 
case of Tan Seng Seng's mother) and Chinese females appear 
to indicate the possible influence of the ethnic 
consideration. 
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Compared to the first case, the younger Chinese generation 
do not seem to be at all influenced by ethnic preference. 
Only a small minority of the subjects think that concern for 
ethnic preference would influence the older generation of 
Chinese. 
Child-Minding 
The case of child-minding is another business setting, but 
more informal to a certain degree. In this situation, ethnic 
preference does not seem to exert a strong influence, but 
the subjects did not seem to ignore it almost completely, as 
in the case of renting out house. The subjects' response is 
very much similar to that of the case of shopping choice 
(Tables 4.5 & 4.6). 76% of the Chinese subjects seem to have 
emphasised material interest as an overriding influence by 
indicating that Tan Seng Seng's niece will accept to baby- 
sit for the Malay child. The Malay subjects also seem to 
think likewise with 64% indicating this. But again, as in 
the case of the shopping choice, the Malay respondents were 
rather more inclined than the Chinese to think that Tan Seng 
Seng would act in accordance with ethnic preference. By 
thinking so, they have again overestimated the ethnic 
influence among the Chinese. No gender differences were 
observed in both the Chinese and Malay groups. 
The ethnic consideration seems to have been more influential 
in the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother and reduced the 
Chinese' prediction of material interest to 62%. Among the 
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Malays, the subjects seem to have a reverse opinion in 
indicating greater ethnic consideration (56%) instead of 
material benefit (36%). As such, their overestimation of 
ethnic influence among the older generation of Chinese 
becomes even greater. The Chinese female and Malay male seem 
to think that Tan Seng Seng and his mother would act in 
accord with ethnic preference. No significant gender 
differences were observed. 
Table 4.5: Child Minding by Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
















TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.6: Child Minding by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 




























TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Housekeys 
In the case of housekeys, the subjects' responses were much 
the same as that of the case of renting-out the house. The 
influence of material interest again seems to be the 
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overwhelming influence among the Chinese and the Malay 
subjects, i. e. 97% and 95% respectively have predicted that 
Tan Seng Seng will choose to leave the housekeys with his 
Malay neighbour (Tables 4.7 & 4.8). 
Table 4.7: Housekeys by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Unlocked 1 2 5 7 
Neighbour 97 95 89 86 
Other 2 3 6 7 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.8: Housekeys by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 




























TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
This appears to imply that the subjects have in their minds 
the possibility of material loss through a break-in as an 
important consideration for Tan Seng Seng not to leave the 
door unlocked. Instead, seeking the help of a Malay 
neighbour by leaving the housekeys with them to look after 
the security of the property in an emergency situation seems 
to overrule whatever ethnic consideration or ethnic 
prejudice he may have towards different ethnic members of 
the community. 
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Even in predicting the responses of the older generation, 
the Malay and Chinese subjects do not seem to indicate any 
significant differences from that of Tan Seng Seng. The 
Malay and Chinese subjects predicted by 86% and 89% 
respectively the possibility of material interest in the 
case of Tan Seng Seng's mother. No gender differences were 
observed in Tan Seng Seng and in his mother's case for both 
the Malay and Chinese groups. 
Summary 
Concern for ethnic preference did not seem to be the 
important influence among the Chinese when this influence is 
presumed to come into conflict with material self-interest 
as defined by the hypothetical questions. In all the social 
situations, as indicated through Tan Seng Seng's and his 
mother's choice of behaviour, the Chinese subjects strongly 
supported behaviour that seem to be consistent with material 
interest, rather than with ethnic preference, as posed by 
the hypothetical dilemma. 
The traditional-minded older generation seems to have an 
equal concern for 'material gain and loss'. This was 
indicated in shopping choice (54%), renting-out house (73%), 
child- minding (62%) and leaving housekeys with Malay 
neighbours (89%). Both the Chinese males and females 
emphasised, with almost equal strength, the importance of 
material interest in all the above situations for both Tan 
Seng Seng and his mother. There exists only a small gender 
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difference in both cases. This does not allow a meaningful 
discussion of the differences between genders. 
The Malays, both the male and female subjects, seem to have 
a good judgement in predicting how the Chinese would act 
when their hypothetical economic interests were pitted 
against ethnic preferences. Similar to but rather less than 
the Chinese' prediction, the Malays seem to have indicated 
that the material interests would overrule any consideration 
for ethnic preference in all the situations that concerned 
Tan Seng Seng. In the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother, the 
Malays' prediction went contrary to the Chinese in two cases 
in which concern for ethnic preference seems to have 
overruled material interest (shopping and child-minding). 
Findings: Ethnic Preference versus Status Interests 
Skin Complexion 
Among the Chinese subjects, a substantial 41% could not 
disclose their choices in the case of skin complexion. But, 
on the other hand, most of them predicted fair skin 
complexion as the preferred choice. This was indicated by 
55% of them (Tables 4.9 & 4.10). ' More convincingly, the 
Malays compared to the Chinese subjects, have indicated 
what they might see as Chinese status interests with 75% 
expecting the actor to choose a bride with fairer skin 
compared to 5% for darker skin. Consistently, from a range 
of the highest at 87% to the lowest at 58%, the male and 
female subjects across the ethnic groups predicted the 
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selection in favour of fair skin, as against dark skin 
(between 2% to 7%). No significant gender difference was 
observed. The preference for fair skin over darker skin has 
been predicted much more strongly in the choice of Tan Seng 
Seng's mother (62% among Chinese and 83% among Malays). 
Table 4.9: Skin Complexion by Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Fair Skin 55 75 62 83 
Dark Skin 45 5 4 
Other 41 20 33 13 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.10: Skin Complexion by Ethnic Group 
and Gender (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Fair Skin 58 51 79 70 63 61 87 78 
Dark Skin 5 4 3 7 6 4 2 6 
Other 37 45 18 23 31 35 11 16 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The findings seem to indicate that skin complexion does 
matter as a status symbol among the Chinese, and even more, 
among the older generation. A fair skin complexion does seem 
to carry a higher status implication within the Chinese 
group. The Malays also appear to understand the Chinese 
preference for status gain and even have rated the Chinese 
status interest higher than the Chinese own estimation. If 
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the preference for fair skin, as disclosed by the above 
results, can be taken to be motivated by self-interest of a 
status kind, than the strength of this motivation can now be 
compared to that of ethnic preference in the following case 
of child adoption. 
Child Adoption 
In the case of child adoption (Tables 4.11 & 4.12), the 
subjects' responses do not seem to show the importance 
attached to self-interests of a status kind. Instead, the 
selection in favour of the ethnic preference is predicted. 
This is indicated by 82% of the Chinese subjects in the case 
of Tan Seng Seng and 83% in the case of his mother who 
thinks that Tan Seng Seng will choose to adopt a fellow 
Chinese although the child has a darker complexion compared 
to the Indian child. More Chinese female subjects, across 
the generations (88% to 91%) have predicted in a way that 
implies that ethnic consideration has a much more important 
influence than fair skin or self-interest of a status kind. 
Table 4.11: Child Adoption by Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
















TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 4.12: Child Adoption by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Dark Chinese 76 88 64 77 75 91 88 83 
Fair Indian 11 9 28 14 9 4 8 13 
Other 13 3 8 9 16 5 4 4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Likewise, the majority of the Malay subjects (70%) do not 
seem to underestimate the importance of ethnic 
consideration among the Chinese. They seem to indicate the 
influence even higher in the case of Tan Seng Seng (86%). A 
higher percentage of female subjects (77%) than their male 
counterparts (64%) have predicted that the ethnic factor 
will be an important influence. 
The findings indicate that in the daily lives, within their 
own group, the Chinese may be influenced by status 
consideration (as in the case of skin complexion); but such 
a consideration does not seem to take greater priority in 
the case of child adoption where they have to make a 
selection between ethnic and status preference. In this case 
ethnic preference appears to be the overriding influence. 
Although the Malay subjects seem to understand this, they 
have in this case underestimated the ethnic influence among 
the Chinese. While the Chinese seem to think that the 
strength of ethnic preference influence would be the same 
for both Tan Seng Seng and his mother, -the Malays, on the 
other hand, seem to think that Tan Seng Seng's mother will 
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be more influenced by ethnic preference choice than Tan Seng 
Seng. The possibility of ethnic influence taking priority 
over status interest has been indicated with a greater 
strength by the female subjects than the male subjects. 
Zoo Trip 
As the result of the zoo trip indicates, the status interest 
again seems to be perceived by the subjects, both Malays and 
Chinese, as not an important factor compared to that of 
ethnic interest (Tables 4.13 & 4.14). Among the Chinese, 66% 
have indicated that Tan Seng Seng will choose Ah Chuan, a 
Chinese but a housemaid's son, to go to the zoo with his 
son. Only 18% indicate to imply that Tan Seng Seng may act 
in accordance with status interest by taking Nasir, whose 
father is a doctor, to go with his son to the zoo. 
The Malay subjects, too, but with a lower percentage (57%) 
have predicted that Tan Seng Seng will make an ethnic 
preference choice rather than self interest of status kind. 
No significant gender differences were observed among the 
Malays and Chinese. 
Table 4.13: Zoo Trip by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
















TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 4.14: Zoo Trip by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Nasir 17 19 32 26 15 21 12 8 
Ah Chuan 68 64 58 57 71 66 78 79 
Other 15 17 10 17 14 13 10 13 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In Tan Seng Seng's mother's case, the ethnic consideration 
again seems to have indicated a much stronger influence than 
that of self-interest of a status kind. The Chinese and 
Malay subjects, 69% and 78%, respectively, have predicted 
that his mother preferred her grandson to choose Ah Chuan*to 
go with him. No gender differences were observed among these 
groups. 
The findings show that in this group of questions the 
Chinese seem to have attached greater importance to the 
ethnic preference than status interest. The ethnic 
preference seems to have a greater influence upon the older 
generation. While the Malays appear to recognise the ethnic 
influence, they have underestimated the strength of Chinese 
ethnic preference in Tan Seng Seng's case but in his 
mother's case, they overestimated it. 
Wedding Invitation 
In contrast to the two results above, both the Chinese and 
Malay subjects seem to have revealed that Tan Seng Seng will 
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choose to give a slightly higher priority to self-interest 
of a status kind in the case of the wedding invitation. The 
Chinese predicted by 42% that Tan Seng Seng will be 
attending the wedding function at Hamid's, a company 
director, first, instead of Leong's who is a fellow Chinese 
but only a storekeeper (Tables 4.15 & 4.16). 35% preferred 
to indicate otherwise to stress that the presumed ethnic 
preference may override status interest. The prediction of 
the Chinese male subjects on the other hand, seems to 
indicate that ethnic consideration is likely to override 
their concern for status gain by associating with someone 
belonging to a higher status group. This is indicated by 44% 
as against 37% for status interest. 
Table 4.15: Wedding Invitation by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Hamid's 42 55 25 16 
Leong's 35 36 53 76 
Other 23 9 22 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 4.16: Wedding Invitation by Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Hamid's 37 48 59 51 22 29 16 16 
Leong's 44 25 37 34 58 48 77 75 
Other 19 27 4 15 20 23 7 9 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Among the Malay subjects, a higher proportion (55%), 
compared to the Chinese subjects, have predicted in a way 
that implies that Tan Seng Seng's preference would be 
motivated by status interest, and 36% by ethnic interest. No 
significant gender difference was observed. 
In contrast to the prediction on Tan Seng Seng's choice, the 
subjects seem to be convinced that his mother will not be 
influenced by self-interest of status kind. The Chinese 
subjects (53%) have predicted that Tan. Seng Seng Is mother 
will want her son to give priority to his fellow Chinese 
wedding invitation. A much higher percentage (76%) among the 
Malays seem to have indicated the ethnic influence. Gender 
differences in both ethnic groups are insignificant. 
The findings would seem to indicate that in a situation like 
the wedding invitation, status interest may override any 
concern for ethnic consideration. But among the older 
generation the concern for ethnic preference still seems to 
hold priority. The Malays seem to have estimated the Chinese 
ethnic preference accurately in Tan Seng Seng's case but in 
the case of his mother, they have overestimated it. 
Summary 
In the three social situations (child adoption, zoo trip, 
wedding invitation), it is presumed that self-interest of 
status kind is in conflict with ethnic preference. It is 
only in the case of wedding invitation that a marginally 
146 
higher percentage of the Chinese subjects are of the 
opinion that status interest rather than ethnic 
consideration will be an important consideration. Although 
in the social situation of skin complexion, the subjects 
seem to indicate that status interest will be an important 
consideration for the Chinese, this status that is 
associated with, or derived from, fair skin does not seem to 
be sustained when it comes into conflict with concern for 
ethnic preference. This was proved in the case of child 
adoption. 
The status that is derived from associating with people of a 
higher occupational status seems to take a slightly higher 
importance among the Chinese, as indicated in the case of 
wedding invitation. But such occupational status 
consideration was not indicated in the case of the zoo 
trip. 
Ethnic consideration traditionally exerts a greater 
influence among the older generation. Although within their 
own ethnic group, the status interest seems to have a 
greater influence among the older generation, as indicated 
in the case of skin complexion (83%), the influence never 
seems to override their concern for ethnic preference in 
interethnic contexts. 
There is not much difference in the prediction between the 
genders for both Tan Seng Seng and his mother. However, in 
the case of the wedding invitation, the Chinese males seem 
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to have predicted ethnic consideration as an overriding 
influence, contrary to the overall prediction of the group, 
which seems to emphasise the status interest as the 
overriding influence. 
The Malays' prediction did not differ much from that of the 
Chinese. The Malay subjects too seem to think that the 
ethnic preference would exert a greater influence in most 
instances among both the younger and older generations of 
the Chinese. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings of the relative strength of ethnic preference 
behaviour seem to support the fact that the act of ethnic 
alignment among the Chinese is weaker in relation to the 
hypothetical influence of material self-interests. But in 
the social situations of value conflict, in which presumably 
ethnic consideration comes into conflict with self-interest 
of a status kind, different trends begin to emerge. Status 
interest, unlike self-interest of the material kind, is 
incapable of exerting a very strong influence, to an extent 
that it can undermine or reduce ethnic sentiments. 
The findings for both sets of questions - (i) where ethnic 
preference is set against material self-interest; (ii) where 
ethnic preference is set against status interest - show that 
individuals may attach different degrees of importance to 
different self-interests (material and status) and therefore 
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this may account for the acts of displacing or emphasising 
ethnic preference in different circumstances. But there was 
also observable variation in the emphasis on ethnic 
considerations within each set of circumstances. The 
subjects' responses seem to show that they have attached 
different degrees of importance to the ethnic consideration 
in different social situations within each set of 
circumstances. These differences in the emphasis on the acts 
of ethnic preference between and within different sets of 
social circumstances invite us to look closely into the very 
nature of the relationship involved in these social 
situations in which ethnicity may or may not take relevance. 
This perhaps could further explain why in different 
circumstances the subjects appear to have acted differently. 
Varying social contexts seem to have created different 
degrees of urgency or relevance with regards to ethnicity 
and other interests among the Chinese subjects. 
In the first set of social circumstances, i. e ethnic 
preference versus material self-interest, all the presumed 
materially-oriented behaviour are supported by more than 75% 
of the Chinese subjects. However, to leave the housekeys 
with a Malay neighbour and to rent the house out to a Malay 
family, has been given more approval (97% and 95% 
respectively) compared to shopping and child-minding (78% 
and 76%, respectively). Among the possible reasons is that 
the material interests may have become more profound in the 
first two instances. At the very personal level, probably no 
person is prepared to take any action risking the loss of 
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property when the house is left unlocked, or foregoing 
monetary gain from the house rent by refusing a good 
tenants. On the other hand, the housekey situation is so 
trivial involving no ethnic sensitivities, and in the case 
of renting the property, it is purely a commercial 
transaction. For a landlord like Tan Seng Seng, he will be 
more concerned about losing income from rent than looking 
for co-ethnic tenant. In matters of shopping and child- 
minding, on the other hand, the situations do not seem to 
have created the same magnitude of desire for material 
benefit and child-minding is closer to family concerns. 
In terms of ethnic preference, the Chinese have given a very 
low priority to the question of housekeys (1%), and renting 
out the house (4%), shopping choice (14%) and child-minding 
(17%). The type of social relationships involved in these 
social contexts are of a more formal and impersonal kind, 
although the degree may differ between these inter-personal 
interactions. In these various formal kind of business 
dealings at the interpersonal interactions, ethnic identity, 
or ethnicity, will be hardly perceived as a 'bargaining' 
issue in the transactions. These social contexts do not have 
much direct relevance to ethnicity or being considered as an 
appropriate avenue for individuals to act according to 
particularistic norms of ethnic consideration. 
There may also be other reasons why the subjects almost 
refuse to think of any substantial ethnic influence, notably 
in the case of housekeys. The Government, through a local 
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neighbourhood scheme called the Rukun Tetangga, which is 
repeatedly shown on the television screen, could have 
created more awareness among the people, most specifically 
encouraging people to trust and leave housekeys with their 
neighbours, regardless of ethnic background, to avoid any 
unwanted incidents of loss of property or theft. 
On the other hand, in a more personal and exclusive kind of 
business activity, like taking care of the only Chinese baby 
in the family, or when their action may have meant rendering 
support to their own ethnic group members' business, ethnic 
consideration seems to have aroused more attention among the 
Chinese. In the case of child-minding, the other important 
factor to be considered is the difficulty that may arise for 
a Chinese person to conform to Muslim religious taboos if 
she, or he, decided to baby-sit for a Malay baby. One of the 
main obstacles is food. The Malays, for example, strictly do 
not eat pork nor keep dogs. But eating pork and keeping dogs 
are common features in the Chinese family. This may exert a 
certain degree of constraint on a Chinese person if he or 
she has to look after a Malay baby in their own house. The 
Malays too, will normally be reluctant to ask a Chinese 
family to baby-sit for them unless the circumstance is a 
formal nursery. 
In the case of shopping choice, the relationship between the 
Malay businessperson (Jaafar) and the Chinese customer (Tan 
Seng Seng) should be more of a secondary and formal kind. 
But again, running a business in a neighbourhood may bring 
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about familiarity and friendly relations between a person 
who is running a grocery shop and a routine customer. This 
may reduce consideration based on ethnic differences 
between them. Tan Seng Seng may not only consider the 
material benefit from shopping at Jaafar's shop but also the 
familiarity and friendship factors. But the consideration of 
helping one's own ethnic small business (like Cheng San's) 
can run high in a society like Malaysia, where the Chinese 
and Indians are well aware of the governmental policy to 
help Malay business, including the availability of loans for 
them to open small-scale business such as a grocery shop. 
Contrarily, in the second set of circumstances (against 
self-interest of status kind), due to the nature of the 
hypothetical situations, ethnic preference seems to have 
exerted a greater influence in all the situations observed. 
Comparing the different degrees of emphasis on status and 
ethnic interests between these social situations, one can 
see that in the situation of child adoption, the Chinese 
appear to be much more ethnically inclined and reduce status 
consideration to a much lesser degree than in the case of 
the zoo trip, and the wedding invitation. Even though child 
adoption does occur, it will be unusual to think of this as 
a common phenomenon. This is even more so when it comes to 
adopting a child from a different ethnic group. When a child 
is adopted, he or she will be integrated into the adoptive 
family and the child is expected to become an integral 
member of that family and to identify with it. The process 
involved in integrating a child from another ethnic group 
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can be perceived to be more difficult. Traditionally, a 
family is a social unit that is created through the practice 
of endogamous marriage norms based on the sameness of ethnic 
origin and culture. 
The process of adopting and integrating a child into the 
traditionally ethnic-based family unit can be assumed to be 
very much influenced by the idea of sameness of ethnicity 
among the family members. The family that wants to adopt a 
child from a different ethnic group presumably will also 
come to think about the awkward situation and constraints 
that they might have to face in bringing up and integrating 
the child who will grow up to have different features, but 
within its ethnic social surroundings. This has most likely 
reduced the importance of status that can be derived from 
fair skin, where a Chinese person adopts an Indian child. On 
the other hand, the pressure to maintain the traditional 
family feature as an ethnically endogamous unit could be an 
important factor for the Chinese to adopt a Chinese child. 
This is quite clearly reflected in the preference for one's 
own ethnic child by the female group who traditionally play 
a major role in bringing up the children by showing a much 
higher support for their own ethnic child than their male 
counterparts, as seen with both Tan Seng Seng and his 
mother. 
In the case of the zoo trip, again the nature of the 
situation is more likely to undermine the status interest as 
an attractive influence compared to ethnic preference. In 
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this case, only slightly more of the subjects (18%) seem to 
consider status as an important factor, compared to the case 
of child adoption (10%) which is a much more serious family 
matter than the case of the zoo trip. What is interesting to 
note here is that status does seem to influence the Chinese, 
as seen in the case of the wedding invitation. Association 
with someone from a higher rank professionally seems to 
confer status gains. But such status considerations cannot 
be assumed to persist in other situations, for instance in 
the case of the zoo trip, where the same occupational factor 
is involved. In this case, status interest is not an 
overriding important factor for Tan Seng Seng to take along 
Nasir, a doctor's son. 
The zoo trip, as indicated, is also a family-related 
situation as is child adoption. When Tan Seng Seng's son 
insists on taking a friend, the question of managing and 
taking responsibility over this friend becomes an important 
factor to be taken into account rather than merely status 
satisfaction. Tan Seng Seng's son's friend, Ah Chuan, 
probably becomes a better choice than Nasir because, being a 
fellow Chinese, he is thought to be managed much more 
easily. The problem involved is similar to the one in the 
case of child-minding. Ah Chuan will eat the same food 
without any problems, understand the same dialect and other 
cultural expressions, unlike someone from another ethnic 
group. Nasir, although a doctor's son in status, being a 
Malay and a Muslim will perhaps add more pressure and 
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difficulties to Tan Seng Seng's family outing, which should 
be relaxed and enjoyable. 
The wedding invitation which is a very much different affair 
from that of child adoption and the zoo trip, perhaps offers 
a better opportunity for the Chinese to enjoy the status 
satisfaction derived from it. Unlike child adoption and the 
zoo trip, the wedding invitation is to a formal social 
function where a certain standard of behaviour is always 
expected from those attending it. People are invited for the 
function because they are considered to have an important 
relationship either with the bride or groom, or their 
families. Being a traditional function, people of the same 
ethnic group usually make up the gathering. If someone other 
than their own ethnic members are invited, it is only 
because he or she is considered to be of importance, more 
so, when the invitation comes from people of higher status, 
like Hamid, who is a company director. This situation 
presumably is thought by the Chinese to give better status 
satisfaction. A small majority of the Chinese subjects 
predicted that Tan Seng Seng would give priority to the 
wedding function at Hamid's instead of Leong's, even though 
a fellow Chinese. 
Apart from the different nature of the social situations, 
this survey showed that ethnic consideration has also 
exerted a greater influence among the older generation of 
Chinese like Tan Seng Seng's mother. In relation to the 
circumstances of material interests, ethnic preference seems 
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to have a greater influence among the older generation of 
Chinese in comparison with the younger age-group (Tan Seng 
Seng); (shopping choice, 32% against 14%; renting out house, 
21% against 4%; child-minding, 28% against 17%; housekey, 5% 
against 1%). In the circumstances contrasted with status 
interests, a much stronger ethnic influence is indicated, 
but not much different 
from the prediction of the younger 
generation, except in one case (child adoption, 83% against 
82%; zoo trip, 69% against 66%; wedding invitation, 53% 
against 35%). 
For both Tan Seng Seng and his mother, the Chinese male and 
female subjects have predicted their actions according to a 
similar pattern. Ethnic influence is assumed to exert 
greater influence among the female than the male group. This 
is because the female's greater role in the family domestic 
circle and in bringing up children is usually associated 
with the influence of traditional cultural values, contrary 
to the males who are usually the breadwinners, career-minded 
and involved extensively with others in workplace spheres. 
The findings, however, do not seem to support this 
assumption. In only 4 out of 7 cases, the female subjects 
have rated ethnic consideration higher than their counter 
part. In all the cases against material interests, they seem 
to be equally capable of recognising the importance of 
material interests. In one case, contrary to the prediction 
of the male subjects, they even seem to have rated the 
status interest higher as an overriding influence than 
ethnic consideration. 
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The Malay subjects seem to predict well the possible 
reactions of the Chinese actor in most of the situations 
observed. In most cases, they have predicted the Chinese 
ethnic representative actor's choice of action without much 
difference from the Chinese subjects themselves. They have 
demonstrated that for practical reasons, the materially- 
motivated actions can override the hypothetical ethnic 
preference in some social situations, and shown the 
emergence of ethnically- oriented actions that undermine 
status interest in other situations. In terms of accuracy of 
estimation, the Malays' judgements are rather more mixed in 
Tan Seng Seng's case than in his mother's (Table 4.17). They 
seem to have over-estimated ethnic influence for Tan Seng 
Seng in two cases and under-estimated in three cases. Two 
other cases have been estimated almost accurately. This can 
be compared to six over-estimations in his mother's case. 
Table 4.17: Percentage Predicting 
as a Choice 
Tan Seng Seng 
Ethnic Preference 
Mother 
Chinese Malay Chinese Malay 
Shopping 14 28 32 68 
Renting 4 1 21 21 
Child minding 17 30 28 56 
Housekey 1 2 5 7 
Child Adoption 82 70 83 86 
Zoo Trip 66 57 69 78 
Wedding Invitation 35 36 53 76 
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The Malays seem to have misjudged the Chinese' lesser 
concern for ethnic preference in the cases of shopping 
choice and child-minding. It is probably not easy for the 
Malays to ignore the Chinese concern for ethnic 
consideration vis-a-vis economic interests. The Malays 
understand that the Chinese are not only economically a 
successful group, but they are also a strong ethnic group 
culturally and politically in Malaysia. The Malays seem to 
demonstrate this by giving either an overriding, or a 
substantial, priority for ethnic consideration in the cases 
which are important to the family and culture (child 
adoption, the zoo trip and the wedding invitation). But the 
importance of Chinese ethnicity in the family and cultural 
spheres is still much greater than the Malays have 
estimated. However, their rating in other cases is more 
inclined towards over-estimation of ethnic preference and 
more so in their estimation of Tan Seng Seng's mother's 
ethnic preference. 
The Chinese are probably aware of the need for them to play 
down the importance of the ethnic differences in public 
interactions like the business and commercial spheres. Being 
a successful business group in the private economic sectors, 
the pressures to play down their ethnic sentiments is also 
much demanded, mainly among the present younger generation, 
in order to sustain their success in a multiethnic society. 
More importantly, the political pressures and demands, viz, 
economic policy, can also suppress any form of open 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic differences with 
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regards to the politically dominant Malay ethnic group 
members. On the other hand, the Malays, and also the others 
in Malaysia, are aware that one of the reasons for the 
Chinese success in business is because of the organisational 
support of their ethnic clan-based economic cooperation 
(kongsi). Thus, it is possible for the Malays to 
overestimate the Chinese concern for ethnic consideration 
even in the economic sphere. 
The nature of the social situations seem to determine to a 
large extent whether ethnic consideration would be perceived 
by the subjects as being challenged by other interests and, 
thus worthy of serious consideration. In other words, it is 
rather a question of the nature of the social contexts in 
which ethnicity may or may not take relevance. In the first 
set of hypothetical circumstances, the predictions made by 
the Chinese subjects seem to show that the Malaysian 
Chinese at the individual level are believed to be more 
influenced by self-interest of material kind than that of 
ethnic preference. Both males and females from the younger 
and older generations appear to emphasise that the pursuit 
of material benefits exert a greater influence than ethnic 
preference in those hypothetical questions where ethnic 
preference was tested against material self-interests. 
However, in social situations where ethnic preference was 
tested against status interests, the nature of these 
situations do not seem to permit the status interests to 
override the influence of ethnic preference. 
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The overwhelming emphasis on the possibility of material 
interests influencing a Chinese person's choice of action 
seems to indicate that ethnic preference may not even have 
been considered by the subjects as an important influence. 
Any person is unlikely to act very strongly or purely on 
ethnic basis except in a highly segregated society. But 
since this is not the situation in Malaysia, it is normal to 
expect a person to actin a very practical manner in some 
situations if people do not perceive their ethnic identity 
and interest will be at stake if they act in a more 
pragmatic way. Material consideration does play an important 
role in everyday life. Presumably no individual will want to 
miss out on any monetary gains from lower-priced shopping, 
renting-out house or child-minding, although this may look 
to an observer as acts of disregard for ethnic 
consideration. Thus we may wonder whether the subjects 
really could have perceived their ethnic identity and 
interest to be at stake when their ethnic interests are 
pitted against material interests. It is not after all 
impossible for the subjects to think that in the above 
situations (shopping, renting-out house, housekeys and 
child-minding), their ethnic interest is not seriously 
challenged sufficiently for them to consider it with equal 
weightage as they may in the case of child adoption, the zoo 
trip and the wedding invitation. 
It is quite impossible for the subjects to think that the 
Chinese ethnicity will be at risk if they do not make an 
ethnic preference choice in the above situations. To predict 
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such acts would mean only that the Chinese are blindly 
influenced by their ethnic sentiments. In business 
transactions, as in the above situations, the bargaining is 
not truly, or greatly, between ethnicity and material self- 
interests. The situations tested practically seem to be 
strongly in favour of material consideration than ethnic 
preference. Thus, any over-estimation of ethnic 
consideration by the Malays under such circumstances does 
not allow us to make any conclusive assumption about the 
weakening of the Chinese ethnic alignment in Malaysia vis-a- 
vis economic individualism. The Chinese, on the other hand, 
seem to support the persistence of strong ethnic attachments 
in matters related to family and culture. But the Malays 
seem to under-estimate the significance of Chinese ethnicity 
in these spheres. 
As far as the social situations being tested are concerned, 
the observations made in this study only concern the 
possible micro-level interactions between ethnic groups in 
Malaysian life. At this level, the findings show that social 
situations which are more personal, exclusive, or routine to 
family and ethnic group, or close to it, tend to encourage 
actions which are consistent with ethnic sentiments. This 
includes social situations that are either influenced by 
ethnic culture, style or taste, as in the examples of 
shopping and the wedding invitation, or by family norms or 
concerns as in child-minding, child adoption and the family 
trip to the zoo. On the contrary, the social situations that 
are impersonal and formal in nature, or close to it, tend to 
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bring about actions that are encouraged by self-interest of 
material or status. This includes social situations which, 
by and large, do not involve intimate or personal social 
contact, for instance in the case of renting out a house, 
handing neighbours the housekeys in emergency situations and 
also partly in the case of attending a wedding. 
Economic individualism can invoke greater motivation of 
self-interest and encourage extensive commercial 
transactions between the Chinese and the Malays in Malaysia. 
But such interethnic business exchanges for the Chinese in 
Malaysia are not new. They have engaged in 'market place' 
interactions since colonial times. But they have treated 
their micro-level business interactions and exchanges with 
other ethnic groups as an individual matter separate from 
that concerning their culture, family and politics. The 
Malays are aware of this. They seem to have confirmed this 
by indicating the importance of the Chinese ethnic 
sentiments in the matters related to family and culture. But 
the present observations do not reveal anything about the 
societal level political matters that concern ethnic group 
relations in Malaysia. While the universalistic norms, viz., 
self-interests of material and status kind, may continue to 
influence the interethnic contact of the Malaysian Chinese 
(and the others), it may not necessarily reduce the 
significance of ethnic identity and sentiments in the 
society where there is a high degree of political 
mobilisation of ethnic allegiance. 
162 
Chapter 5 
STRENGTH OF ETHNIC PREFERENCE VERSUS PERSONAL OBLIGATION 
In the previous chapter, the strength of Chinese ethnic 
preference as perceived by the Chinese themselves, as well 
as by the Malays, was compared with the influence of self- 
interest. In this chapter, the importance of Chinese ethnic 
preference will be further measured and understood in 
hypothetical social situations where ethnic preference is 
seen to be in conflict with values of personal obligation. 
We will now be able to see how the Chinese, as well as the 
Malays, estimate the strength of Chinese ethnic alignment 
relative to that of their appraisal of personal obligation 
as an influence in their everyday life. By personal 
obligation here we refer to some sense of social obligation 
to an individual that has developed across ethnic lines. 
In social situations where members of different ethnic 
groups come to interact, this act of personal obligation, 
however, cannot be assumed to be a simple matter since it 
can also come into conflict with ethnic preference as 
determinants of alignment. In normal circumstances, unless 
it is legally prohibited, an individual is indeed expected 
or encouraged, for example, to talk, shake hands, smile, 
obey or respect parents and other elder members of the 
family and community, or to allow children to play with 
their peers in the neighbourhood, to attend invitations from 
friends and neighbours, and to help each other when the need 
arises. Acts of personal obligation, however, can also come 
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into conflict with ethnic sentiment of the individual, where 
interethnic interactions occur. The choice to behave in a 
manner that fulfils personal obligation can be hindered by 
ethnic sentiments, or vice versa. 
The Chinese and the Malay subjects were presented with 
questions, through another set of interethnic hypothetical 
situations, asking them to indicate in which manner the 
typical Malaysian Chinese, Tan Seng Seng, and his family 
members, would choose to act in these situations where both 
personal obligation and ethnic influences presumed to come 
into conflict. The following questions were formulated to 
represent such situations. 
1) Tan Seng Seng's 12 year old son wants to bring his Malay friends 
home to play. 








2) Tan Seng Seng has a next door Malay neighbour who likes her child 
to play with Tan Seng Seng's 2 year old daughter. Will he allow 
his Malay neighbour to take his daughter to her house for the 
afternoon? 









3) Tan Seng Seng's office received 2 applications for the post of 
office-boy in his department. Tan Seng Seng is asked to choose any 
one of the applicants: Abdul Taha and Lim Wong Peng who are 
equally suitable candidates except that Abdul Taha is one of his 
neighbour's sons. 
i) Whom will Tan Seng Seng choose? 
[1] Abdul Taha 
[2] Lim Wong Peng 
[3] Other 
ii) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to choose? 
[1] Abdul Taha 
(2) Lim Wong Peng 
[3] Other 
4) Tan Seng Seng has an Indian friend as a workmate. This friend is 
throwing a wedding party for his daughter at his house. 








5) Mr. Rashid, a mechanical engineer who graduated from Oxford, has 
been the head of Tan Seng Seng's Mechanical Department for the 
past 3 years. A Chinese group within his department is trying to 
replace his boss with a Chinese candidate. 








6) Tan Seng Seng's wife has been persuading her daughter to marry 
Jamil, her Malay friend's son who is considered by Tan Seng Seng's 
family as a good person, having close rapport with them, speaking 
fluent Chinese and familiar with the Chinese lifestyle. 






ii) Will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grand- daughter to 




In everyday dealings, a person can be expected to face many 
different types of moral duty of personal obligation, such 
as to family members, neighbours, friends, employer or boss. 
The above questions reflect some of this kind of duty which 
seems to be entangled with particularistic norms of ethnic 
preferences. 
Findings 
Bringing a Friend Home 
In the case of bringing a friend home (question 1), the 
strength of Tan Seng Seng's ethnic sentiments is presumed to 
be challenged by his duty of personal obligation as a 
responsible parent towards his son. In this situation, would 
Tan Seng Seng be committed towards his personal obligation 
and allow his son to bring home his Malay friend, or would 
he disagree with his son's wish because of his ethnic 
sentiments or prejudice against the Malays? Some parents may 
not want their children to mix or have close relations with 
other ethnic children because of their ethnic prejudice 
against them, or because of their own strong ethnic 
sentiment. In such situations, their duty of personal 
obligation to their children's needs and wishes can become a 
challenging influence or interest. But in a modern 
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multiethnic society, such blind acts of ethnic consciousness 
can be highly impractical. 
There seems to be no doubt in the minds of the subjects 
about the over-riding importance of personal obligation in 
the case of bringing a friend home. A large proportion of 
the Chinese and Malay subjects do not seem to think that 
ethnic sentiments will have any significant influence on Tan 
Seng Seng refusing his son's wish to bring home his Malay 
friend to play with. 
As shown in Table 5.1,96% of Chinese subjects predicted 
that Tan Seng Seng will allow his son to bring his Malay 
friend home. This tends to imply that Tan Seng Seng's duty 
of personal obligation to his son and his son's friend 
becomes a far more important consideration than any other 
based on ethnic sentiment. Both Chinese male and female 
subjects predicted this choice of action in equal numbers 
(96%) (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.1: Bringing a Friend Home, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Yes 96 93 80 57 
No 1 4 14 35 
Other 3 3 6 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5.2: Bringing a Friend Home by, Ethnic Group and 
Gender (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 




























TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Predictions among the Malay subjects also seem to imply that 
the influence of personal obligation would overrule ethnic 
sentiment. 93% of them predicted the non-ethnic choice as a 
preferable option. No significant gender differences were 
observed among the Malays. 
Parents, in bringing their children up and in fulfilling 
their needs, can be expected to understand the need for 
children among others to have friends to play with, as this 
is considered an important process in their early 
socialisation. Responsible parents do, however, try to 
monitor and control their children's freedom to mix with 
'just anybody' to make sure that they do not pick up any bad 
influences or habits. But it is unlikely that the majority 
of parents would prevent their children from mixing or 
having close relationships with children of other ethnic 
groups because of their prejudice towards them, or because 
of their own strong ethnic sentiment. If a child brings, or 
wishes to bring home, a friend belonging to another ethnic 
group, it can be taken to mean that the child has formed a 
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close relationship with this friend. Thus, it is only 
practical to expect parents like Tan Seng Seng to show a 
more understanding and tolerant attitude in allowing their 
children to mix with other children, including children from 
other ethnic groups who most likely attend the same school 
or who live in the same neighbourhood. They may even 
recognise the importance of such interethnic friendship as 
they themselves have, or wish to have experienced during 
their own childhood. 
Generally, the older generation will be more conservative in 
their thinking about accepting changes. Matters relating to 
children and their upbringing can create great concern. They 
can be more worried, suspicious and reluctant to accept with 
an open mind mixing with children from different ethnic 
backgrounds. They may worry that close friendship with 
members of an outside group may even lead the children to 
marry outside their group. However, in predicting Tan Seng 
Seng's mother's- choice, pattern of response did not change 
much among the Chinese subjects. Value of personal 
obligation seems to prevail as the overriding influence 
among the Chinese of the older generation. 80% of them 
predicted that Tan Seng Seng's mother will also be 
influenced by the value of personal obligation (80%). But 
some differences in opinion do appear to imply that the 
Chinese of the older generation would be more reluctant to 
allow free interethnic mixing. In Tan Seng Seng's mother 
case, 14% appear to indicate ethnic consideration as an 
important influence in her decision not to allow her 
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grandson to bring home his Malay friend. This can be 
compared to 1% in Tan Seng Seng 's own case. 
A clear shift in opinion seems to be apparent among the 
Malay subjects in predicting Tan Seng Seng's mother's choice 
of action. While 57% of the Malays continue to predict in a 
way to imply personal obligation as an overriding influence, 
with a considerable shift, 35% of them now seem to be 
inclined to think that there is a possibility of ethnic 
consideration taking priority over personal obligation. The 
Malays' over-estimation of ethnic influence result from 
their relatively recent experience of 'modernisation' and 
from living in more mixed communities than the Chinese. The 
Malays may still be traditional in their attitudes to 
recognise the possibility of the older generation, like Tan 
Seng Seng's mother, being influenced strongly by the value 
of personal obligation. 
Child's Playmate 
In the case of child's playmate (question 2), Tan Seng 
Seng's duty of personal obligation is presumed to be 
challenged by his ethnic sentiment, that is, whether to 
allow his Malay neighbour to take home his child to play 
with their child. Theoretically, prejudice against other 
ethnic groups, or a person's own ethnic sentiments, can be 
expected to be challenged by personal obligation towards 
neighbours when one lives in a mixed ethnic neighbourhood. 
But from a practical point of view, as in the first 
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situation, in any case, refusing to talk, not acknowledging 
or not allowing interaction between children because of 
ethnic prejudice or sentiment, can be considered as an act 
of blind ethnic sentiments or prejudice that may not at all 
be suitable for modern living in heterogeneous communities. 
The result shows the presence of this pragmatic attitude 
among the subjects. 
In the case of child's playmate, the Chinese subjects seem 
to have overwhelmingly predicted the action of personal 
obligation as a preference (Tables 5.3 & 5.4). This is 
indicated by 87% of the subjects. The subjects think that 
Tan Seng Seng will allow his Malay neighbour to take his two 
year old daughter to be a playmate for their child. The 
possibility of ethnic influence for Tan Seng Seng to refuse 
his Malay neighbour was indicated by 9% of the subjects. No 
great gender differences were observed. 
Table 5.3: Child's Playmate by, Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng- Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Yes 87 84 56 48 
No 9 11 32 44 
Other 4 5 12 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5.4: Child's Playmate by, Ethnic Group and Gender(%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 




























TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
A majority of the Malay subjects are also of the opinion 
that Tan Seng Seng will allow his child to be taken by his 
Malay neighbour to their house (84%). Compared to the 
prediction by the Chinese, only a subtle drop in the support 
for action of personal obligation was indicated. Almost an 
equal number of Malay male and female subjects seem to 
support the relative importance of the value of personal 
obligation over that of ethnic consideration. 
However, in predicting Tan Seng Seng's mother's preference, 
the Chinese did not seem to show the same strength of 
personal obligation as in the case of bringing a friend 
home. Instead, the Chinese, like the Malay subjects, do not 
seem to believe that the value of personal obligation will 
be an overwhelming influence. Ethnic consideration seems to 
exert greater influence on Tan Seng Seng's mother. As 
mentioned earlier, the older generation generally would be 
more traditional in their attitudes. In the present case, 
another factor could also have been perceived by the 
subjects as strengthening the traditional attitude among the 
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older generation. This is the age of the Tan Seng Seng's 
child who is only two years old; this may cause more worry 
among the older generation. Among the Chinese subjects, only 
56% predicted the non-ethnic choice of action. 32% predicted 
refusal from Tan Seng Seng's mother, to imply the overriding 
influence of ethnic consideration. Among the Malay subjects, 
the support of the possible influence of personal obligation 
was even much lower, i. e. 48%, whereas 44% seem to have 
predicted ethnic influence. No gender differences were 
observed among both Chinese and Malay subjects. 
Office-Boy Candidate 
The role of personal obligation which is expected among 
neighbours may also extend beyond their close local 
surroundings. Neighbours are also expected to acknowledge 
each other, as a matter of personal obligation, when they 
meet at different places such as in a shopping and leisure 
centre, in the streets, parks, playgrounds, or even be ready 
to give a helping hand to neighbours or their children 
whenever and wherever the need arises. 
In the case of office boy candidate (question 3), one can 
expect Tan Seng Seng to be influenced by his feelings of 
neighbourliness to pick Abdul Taha, who is the son of a 
Malay neighbour for the job of office boy. But, the fellow 
Chinese candidate, Lim Wong Peng, can also be expected to 
arouse ethnic sentiments which can exert a constraint on Tan 
Seng Seng from freely expressing a choice of action based on 
173 
personal obligation. Because of his ethnic consideration, 
Tan Seng Seng might also want to consider Lim Wong Peng and 
not Abdul Taha for the post, although both candidates are 
equally qualified for the job. 
The result appears to show that commitment to the duty of 
personal obligation continues to be perceived by the 
majority of the subjects as an over-riding influence in the 
case of office boy candidate (Tables 5.5 & 5.6). Both the 
Chinese and Malay subjects are of the opinion that Tan Seng 
Seng will pick Taha, the Malay candidate, to work in his 
department and not his fellow Chinese candidate (76% and 75% 
respectively). 15% of the Chinese and 17% of the Malay 
subjects predicted that Tan Seng Seng would pick Lim Wong 
Peng, who is presumed to represent the choice of ethnic 
alignment. No great gender differences were observed among 
the subjects across ethnic groups. 
In predicting the choice of Tan Seng Seng's mother, the 
preference for personal obligation vis-a-vis the Malay 
candidate has been reduced. The prediction among the Chinese 
subjects on the possible influence of personal obligation 
dropped from 76%, in Tan Seng Seng's choice, to 50% in his 
mother's. The prediction for a co-ethnic candidate increased 
from 15% to 33%. Both male and female subjects have 
expressed this pattern of certainty without noticeable 
difference. 
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Table 5.5: Office-Boy Candidate by, Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Abdul Taha 














TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.6: Office-Boy Candidate by, Ethnic Group and 
Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Abdul Taha 77 74 80 70 48 52 25 34 
Lim Wong Peng 13 17 13 21 32 34 65 57 
Other 10 979 20 14 10 9 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The reverse prediction is clearly indicated by the Malay 
subjects in the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother. They appear 
to show a greater conviction on the influence of ethnic 
sentiments (61%), compared to the choice of personal 
obligation (29%). A slightly higher percentage of Malay 
males (65%) than the females (57%) have expressed their 
certainty on the possible influence of ethnic preference. 
Perhaps more women are at home and need to 'get on' with 
neighbours. 
The subjects appear to recognise the importance of personal 
obligation between friends and neighbours to overrule the 
act of favouritism based on ethnic differences. Showing good 
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will as a duty of personal obligation to neighbours, or 
their family members outside the neighbourhood, can create a 
strong influence that may undermine acts of ethnic 
alignment. Refusing to help or showing favouritism to a 
friend's and neighbour's son, as in the present case, could 
lead to a strained relationship between friends and 
neighbours. This can also happen between co-ethnic 
neighbours and friends. But in the present case, Tan Seng 
Seng may even be accused of being racist if the Malay 
neighbour friend comes to know that Tan Seng Seng has picked 
a fellow Chinese candidate instead of his son. One would 
expect Tan Seng Seng to be more careful and not take such a 
possible social risk, thus straining the relationship by 
ignoring his neighbour's expectation. Under such conditions, 
Tan Tan Seng would suppress his ethnic feeling, although his 
action does not necessarily mean he ignores the importance 
of his ethnic identity. But under different circumstances, 
without such constraints, Tan Seng Seng may act differently 
or even show favouritism to his co-ethnic candidate. 
Wedding Party 
Personal obligation can also come into conflict with one's 
ethnic sentiment at other public places, like the workplace, 
where different ethnic members interact and work together. 
Formal and informal relations that are formed across ethnic 
boundaries between workers of the same rank, or between 
people of different ranks, in the same department can also 
demand that a person show some degree of personal obligation 
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as a norm in his or her interaction. This duty of personal 
obligation becomes more influential when people work 
together for a longer period of time. 
Friendship between members of different ethnic groups can 
also develop in the course of their daily interactions in 
the workplace. In many modern organisations, the management 
provides opportunities for recreational activities for the 
workers. They may also meet during breaks for refreshment. 
This can enhance the importance of the duty of personal 
obligation between them, not only in the workplace but also 
in other personal matters. A workmate, for example, may 
invite his or her co-workers to his or her son's or 
daughter's wedding party. Those invited also have a personal 
obligation to attend. This duty of personal obligation can 
also be challenged by a person's ethnic sentiments when he 
or she takes into account this factor when inviting, or 
deciding to attend such an gathering. In the case of the 
wedding party (question 4), the relative strength of 
personal obligation and ethnic sentiments are presumed to be 
the prospective conflicting interests. Tan Seng Seng would 
be expected to attend his Indian workmate's daughter's 
wedding party, if he is more concerned about his duty of 
personal obligation towards his co-worker friend than the 
possible influence of ethnic sentiments. 
Yet, compared to the case of the office-boy candidate, one 
would not expect Tan Seng Seng, or even his mother, to be 
more serious about their ethnic sentiments in the present 
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case. At least in the case of the office-boy candidate, Tan 
Seng Seng is not only dealing with his formal duty to lessen 
his consideration for personal obligation, but he also seems 
to be facing a more 'tempting' ethnic choice. In the present 
case of the wedding invitation, Tan Seng Seng does not seem 
to face any such tempting ethnic choice. Thus, it will be 
unrealistic for the subjects to imagine Tan Seng Seng 
ignoring his friend's invitation simply because his friend 
is of a different ethnic origin. The results appear to 
indicate this. 
As the results in Tables 5.7 & 5.8 show, almost all the 
subjects seem to think that the choice of personal 
obligation would take precedence over ethnic sentiments. 
Among the Chinese, 98% predicted that Tan Seng Seng would 
attend the wedding party of his Indian workmate's daughter. 
97% of the Malay subjects, likewise, predicted this very 
strongly. Both male and female subjects across the ethnic 
groups have expressed their strong belief in the influence 
of personal obligation (96% Chinese males, 100% Chinese 
females, 98% Malay males and 96% Malay females). 
Table 5.7: Wedding Party by, Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Yes 98 97 83 62 
No 01 6 23 
Other 22 11 15 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5.8 Wedding Party by, Ethnic Group and Gender (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Yes 96 100 98 96 80 86 58 66 
No 0 0 0 3 5 8 23 22 
Other 4 0 2 1 15 6 19 12 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Regarding Tan Seng Seng's mother's preferred choice of 
action, both the Chinese and Malay subjects continued 
to indicate the priority of personal obligation over that of 
ethnic sentiments. Only a small shift in opinion was 
observed, although 83% of them still seem to believe in the 
importance of personal obligation. A shift in opinion is 
much greater among the Malay subjects. 62% seem to stress 
the influence of personal obligation and 23% seem to stress 
ethnic sentiments. Comparison between the genders showed 
very little difference. 
Supporting Boss 
Compared to all the above cases, the case of supporting boss 
(question 5), challenges Tan Seng Seng's personal obligation 
which appears to be more crucial. Tan Seng Seng's ethnic 
sentiments could be an important influence because he 
realises that his fellow Chinese workmates in the department 
are trying to oust his boss who is a Malay. The problem 
seems really to arouse ethnic sentiments. Although his 
personal obligation demands that he supports his Malay boss 
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for whom he has been working for 3 years, Tan Seng Seng's 
ethnic sentiments can become another entangling influence 
for him to support his co-Chinese workers' efforts to bring 
in a Chinese boss as their new departmental leader. 
In the case of supporting boss, both the Chinese and Malay 
subjects, however, do not seem to speculate that Tan Seng 
Seng's ethnic sentiments would restrain him from supporting 
his Malay boss (Tables 5.9 & 5.10). Turning his back and 
supporting the attempts of his fellow Chinese workmates to 
replace his Malay boss with a Chinese does not seem to 
convince the subjects' rationalisation. However, the 
influence of personal obligation was not convincingly 
expressed by the subjects as in the other' cases, especially 
among the Chinese. The possibility of the influence of 
personal obligation taking priority was predicted only by 
42% of the Chinese and 52% by the Malay subjects. The 
figures are very much lower than the predictions in the 
previous cases. Although the figure does not allow us to 
conclude otherwise in favour of influence of ethnic 
sentiments, a substantial 25% of the Chinese and 32% of the 
Malay subjects speculated that he would be ethnically 
motivated and therefore not support his Malay boss. No 
gender differences were observed. 
180 
Table 5.9: Supporting Boss by, Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Yes 42 52 31 36 
No 25 32 24 46 
Other 33 16 45 18 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.10: Supporting Boss by, Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 




























TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
When it came to consider how Tan Seng Seng's mother would 
want him to act, the Chinese subjects' prediction further 
showed a lack of certainty on the influence of personal 
obligation over that of ethnic sentiments. The Chinese 
subjects seem to predict this only by 31%. The prediction 
for the predominance of ethnic sentiments was still about 
the same as in the case of Tan Seng Seng (24%). A shift in 
opinion, particularly among the Malay males, in favour of 
the influence of ethnic sentiments was observed. The overall 
prediction for the overriding influence of ethnic sentiments 
rose to 46% among the Malays. Those who seem to predict that 
Tan Seng Seng will follow the personal obligation influence 
was 36%. 
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As the nature of the social situation resembles that of the 
power struggle between the Malays and the Chinese, the 
respondents seem to have a stronger opinion about the 
influence of ethnic interest compared to other cases. It is 
important to take note that 33% of the Chinese subjects in 
the case of Tan Seng Seng and 45% in the case of his mother 
were not able to indicate how Tan Seng Seng would choose to 
act. Comparing their responses with the other cases above, 
this significant 'non-committal' percentage does seem to 
imply that the importance of ethnic sentiments could not be 
easily disregarded in situations similar to that of 
political conflict in competition for power and leadership. 
The Malays seem to be more 'open' than the Chinese in 
revealing their stronger opinion about the possible 
influence of ethnic interest among the Chinese, especially 
among the older generation. This was more prominent among 
55% of the Malay male subjects who predicted the influence 
of ethnic sentiment on Tan Seng Seng's mother. This could be 
due to the greater involvement of males than females in 
politics to make them realise the importance of ethnicity in 
Malaysian politics. They may have higher ethnic 
consciousness as far as political issues are concerned, 
although the Chinese seem to 'suppress' it, which could be 
owing to their minority status. This reminds us that we 
cannot finally know the motives and intentions behind the 
choice they make. 
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Mixed Marriage 
Personal obligation of children towards parents can also 
come into conflict with the influence of ethnic sentiment. 
In a society like Malaysia where cultural tradition is still 
very much an important influence in the lives of ethnic 
groups, the aspirations of parents play a very important 
role in influencing the choice of the children. In the 
matter of children's marriages for instance, traditionally' 
if not always, the approval of the elders in the family, 
especially the parents, is a prerequisite. However, in the 
processes of modernisation, economic development and social 
mobility, liberal and individual freedom have encouraged 
courtship and love marriage among individuals. But in many 
societies, and Malaysia being one of them, mixed marriages 
between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds remain 
very low. 
Among the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia, 
traditional arranged marriages and the wishes of parents in 
the selection of a spouse may be beginning to give way to 
that of modern marriages for love or of personal choice. Yet 
children are still expected to respect and consider their 
parents' choice or wishes as a matter of their personal 
obligation towards them. In the hypothetical case of mixed 
marriage (question 6), the question appears to measure the 
relative strength of Tan Seng Seng's daughter's personal 
obligation in satisfying her mother's wish to that of her 
ethnic sentiments in the matter of her selection of a 
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marriage partner. The difficulty here is that it is the mother who 
is suggesting the inter-ethnic marriage. In actual sense we are not 
measuring the relative strength of personal obligation towards an 
individual of different ethnic background. The question only tries to 
measure it indirectly by anticipating that the daughter would identify 
with her mother's wish. It is unlikely, however, for parents in 
normal circumstances to suggest mixed marriage to their 
children. But there may be some other reason for them to do 
so. For example, Chinese and Indians may agree to marry a 
Malay so as to enjoy the economic benefits, directly or 
indirectly, of the government's policy. Parents who are 
motivated by individualistic attitudes may allow or even 
suggest mixed marriage in particular circumstances to 
consolidate their kinship ties with their economic and 
status self-interests. 
The results show that the subjects' presumption of the 
plausible influence of personal obligation over ethnic 
sentiments has reduced tremendously in the case of mixed 
marriage (Tables 5.11 & 5.12). Respecting and fulfilling the 
wishes of parents, like the mother's wish in this case, 
could be expected to arouse a substantial, if not strong, 
influence of personal obligation in children. However, the 
Chinese subjects seem to show more conviction in the 
possibility of a refusal from Tan Seng Seng's daughter to 
marry a Malay despite her mother's persuasion. Only 4% of 
the Chinese appear to have expressed the opinion that the 
daughter will act on the basis of personal obligation to 
agree to her mother's proposal. A strong plausible influence 
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of ethnic sentiments was expected by 69%. They predicted 
that Tan Seng Seng's daughter will refuse her mother's 
proposal. Since the subjects actually have to take into 
consideration the personal obligation of the daughter 
towards her mother, a substantial percentage (27%) were not 
able to resolve the presumed value conflict in the question, 
which in other circumstances could possibly have increased 
the percentage of subjects rejecting mixed marriage. More 
Chinese female subjects (75%) than male subjects (63%) have 
expressed their certitude in the influence of ethnic 
sentiments. No gender differences were observed. 
Table 5.11: Mixed Marriage by Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Yes 48 4 4 
No 69 80 71 84 
Other 27 12 25 12 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.12: Mixed Marriage by Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Yes 4496 35 3 4 
No 63 75 79 82 68 74 85 83 
Other 33 21 12 12 29 21 12 13 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The Malay subjects have over-estimated Chinese ethnic 
sentiments. 80% of them disclose the possibility of the 
importance of ethnic consideration over-powering the duty of 
personal obligation. Only a minority predicted the influence 
of personal obligation (8%), a little higher than that of 
the Chinese (4%). No significant gender differences were 
observed among the Malays. 
No significant differences were observed in the prediction 
of Tan Seng Seng's mother's choice. Both the Chinese and 
Malay subjects seem to believe strongly in the plausibility 
of ethnic sentiments overpowering personal obligation. The 
Chinese predicted ethnic sentiments by 71%. The Malays again 
over-estimated the older generation's ethnic sentiments. 84% 
of them predicted ethnic sentiments as an overriding 
influence. 
Unlike other cases, decisions made in the case of mixed 
marriage did not seem to be swayed by personal obligation 
despite the mother's wish. Both male and female subjects 
across the ethnic groups seem to believe that the social 
circumstance in the case of mixed marriage instigates a 
strong ethnic sentiment which becomes an overriding 
influence among both the younger and older generation 
Chinese. By indicating this, the subjects seem to confirm 
the strong tendency of endogamy within ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. The subjects may realise the importance of such 
in-group marriages in maintaining ethnic identity and 
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solidarity within the society where ethnicity is politically 
salient. 
One of the important reasons why mixed marriages are 
believed to be unpopular in Malaysia is the wide religious 
differences especially between the Malays and non-Malays. In 
the present hypothetical case, Tan Seng Seng and his family 
represent a 'mainstream' Chinese Malaysian who belongs to 
the 'Chinese religion' (see chapter 1). Commitments to 
religious obligation could enhance ethnic sentiments. 
Influence of Religious Obligation 
As mentioned earlier, on the question of mixed marriage, any 
significant understanding of the influence of ethnic 
sentiments should also take into consideration the plausible 
influence of religion. Here arises the question of whether 
the strong predictions of rejection by Tan Seng Seng's 
daughter from marrying a Malay who is also a Muslim could be 
possibly influenced by her obligation towards her religion. 
In the present survey, two other questions are also included 
for this purpose. The results of these two questions will be 
an aid in understanding the extent to which the strength of 
religious obligation could be an important influence among 
the Chinese in their interactions with other ethnic members. 
This is particularly so when it comes to form close inter- 
personal or inter-family relationships, such as through 
interethnic marriages. The two additional questions are as 
follows: 
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7) Tan Seng Seng will be attending the election of committee members 
for the local branch of his political party next week. The 
treasurcr's post is a keenly contested three-cornered fight. The 
previous treasurer was found to have embezzled the party's funds. 
i) Whom will Tan Seng Seng vote? 
[1] Chuah, a businessman linked with the Malay elites 
[2] Yap, a school teacher with grass-root support from the 
local Chinese 
[3] Lee, a candidate backed by the Chinese religious group 
[4] Other 
ii) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to vote for? 
[1] Chuah, a businessman linked with the Malay elites 
[2] Yap, a school teacher with grass-root support from the 
local Chinese 
[3] Lee, a candidate backed by the Chinese religious group 
[4] Other 
8) Tan Seng Seng's daughter, attending one of the local universities, 
wonders whom she should vote as president of the university's 
Student Union: 
a) Ah Huat who takes religion as a personal choice 
b) Ah Chong who prefers religion to be seen as a separate issue 
from politics 
c) Ah Hock, besides belonging to the same religion as Tan Seng 
Seng, is also a committee member of the Chinese Students' 
Religious Society. 
i) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's daughter vote for? 
[1] Ah Huat 
[2] Ah Chong 
[3] Ah Hock 
[4] Other 
ii) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grand daughter to 
vote for? 
[1] Ah Huat 
[2] Ah Chong 
[3] Ah Hock 
[4] Other 
The two questions above could indicate the strength of 
religious commitment of the Chinese individuals. By putting 
forward different ethnic choices that represent the 
importance and or otherwise of religious commitment to the 
subjects, one can differentiate to a certain extent between 
the influence of religious commitment and that of ethnic 
sentiment alone. If a Chinese person's religious obligation 
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was thought to be an overwhelming influence, then the 
subjects could be expected to predict Tan Seng Seng or his 
daughter to support, as in the above cases, their ethnic 
candidate who represents, or is committed to, religious 
obligation in preference to their other ethnic candidates 
who do not. 
In the case of the treasurer's post (question 7), Tan Seng 
Seng has to make a decision whether to support the candidacy 
of Lee, who has the backing of the Chinese religious group, 
or the other two candidates, Ah Chuan and Yap, who have the 
support of the Chinese grass-root and Malay elites, 
respectively. If Tan Seng Seng is expected to stand firmly 
behind Lee, this can be taken to mean that Tan Seng Seng has 
religious obligation as a priority in his mind, since in all 
the choices ethnic background is identical. 
As shown in Tables 5.13 & 5.14, both the Chinese and Malay 
subjects seem to have clearly indicated that religious 
obligation is not an important influence among the Chinese 
in Malaysia. They have indicated this by showing their 
lowest priority for Lee who is supposed to represent the 
importance of religion to the Chinese. Only 4% of the 
Chinese and 8% of the Malays have indicated that Tan Seng 
Seng will support Lee. The majority of the Chinese (85%) and 
Malay (87%) subjects have rather strongly predicted other 
candidates (Yap and Chuah) who are pictured as non-religious 
candidates. Both the male and female subjects across the 
ethnic groups responded to this without much variation. 
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Table 5.13: Treasurer's Post by, Ethnic Group (X) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Chuah 34 35 11 9 
Yap 51 52 44 35 
Lee 48 25 48 
Other 11 5 20 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.14: Treasurer's Post by, Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Chuah 32 36 35 34 14 8 7 10 
Yap 54 47 55 49 42 45 33 38 
Lee 536 10 24 26 52 43 
Other 9 14 47 20 21 8 9 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In the case of Tan Seng Seng's mother, although the support 
for religious obligation seem to have increased 
substantially to 25% among the Chinese, 55% still do not 
anticipate this to be the case. Among the Malays, however, a 
slightly higher percentage seems to anticipate the important 
religious influence on the choice of Tan Seng Seng's 
mother (48% compared to 44%). No gender difference was 
observed among the Chinese and Malays in their prediction 
about Tan Seng Seng's mother's choice. 
The above result is again very consistent with what the 
subjects thought Tan Seng Seng's daughter's possible 
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reaction would be in the case of electing the student union 
president (question 8) (Tables 5.15 & 5.16). Tan Seng Seng's 
daughter was predicted by 60% of the Chinese to support the 
candidates who are not religiously committed (Ah Huat and Ah 
Chong). Only 35% predicted Ah Hock, who stood for religious 
commitment as her choice. A much higher percentage (52%) of 
the Malay subjects, however, have predicted the possibility 
of the choice of Tan Seng Seng's daughter being influenced 
by religious obligation. 
Table 5.15: Student Union President by, Ethnic Group (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
Chinese Malays Chinese Malays 
Ah Huat 12 12 6 13 
Ah Chong 48 32 19 9 
Ah Hock 35 52 61 72 
Other 54 14 6 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.16: Student Union President by, Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Tan Seng Seng Tan's Mother 
CM CF MM MF CM CF MM MF 
Ah Huat 15 9 12 13 6 5 15 9 
Ah Chong 39 56 27 38 16 21 10 9 
Ah Hock 38 32 58 45 59 64 66 79 
Other 8334 18 10 93 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
191 
A clear shift in opinion was observed when the subjects 
predicted the choice of Tan Seng Seng's mother. The majority 
of the Chinese subjects (61%) and the Malays (72%) now seem 
to believe that religious obligation will be a greater 
influence. Only 25% of the Chinese and 22% of the Malay 
subjects thought that Tan Seng Seng's mother would wish her 
grand-daughter to vote for candidates who are not committed 
to their religion. 
In Malaysia, a person's religion can often coincide with an 
ethnic label or differences. In such a situation, religion 
can also be a matter of concern. It is probably religious 
obligation, and not entirely ethnic consciousness or ethnic 
differences, that might influence an individual like Tan 
Seng Seng's daughter in deciding whether to marry someone 
from a different ethnic and religious background. However, 
it is difficult to separate these two influences. For most 
Malaysians, irrespective of their ethnic background, because 
of their overlapping ethnic and religious boundaries, any 
indication of strength in one of these factors does not 
invalidate the other. The subjects seem to be less concerned 
about the importance of the 'Chinese religion' in the two 
above cases. Yet the influence of ethnic differences and 
religious obligation among the members of ethnic groups in 
Malaysia can be seen to go hand in hand, reinforcing rather 
than contradicting each other. This is especially so in 
interethnic interactions which involve the Malay ethnic 
group, because the prevalent social division on the basis of 
Malay/non-Malay also coincides and influences, by and large, 
192 
the corresponding Muslim-non-Muslim division of the 
population. Furthermore, in the cases of treasurer's post 
and student union president, the tests are concerned only 
with the strength of religious obligation within the Chinese 
group. But in the case of mixed marriage the test involved 
relationship with other ethnic groups. The Chinese may not 
be very religious, but this is quite a different issue from 
accepting someone from a different religious group as a 
marriage partner. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results seem to show that personal obligation has been 
viewed by a vast majority of the Chinese subjects as the 
most important influential factor that will undermine the 
influence of ethnic preference in 4 out of 6 cases (96% in 
the case of bringing a friend home, 87% in the case of 
child's playmate, 76% in the case of office boy candidate, 
and 98% in the case of wedding party). Consistently, this 
view is also reflected in the likely action of the older 
generation, although the percentages in support of personal 
obligation were reduced (80% in the case of bringing a 
friend home, 56% in the case of child's playmate, 50% in the 
case of office-boy candidate and 83% in the case of wedding 
party). But in two other cases (supporting boss and mixed 
marriage) the subjects did not seem to think that personal 
obligation will overwhelmingly overpower ethnic sentiments 
especially in the case of mixed marriage where the subjects 
clearly seem to indicate that ethnic sentiments would take 
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preference over personal obligation (69% in Tan Seng Seng's 
case and 71% in his mother's). Both the male and female 
Chinese subjects, without any significant disparity between 
them, have also expressed the above patterns in their 
predictions. 
The Malay subjects seem to predict a similar possible 
influence in all the cases with regards to Tan Seng Seng 
and, in 4 out of 6 cases, with regards to his mother. But 
they seem to have over-estimated the Chinese ethnic 
sentiment in all the cases across generations. This seems to 
correspond with the general tendency of the dominant groups 
in any society who are likely to see the minority groups as 
'sticking together'. The Chinese, on the other hand, may be 
more reluctant to indicate a lesser concern for their duty 
of personal obligation because this may be viewed as down 
grading their own culture and moral standing, thus effecting 
their dignity. It is not surprising if the Chinese subjects 
try to avoid creating too much of a 'bad' image of 
themselves in revealing an opinion which emphasises ethnic 
sentiments. 
In all societies, members of ethnic groups are prepared for 
various culturally-defined roles through the process of 
socialisation. Norms that are socially and morally valued 
are installed in individuals based on the general cultural, 
or religious principles of a particular group. The act of 
personal obligation is one such norm. This norm becomes part 
and parcel of an individual's moral duty in everyday life. 
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Its importance as a moral duty would be usually considered 
by members of ethnic groups to accomplish the aspirations of 
cultural and moral values for which his or her group members 
stand. In many instances, if not all, this act of personal 
obligation is a universal norm because the act is based on 
universal values, such as being truthful, loving and caring, 
and rendering help to others in need. 
People of different ethnic groups may ignore each other for 
some reasons when it comes to living in the same 
neighbourhood or working together. This may include reasons 
based on ethnic prejudices, differences and ethnocentric 
preferences. But under normal circumstances, people may 
suppress their ethnic sentiments and carry on with daily 
interaction with members of other ethnic groups for 
practical reasons. Individuals from different ethnic groups 
who come in increasing numbers to live in the same 
neighbourhood and work in the same places are likely to find 
it necessary to extend their duty of personal obligation 
beyond ethnic boundaries. Under highly violent situations 
between ethnic groups, personal obligation may be hindered 
from overruling an individual's ethnic sentiments at micro- 
level interaction. The situation in Malaysia at present is 
relatively peaceful without physical ethnic clashes. 
The subjects' overwhelming support for , the possible 
influence of personal obligation in most of the cases 
presented to them seems to indicate that ethnic 
consideration does not appear to possess a strong appeal 
195 
among the Chinese in their daily social course of 
interaction of this type. Acts of personal obligation across 
ethnic boundary, such as allowing children to make friends 
with other children, helping neighbours, attending the 
wedding of a co-worker's daughter or even showing support 
for boss in a multiethnic society like Malaysia is just a 
practical thing to anticipate. Cooperation and helping one 
another, for example in the same neighbourhood and 
workplace, practically becomes unavoidable in order to 
maintain a peaceful and social atmosphere among different 
ethnic neighbours and workers. But their action which may 
appear to support the influence of personal obligation 
across ethnic groups does not necessarily mean that they 
have ignored their ethnic identity. In Malaysia, a 
neighbourhood cooperation scheme called the Rukun Tetangga 
has been implemented for this very purpose. The scheme is 
aimed at creating more awareness among the people about the 
importance of 'cooperation, help and trust among neighbours 
regardless of ethnic backgrounds. Ignoring one another on 
the basis of ethnic difference could be an impractical 
attitude. But what we need to ask here is under what 
circumstances ethnicity may take relevance in their everyday 
lives? 
The influence of personal obligation is strongly predicted 
in the case of wedding party (98%), bringing a friend home 
(96%) and child's playmate (87%). But in the case of office 
boy, it was reduced to 76% and further reduced to 42% in the 
case of supporting boss and to 4% in the case of mixed 
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marriages. Looking from the perspective of the influence of 
ethnic consideration, the subjects appear to believe that it 
exerts more influence in the case of office-boy, supporting 
boss and mixed marriages than the other three cases (Table 
5.17). A different pattern of prediction starts to emerge in 
these three cases. A clear cut exception is, however, in the 
case of mixed marriage. In this case, both males and females 
across ethnic groups have expressed their disposition of the 
possibility of ethnic sentiment as an overpowering 
influence. For the older generation, almost the same pattern 
of ratings was observed but with much greater confidence in 
the influence of ethnic sentiments. The emergence of ethnic 
influence significantly corresponds with the different 
nature of interethnic situations studied. This could explain 
the variation in the influence of personal obligation over 
ethnic preference or vice-versa, even if we accept the 
questions as the 'true test'. 
Table 5.17: Percentage Predicting Ethnic Preference as a 
Choice 
Tan Seng Seng Mother 
Chinese Malay Chinese Malay 
Wedding Party 0 1 6 23 
Bringing Friend Home 1 4 14 35 
Child's Playmate 9 11 32 44 
Office-Boy Candidate 15 17 33 61 
Supporting Boss 25 32 24 46 
Mixed Marriage 69 80 71 84 
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The first three compared to the other three following 
cases, are very much a simple social matter by nature. 
The subjects could not anticipate any strong challenge 
on the basis of ethnic consideration to stop anyone from 
fulfilling simple everyday duties of personal obligation. 
For this reason, the Chinese would not really mind attending 
the wedding of an Indian workmate's daughter, allowing their 
children to bring home a Malay friend, or even allowing 
their next-door Malay neighbour to take home their children. 
But in the case of office-boy candidate, a sense of personal 
obligation towards a neighbour appears to be better 
challenged by ethnic consideration to help one's own ethnic 
member to secure the job. This challenge does reflect the 
possible influence of the wider practice of ethnic 
preferential economic policy (New Economic Policy) by the 
Government to help positively the Malays. The policy has 
been an influential factor since 1969, dominating the issues 
of jobs and equity distributions between ethnic groups in 
Malaysian society. The Chinese may not be reluctant to 
counter balance the government's effort to help the Malays 
in economy by showing more favouritism to co-ethnic members 
as long they feel socially and politically safe to do so. A 
greater degree of ethnic consciousness as such can be 
expected in the case of office-boy candidate. 
Moreover, ethnic sentiments play an important role in 
matters that are political in nature, such as in the case of 
supporting boss. Again, the wider practice of ethnic 
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politics that has been determining the political trends and 
voting patterns in Malaysian society, cannot be assumed to 
pass by without influencing the mind of a Chinese person, 
like Tan Seng Seng, to ally with his fellow Chinese 
workmates to bring in a Chinese as their leader or boss in 
the department. On the other hand, because of a good 
personal working rapport that might have been formed between 
Tan Seng Seng and his Malay boss, a strong influence of 
personal obligation can also be expected in this case. Thus 
these two factors in this circumstance, compared to other 
cases, seem to create a serious conflict of interest for Tan 
Seng Seng. As reflected through the prediction, a 
considerable proportion of subjects (33% in the case of Tan 
Seng Seng, and 45% of his mother) could not easily 
determine, as in the other cases, the overriding influence 
of personal obligation over ethnic preference. 
Mixed marriages could come about much more easily in 
societies where free and wide interethnic interactions are 
viable. Proximity, however, is not the only factor that 
influences its occurrence. Mixed marriage is not a common 
phenomenon, particularly in societies where ethnic influence 
is still very important in the lives of ethnic groups. Any 
process, or formation of inter-personal relationship like 
mixed marriage, which can blur ethnic root and identity, 
will not be accepted that easily. On this very basis, the 
rate of mixed marriages have been used as an indicator in 
sociological studies to measure the assimilation process, 
including social distance, ethnic prejudice and stereotype. 
199 
If this sociological assumption is justifiable, than the 
predictions of the Chinese in the case of mixed marriage 
clearly indicates that Chinese ethnicity is very much an 
influential factor that can prevent any social process from 
endangering their ethnic identity. 
The results which seem to show the lack of a strong 
religious commitment among the Chinese do not in any way 
prove that the Chinese have no problems in accepting the 
Muslim religion, which is an integral element of Malay 
identity, through mixed marriages. This religious influence 
should be differentiated between a person's own religious 
commitment and the rejection of other religions. For the 
majority of Chinese (as well as Indians) who in Malaysia are 
non-Muslims, the refusal to marry a Malay is also very much 
a reflection of their rejection of being compelled to 
convert and accept a new Muslim identity, which is almost 
unavoidable in such circumstances. Thus this rejection, 
which is not necessarily due to being very religious, is 
still a part of their religious commitment. The Chinese may 
refuse to show a strong commitment towards their own 
religion as an influence in everyday life. This does not 
imply that they will easily accept a person of another 
religion as a life partner, particularly when marrying a 
Malay means they have to convert and become a Muslim. As a 
consequence, one cannot conclude that religious 
consideration, or identity (to be non-Muslim) is not an 
important factor among the Chinese when compelled to accept 
a new religious identity through mixed marriages. 
200 
The predominance of personal obligation over the influence 
of ethnic sentiments can be possibly anticipated in most of 
the interactions involving social matters that are informal 
in nature. Nevertheless, as the subjects have indicated, 
ethnic sentiment can provoke a strong influence among 
Chinese individuals in some other situations. Firstly, in 
the situation where their acts will seriously endanger their 
ethnic identity. Secondly, ethnic sentiments appear to gain 
greater strength in social situations that are most likely 
to be influenced by the wider practice of ethnic politics 




SOCIAL CHANGES: CULTURAL, INTERETHNIC CONTACT, SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
In the two previous chapters, the strength of ethnic 
alignment among the Malaysian Chinese was assessed in the 
context of hypothetical social situations. The subjects were 
asked to express how they believe a fictional typical 
Malaysian Chinese would act in numerous social situations 
where ethnic consideration is likely to contradict material 
and status self-interests and values of personal obligation. 
This chapter, and the succeeding one, looks at another way 
of supplementing our understanding of the significance of 
ethnicity in Malaysia. This is done by examining the data 
concerning subjects' own interethnic 'experiences' and 
'attitudes'. We will examine the subjects 'experiences' 
related to their cultural adaptation, social contacts, and 
their 'attitudes' concerning social and political issues and 
problems. This will allow us to see whether the Chinese and 
Malay subjects have grown closer in these aspects of social 
changes in society. These 'experiences' and 'attitudes' 
measure the extent of similarities and agreement, or 
differences and disagreement between the Chinese and Malays. 
These measures are important in permitting us to see whether 
or not there is any basis for believing that social changes 
and modernisation in Malaysia have counter-balanced the 
importance people attached to ethnic sentiments and ethnic 
identity. 
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The following areas of 'experiences' and 'attitudes' of the 
subjects will be explored for the above purposes. 
(i) Interethnic contact and cultural exposures 
Since colonial times, ethnic relations among the major 
ethnic groups in Peninsular Malaysia have been marked to a 
large extent by their separation in economic activities and 
residential areas. As a consequence, this separation has 
restricted their interethnic contacts and intercultural 
exposures. Firstly, we will explore the subjects' 
interethnic contact exposure in their residential areas. By 
comparing the changes in interethnic contact exposure as 
shown in residential areas between the Malays and the 
Chinese subjects' during their childhood, and currently, we 
should be able to see to what extent these ethnic groups 
have come to live in close proximity after Independence. 
Secondly, we shall focus on the intercultural adaptation 
among the subjects. The learning of the different aspects of 
another culture which is considered appropriate by members 
of another ethnic group may occur quite extensively among 
members of smaller and politically weaker groups. In other 
circumstances, assimilation or partial cultural adaptation 
may be required by the socio-cultural policy designed by the 
state. In this respect, the Malay language has been in use 
as the official and national language in Malaysia. The 
language can be expected to stand at the forefront of social 
interactions among the members of the different ethnic 
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groups. English is another common language which can be 
expected to play an important role in interethnic 
interactions. The extent of the usage of these languages, 
and the influence of other ethnic languages among the ethnic 
groups, can be understood only in the context of wider 
intercultural exposure. For this purpose, the usage of 
different languages, language-based newspapers and 
television programmes have been explored. 
(ii) Interethnic contact 
Development of mixed ethnic surroundings in residential 
areas and workplaces can be essential conditions needed to 
bring people of different ethnic backgrounds closer and 
enhance the development of common social and political 
attitudes. Historically, interaction among the Malays, 
Chinese and Indians in Malaysia has been restricted by the 
vast differences in their occupations, areas of residence 
and organisational activities. For the later generations, 
however, the restrictions on interethnic contacts could have 
been diluted by the interrelated processes of urbanisation, 
industrialisation and modernisation in the society. The 
effect of these processes will be explored more specifically 
in the next chapter. The questions on the actual interethnic 
contacts or interactions were designed to understand: (a) 
frequency of contact (b) ethnic members the subjects come 
into contact with the most, and (c) the various social 
settings, or avenues that play an important role in 
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providing the networks for these shared interactions and 
contacts to take place among the subjects. 
(iii) Attitudes and Perceptions 
The tangible divisions among ethnic groups discloses only 
part of ethnic relations. From the discussion in chapter 1, 
we know that in terms of ethnic labour force distribution, 
the Malays form the majority of agricultural workers, while 
the Chinese are dominant in the modern economic sectors. We 
are also aware that the Malays are the least urbanised group 
compared to the Chinese and Indians. But the Malays made 
rapid progress following the implementation of the New 
Economic Policy (see Chapter 1: 39-41). This was acknowledged 
in the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995): 'The improvement in 
the pattern of income distribution reflects the significant 
progress made by Bumiputra in increasing their employment 
and economic participation in modern sectors of 
economy.... enable Bumiputra's share of income in the higher 
brackets of the income distribution to improve' (Malaysia, 
1991: 10-11). 
Objective measurements, such as changes in the distribution 
of occupations and income, do not necessarily bring about 
appropriate or equal changes in the opinions, perceptions or 
attitudes of the people. We also need to understand the 
prevailing social and political attitudes of the different 
ethnic groups in the society in the light of the 
government's intensive measures to promote social mobility 
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and modernisation among the dominant Malays. For the purpose 
of examining this subjective dimension, the attitudes and 
perceptions of the Chinese and Malay subjects in the 
following two areas have been investigated: 
(a) Issues of national interests and problems 
The on-going social and political issues and problems in a 
society are also capable of bringing together people of 
different ethnic backgrounds. They may share their views, 
opinions, beliefs on, or attitudes towards certain things 
that directly or indirectly affect them. Conversely these 
issues and problems can also form a basis of interethnic 
conflict in the society. This depends on how the members of 
each ethnic group view the importance of, are actually 
affected by, or assess the effect or potential consequence 
of social and political issues, including national 
strategies and symbols and other problems in their everyday 
lives as citizens. 
In this survey, among the other factors studied will be: i) 
the way in which people view the importance of the 
Rukunegara, the national ideology which was introduced after 
the 1969 riots to bring about greater unity among the 
people; ii) the seriousness of social problems faced by the 
country; and, iii) their attitudes (agreement or 
disagreement) on the following seven statements that 
reflects various social and political issues of national 
interests: 
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1) It is disgraceful if people fail to stand while the 
country's National Anthem is being played. 
2) Compared to other countries, there is much racial 
discrimination in Malaysia. 
3) People should not be dependent on government 
programmes; these destroy people's ability to look 
after themselves. 
4) The Indonesian migrants are socially undesirable, they 
take our jobs away. 
5) Those who are dissatisfied with Malaysia should 
emigrate to another country of their choice. 
6) This country does not belong to the Malays alone, it 
belongs to all Malaysians. 
7) A multi-ethnic population in this country has proven to 
be more advantageous than disadvantageous. 
(b) Perceptions on ethnic relations 
Malaysia is among the few countries in the world that is 
actively involved in implementing ethnic preferential public 
policies since Independence. Apart from the economic policy 
which is aimed at rectifying the ethnic imbalances in 
economic sectors, additional socio-cultural policies and 
political measures have also been implemented to bring about 
other social changes for unity and flexibility in the 
relations among ethnic groups. Thus, it is important to 
understand whether there is any trend towards mutual 
agreement in the opinions or perceptions of the people with 
respect to quality of ethnic relations at present, and 
whether they perceive any improvements by comparison with 
the past and for the future. 
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(iv) Organisational membership, choice of party and leader 
One of the prominent and influential features of Malaysian 
society since before Independence is that of communal 
politics that have created organisational divisions among 
the Malays, Chinese and Indians. The ethnic organisational 
memberships, ethnic political parties and their ethnic 
leaders have played prominent roles in the way in which the 
people express the importance of their ethnic identity. This 
survey also aims to discover whether these ethnic boundaries 
are weakening, by looking at how the subjects express their 
wishes or choices in relation to their organisational 
membership, choice of political party and leader. 
Findings 
(i) Interethnic Contact and Intercultural Exposures 
(a) Ethnic Composition of Neighbourhood 
The ethnic composition of the neighbourhood does not really 
reveal the actual interethnic contact among the subjects, 
but it does tell us of the general interethnic exposure 
based on their residential areas. Unlike the Chinese, the 
Malays may not possibly experience wider interethnic 
exposure during their childhood. This is because the 
majority of them live in rural areas, whereas the Chinese 
majority live in urban residence. 
On the whole, the general distribution of the ethnic 
population in the country is reflected in the childhood 
interethnic exposures among the subjects. As the findings 
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show, most of the Malay subjects (86%) had lived in Malay- 
dominated areas during their childhood, most likely in the 
rural areas. Only 45% of the Chinese had lived in Chinese- 
dominated areas in their early years and most likely in the 
older housing schemes in urban areas (Table 6.1). Only 14% 
of the Malays lived in mixed areas. The rest of the Chinese 
(55%), had been exposed to mixed ethnic surroundings. This 
includes 26% who had also lived in Malay-dominated areas and 
29% who lived in other mixed areas. 
Table 6.1 
Ethnic Composition during Childhood, by Ethnic Group(%) 
Malays Chinese 
Mostly Malays 86 26 
Mostly Chinese 1 45 
Malay-Chinese equal 10 21 
Other mixed areas 38 
100 100 
Interethnic exposure in the neighbourhood at present showed 
that 57% of the Malays still live in mainly Malay areas 
(Table 6.2). Compared to their childhood, the percentage of 
Chinese who live in ethnic community enclosures has not 
reduced or, changed much. In fact, a 3% increase was noticed 
instead. It is not surprising that the percentage of the 
Malay subjects who lived in mixed ethnic areas has increased 
(43%). Since the Chinese dominated the urban areas in 
Malaysia from the beginning, there is not the same pattern 
of rural-urban migration among them in the search for better 
job opportunities in urban areas. In contrast, for the 
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Malays this is definitely the trend since Independence, 
especially after the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy. 
Table 6.2 
Ethnic Composition at Present, by Ethnic Group(%) 
Malays Chinese 
Mostly Malays 57 22 
Mostly Chinese 13 48 
Malay-Chinese equal 25 24 
Other mixed areas 56 
100 100 
In the post-Independence period, from 1957 to 1970, the 
proportion of Malays living in urban areas rose from 19.3% 
to 21.8% (Sidhu and Ahmad, 1978: 26). According to the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1986), the urban Malay population has 
increased drastically to 30%. With the government policies 
and strategies to increase Malay participation in modern 
economic sectors, they are encouraged to move to urban areas 
for better job opportunities. For example, the Malay labour 
force as part of the total manufacturing sector in 1970 was 
29% and it increased to 46% in 1985 (Goh, 1991: 80). During 
this period, the expansion of the government sector also 
increased urban Malay population through the newly- 
established quasi-government corporations like The Council 
of Trust for the Indigenous People (MARA) and State Economic 
Development Corporation (SEDC) (Sharif, 1982: 85). Jesudason 
observes, 'The expansion of state enterprise, the vigorous 
promotion of Malay business, and the battery of regulations 
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imposed on private firms to employ Malays in rough 
proportion to their population now opened up a greater 
number of positions in the urban sector than before' (1990: 
111). 
(b) Usage of Language 
As one of the intercultural exposures and exchanges among 
the subjects, the bilingual usage of common languages of 
Malay and English have developed extensively in Malaysia 
(Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Percentage of Subjects Speaking Different 
Languages, by Ethnic Group 
Malays Chinese 
Mother tongue 100 100 
Mother tongue only 30 0 
Mother tongue & English 70 100 
Malay & Chinese 6 100 
The Malay and Chinese subjects, however, also indicate a 
strong adherence to using their mother tongue in their 
everyday lives. All of them were able to speak their mother 
tongue. Malay has commanded the number one position as a 
common language, as it is not only spoken by the Malays, but 
also by all the Chinese subjects. Only 70% of the Malays 
speak English. To a large extent, this bilingual trait can 
be accounted for by the nature of the sample used in this 
survey. The Malay and Chinese respondents, apart from their 
working experience, are also part-time degree course 
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students at university. Both their educational and working 
experiences would have exposed them to the use of both the 
Malay and English languages. 
It is also important to note that Malay in Malaysia has also 
become the language of communication among the ordinary 
people who do not speak English. It has become a language of 
convenience, or "bazaar" language. English is still being 
widely used among the educated groups, especially among the 
non-Malays in their everyday interaction. The Malay language 
has been transmitted to the non-Malay groups of Chinese and 
Indians, rather successfully. But very few Malays speak 
Chinese or Tamil. This is because of the language policy of 
the country. The promotion of Malay as the sole official and 
national language of the country, especially through the 
education system, has successfully produced a new generation 
of non-Malay Malaysians who can speak the Malay language 
more fluently than the older generation of the non-Malays. 
The common bilingual characteristic of the Malays and 
Chinese has also obviously exposed them to much wider 
interethnic contacts and intercultural communications and 
exchanges via other mass media like newspapers, television 
and radio. This was indicated by the subjects in their usage 
of language-based newspapers and television programmes where 
Malay and English continue to play a vital role (Tables 6.4 
& 6.5). 
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Table 6.4: Percentage of Subjects Reading Different 
Language Newspapers, by Ethnic Group 
Malays Chinese 
Malay newspaper 99 90 
Chinese newspaper 0 56 
English newspaper 85 92 
Table 6.5: Percentage of Subjects Viewing Different 
Language Programmes, by Ethnic Group 
Malays Chinese 
Malay programmes 99 83 
Chinese programmes 70 93 
Indian programmes 52 27 
English programmes 99 99 
Almost all the Malay subjects read the Malay newspapers, and 
85% also read the English newspapers. A big majority of 
Chinese read the English (92%) and Malay (90%) newspapers. 
But only 56% read the Chinese newspapers (Table 6.4). 
Among the Chinese, 93% watched Chinese television 
programmes, 99% English programmes and 83% Malay. 27% of 
them also watched Indian programmes. Both Malay and English 
programmes were watched by 99% of the Malays, and Chinese 
programmes by 70%. Just over half of them (52%) were also 
inclined to watch Indian programmes. 
This is again not surprising as Malay and English are the 
media used widely in audio-visual broadcasts, and in 
newspapers circulated in Malaysia, compared to other ethnic 
language-based television programmes or newspapers. The 
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Malay and English-based media are more attractive, and 
easily available to inform anyone about the wider society 
and the world, politics, business and job opportunities, 
sports and entertainment. 
The usage of these practical and convenient media of 
communications is not in any way to be seen as undermining 
the importance of Malaysian ethnicity, especially of the 
Chinese who have widely adopted the Malay language. The 
importance of the mother tongue to Chinese and Malay 
ethnicity is not eliminated from the Malaysian scene. This 
was indicated by the experiences of the subjects. For the 
Malays, the importance of their language to their culture 
and ethnicity has been strongly enhanced by granting it the 
status of the only official and national language. Although 
the Chinese have adopted the Malay language, the widespread 
use of the Chinese language firmly indicates that their 
different dialects are very much central to their culture 
and ethnicity. It continues to foster their ethnic ties and 
communication in the private spheres of their ethnic 
community. Thus, their use of Malay cannot really be 
understood to have infiltrated the intraethnic sphere of the 
Chinese community. 
(ii) Interethnic Contacts 
Interethnic contact is one of the important variables that 
can be used to measure the effect of modernisation on ethnic 
relations in a multiethnic society like Malaysia. We shall 
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explore the effect of changes in the interethnic contact 
exposures among the subjects on their social and political 
attitudes in the next chapter. But in this section, we shall 
explore the interethnic contact patterns among the subjects. 
The frequency of interethnic contact itself is a reliable 
indicator of the way in which modernisation and economic 
development in a society like Malaysia may bring together 
different ethnic groups into greater interaction and 
consequently lead to the weakening of the influence of 
ethnic attachments. 
One of the main objectives of the Government's economic 
planning since 1970 is to increase the participation of the 
Malay population in the life and work of the urban areas and 
in the economic sectors. Unfortunately, there is not any 
publication of ethnic distribution in any particular modern 
industry for us to quote as an example, except the general 
statistics that show the changes in the ethnic labour force 
distribution in various occupational groups. However, in the 
Pioneer Programme which aimed to bring in foreign investment 
in the country, Jesudason writes, '... the pioneer firms 
roughly met the expectation that they hire Malays in 
proportion to population ratios; Malays constituted 42% of 
the labour force in pioneer firms... ' (1990: 58). 
The expansion of state enterprises, for example, through the 
National Corporation, National Equity Corporation, State 
Development Corporation and the Heavy Industry Corporation 
of Malaysia, has enabled the Government not only to increase 
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Malay-based investment, but also to provide greater 
employment opportunities for the Malays in the modern 
economic sectors, thus encouraging Malay urbanisation. We 
have earlier mentioned the increase of the Malay urban 
population and their participation in the manufacturing 
sector: the increase of the Malays in other modern sectors 
could have also produced greater interaction between the 
Malays and non-Malay populations in urban environments. For 
example, between 1970 and 1988, an increase in their 
participation occurred in clerical posts (35.4% to 55.1%), 
sales (26.7% to 36.5%), service industries (44.3% to 58.7%) 
and in production sectors (34.2% to 45.9%) (Malaysia, 1986: 
104; 1988; 66). More importantly, the creation of the new 
Malay middle class and upper class (Ali, 1991: 112; 
Jesudason, 1990: 111-112; Khalid, 1993: 103-105) could have 
led to greater contact between ethnic groups members at 
workplaces and in residential areas in urban centres. With 
the ability to communicate in Malay and English, especially 
among the educated groups of middle and upper occupation 
categories, contact between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians 
is really only a matter of opportunities for meeting. 
To the question of how often the subjects come into contact 
with members of other ethnic groups in general, the findings 
show that most of them have established frequent contact 
(Tables 6.6). Notably among the Chinese, 80% of them 
reported that they frequently interacted with members. of 
other ethnic groups. Only 18% consider that their meeting 
takes place occasionally, and for a negligible 2%, this 
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contact rarely occurs. A slightly lower percentage (62%) 
of the Malays than the Chinese, maintained frequent contact 
with other ethnic group members, 31% occasionally and 7% 
seldom. 
Table 6.6: Contact with Other Ethnic Groups, by Ethnic 
Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Frequently 62 80 
Sometimes 31 18 
Seldom 7 2 
100 100 
Tables 6.7,6.8 and 6.9 show the frequency of contact with 
different ethnic groups, including members of their own 
ethnic group. While the majority of the subjects may 
experience wide interethnic interaction, contact with their 
own ethnic group members also has been strongly preserved. 
Intraethnic interaction is still the most extensive 
among both the Malays and Chinese. Only 2% feel that 
contact with members of their own ethnic groups does not 
happen frequently. 
More Chinese come into contact with the Malays (79% 
frequently and 20% sometimes) in comparison with the Malays' 
contact with the Chinese (56% frequently, 39% sometimes and 
5% seldom). Both the Chinese and Malay subjects have social 
contact with the Indians too, members of the third major 
ethnic group, although not as much interactions take place 
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between the Chinese and the Malays. Among the Malays, 36% 
meet Indians frequently, 46% sometimes and 18% seldom, while 
38% of the Chinese meet them frequently, 41% sometimes and 
21% seldom. In part this reflects the relative size of the 
three groups. 
Table 6.7: Contact with Malays, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Frequently 98 79 
Sometimes 2 20 
Seldom 01 
100 100 
Table 6.8: Contact with Chinese, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Frequently 56 98 
Sometimes 39 2 
Seldom 50 
100 100 
Table 6.9: Contact with Indians by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Frequently 36 38 
Sometimes 46 41 
Seldom 18 21 
100 100 
As expected, opportunities for wider contact between ethnic 
groups among the subjects have presented themselves mainly 
in the workplace and residential settings. Table 6.10 shows 
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the result of the question asking the subjects where they 
come into contact with members of other ethnic groups. 
Interethnic contact among the Chinese and Malay subjects 
takes place more frequently at the workplace than at any 
other place (97% among the Chinese, 91% among the Malays). 
Other modern venues, like residential areas, shopping 
centres, public gatherings, formal organisations, parties 
and festivals, have also provided these opportunities. Among 
other important identified avenues for the Chinese are 
residential areas (54%), public gatherings (37%) and 
shopping centres (35%). Whereas for the Malays, these are 
shopping centres (54%), residential areas (52%) and public 
gatherings (36%). 
Table 6.10: Percentage of Subjects Making Interethnic 
Contact in Different Places, by Ethnic Group 
Malays Chinese 
Residential areas 52 54 
Workplace 91 97 
Shopping centre 54 35 
Children's school 43 
Public functions 36 37 
Organisation meetings 20 19 
Other places 29 38 
To the question about the occupational categories of those 
contacted, as shown in Table 6.11, most of the subjects 
contacted come from the general services occupational 
groups. This was indicated by 84% of the Chinese and 75% of 
the Malays. This is quite understandable because the 
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majority of the subjects also fall into this category. Like 
many other developing countries, this is one of the most 
rapidly growing sectors under the expansion of a capitalist 
economy in Malaysia. The growth of the middle range 
occupational groups is an urban phenomenon. This 
occupational section of the population in a multiethnic 
society should offer a wide opportunity for interethnic 
contact and greater appreciation of values of interethnic 
group tolerance and understanding. In the following 
questions, we should be able to measure whether the 
subjects' social and political attitudes are in accordance 
with their vast interethnic contact experiences. 
Table 6.11: 
Percentage of Subjects Who Come into Contact With Persons 
of Different Occupational Categories, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Agricultural workers 10 12 
Factory workers 17 13 
General services 75 84 
Business 18 8 
Executive 17 22 
(3) Attitudes and Perceptions 
(a) Rukunegara 
It will be unusual for the subjects not to remember the 
Rukunegara. The national ideology has been effectively 
publicised through media and exhibited in many important 
places in schools and government departments, especially 
220 
during the early years of its launch. It is repeated at 
school assemblies and occasionally will be included in the 
speeches of political leaders. Candidates who are called for 
interviews for government jobs will try to memorise the five 
principles of the Rukunegara, anticipating that the 
interviewers may ask about it. The government publication, 
the Sixth Malaysia Plan in 1991, still continued to 
enunciate the declaration and the principles of the national 
ideology in its opening page. 
The subjects have accordingly demonstrated that they share 
an awareness of the national ideology. There are five 
principles in the Rukunegara that form the national ideology 
for integration. The majority of the Malays and the Chinese 
seem to be fully aware of all these principles (Table 6.12). 
Only 7% of the Malay subjects remember it partially, and 1% 
do not remember it at all. Among the Chinese, those who 
remember it partially are 11% and do not remember it at all, 
2%. 
Table 6.12: Rukunegara, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Remember fully 91 87 
Remember partly 7 11 
Do not remember 12 
100 100 
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(b) National Social Problems 
Both the Chinese and Malays have picked drug addiction and 
corruption as the primary two most important social problems 
among the national social problems listed (Tables 6.13). 
Corruption was indicated by 66% and drug addiction by 57% of 
the Chinese, whereas in the reverse pattern of priority, the 
Malays have picked drug addiction as the number one problem 
(62%) and corruption as second (46%). 
Table 6.13: Percentage Who Believe These as Serious 
National Problems, by Ethnic Group 
Malays Chinese 
Unequal access to Education 6 50 
Corruption 46 66 
Political Disunity 36 21 
Ethnic Differences 28 42 
Religious Deviation 7 11 
Drug Addiction 62 57 
Poverty 32 28 
There have been some immense 'national' incidents of 
corruption which made the public aware of it, as a serious 
national problem. In early 1980s, Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad adopted the slogan, 'clean, efficient and 
trustworthy' in his new administration, and the National 
Bureau of Investigation made many arrests in connection with 
corruption. However, the important events of corruption that 
might have created a common awareness of this problem among 
the people are the Bank Rakyat scandal in the mid 1970s and 
the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance scandal in the early 1980s. 
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Many prominent Malay political leaders were implicated, and 
in the case of Bank Rakyat, the Chief Minister of Selangor 
was arrested and convicted. 
One of the biggest corruption scandals that involved the 
Chinese leaders was the fraud in Deposit-Taking Co- 
operatives sponsored by the MCA. While the Chinese may 
recognise corruption practices among their ethnic group, 
they are more aware of the corruption among the Malay 
politicians. One of the reasons for this is the allegation 
of corruption and malpractices associated with government 
departments, and leaders usually brought up by the Chinese 
politicians (eg. Lim Kit Siang) of the opposition party 
(DAP). This may have prompted a higher awareness among the 
Chinese to highlight the inefficiency in the government 
administration and Malay leadership. On the other hand, the 
Malays could be influenced by their ethnic sentiments not to 
highlight such problems, as it will only tarnish the image 
of Malay leadership in the government. 
Drug addiction, too, received much publicity when the 
government declared the problem as the number one national 
problem. The national agency called Pemadam was established 
to rehabilitate drug addicts. More importantly, as a 
punishment, a mandatory law was passed against the drug 
traffickers. Since then, many cases of police arrests and 
severe convictions of drug smugglers have been carried out 
which make the public more aware of this problem. 
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Although the Chinese and Malay subjects have commonly 
indicated corruption in Malaysia as the number one problem, 
as discussed above, their attitudes to some degree also seem 
to be influenced by ethnic perspective among them. Apart 
from this, there are three other problems to which both 
groups display different attitudes. These are political 
disunity (36% Malay and 21% Chinese), unequal access to 
education (6% Malay and 50% Chinese and ethnic differences 
(28% Malay and 42% Chinese). Other problems (religious 
deviation, poverty, ) were not perceived as very important by 
both groups of subjects. 
Means wrote, 'For the most part, UMNO had remained free of 
extreme factionalism, partly because of the strong 
leadership exercised by successive Prime Ministers and 
partly because of the extensive patronage available to 
placate the recurring factionalism which surfaced 
periodically' (1991: 199). This party is the backbone of 
Malay power and political supremacy in the government and 
society. But for the first time in the late 1980s, it faced 
serious factionalism following an open challenge for UMNO 
leadership among prominent Malay leaders. This gave rise to 
a crisis within UMNO leadership and factionalism between two 
groups, well known as "Team All and "Team B" and has 
intensified the schism in the Malay community. As a 
consequence, another Malay party called Semangat 46 was 
formed by a few former UMNO leaders and members to win Malay 
support. Although UMNO still commands strong support from 
the Malay community compared to more regional based parties 
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(Semangat 46 and PAS), factionalism does cause some concern 
among the Malays and this can account for the Malay 
subjects' stronger emphasis than the Chinese on political 
disunity as a national problem. This problem of the UMNO and 
Malays does not seem to concern the Chinese greatly. 
The Chinese, on the other hand, would regard unequal access 
to education and ethnic differences which concern them most 
as serious national problems. Since the implementation of 
the New Economic Policy (1970), the Chinese have faced a new 
era of ethnic preferential strategies by the Malaysian 
government that give priority to the education and economic 
advancement of the Malays. The Malays may be aware of these 
positive discriminatory strategies, and possibly a feeling 
of discontent, among the Chinese. But, as the benefiting 
group, the Malays are not willing, or do not like, to admit 
that these are serious national problems. Conversely, as the 
group directly and adversely affected, the Chinese show 
disagreement with the Malays on interpreting these 
strategies, and more generally, the problem of 'ethnic 
differences' in Malaysia. 
(c) Statements on Social and Political Issues 
The subjects' attitudes on various statements of social and 
political issues are presented in Table 6.14. The tables 
show the percentage of subjects who agreed and disagreed 
with each statement. The category that agreed includes 
subjects who both strongly agreed and agreed to statements. 
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Similarly, the category that disagreed includes subjects who 
both strongly disagreed and disagreed to the statements. 
Differences in the levels of emphasis between the Malay and 
Chinese subjects on their agreement or disagreement can be a 
significant division. It can reflect a situation of 
uncertainty, non-committal attitudes and subtle conflict, or 
division between different ethnic groups regarding 
ethnically important political issues. Some of these 
divisions will be highlighted in the following analysis and 
discussion. Those who showed an indifferent attitude, 
including those who did not at all indicate their responses, 
were very marginal. 
Table 6.14: Subjects' Responses to Statements Questions, 
by Ethnic Group (96) 
Issues Malays Chinese 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 92 94 
Disagree 4 3 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Agree 15 50 
Disagree 82 46 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 82 82 
Disagree 17 16 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 50 53 
Disagree 46 44 
5. Migration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 73 33 
Disagree 23 58 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 89 97 
Disagree 10 1 
7. Advantages of Multiethnic 
Agree 80 89 
Disagree 17 9 
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Differences in political views in the society were revealed 
by the Malay and Chinese subjects through dissimilarities in 
their attitudes concerning "ethnic discrimination" and 
"migration of the dissatisfied" in the statements questions. 
The Malay subjects do not think that racial discrimination 
in Malaysia is higher or worse than in other countries. An 
overwhelming majority (82%) refused to support the 
statement. 61% of them have strongly disagreed with it. 
But among the Chinese, only 46% could reject the statement, 
although most of them (40%) strongly expressed their 
disagreement. 50% of the Chinese think that racial 
discrimination in Malaysia is higher than in any other 
country. 
On the statement that Malaysians should emigrate if 
dissatisfied in Malaysia, the Chinese, compared to the 
Malays, have expressed quite a different view. 58% of them 
do not agree with this view. Among these, 36% rejected the 
view with very strong attitudes of disagreement. Those among 
the Chinese who agreed only form 33%, and again only 9% 
among these very strongly agreed. As for the Malays, 72% of 
them agreed with the statement. A greater percentage (38%) 
also stressed this with a very strong attitude. 
In the case of Malaysia, both the above issues refer to the 
ethnic preferential policy and its possible consequence of 
discontent among the non-Malays. Racial discrimination in 
Malaysia can be viewed only in reference to the government's 
ethnic preferential strategies or positive discrimination to 
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foster the Malays. The most important of these is the New 
Economy Policy. This policy is a direct result of the 
Malays' Constitutional 'special rights' in Malaysia. This 
'special rights' permit positive official discrimination in 
favour of the improvement of the Malays in economy and 
education. The Malays, as argued earlier, cannot possibly 
see a policy that benefits them as a bad one, or Malaysia as 
worse than any other country in terms of racial 
discrimination. In recent years, however, the Malay leaders 
in the government have themselves openly and continuously 
reminded the Malays to be more independent in order to 
achieve the capability to compete successfully with the rest 
of the population in various economic sectors. The issue of 
dependency on government programmes, as such, has become a 
socially accepted view in the society. The Malay subjects 
did not object on paper to agree to it. 
Even though the statement concerning migration of the 
dissatisfied does not directly mention the discontent of the 
non-Malays with the pro-Malay policy, the migration, or 
"brain-drain" problems in Malaysia is in fact very much the 
issue of the non-Malays (Means, 1991: 135). The Malays may 
not hesitate to support the idea that if anyone is 
dissatisfied with the government's public policies of Malay 
preference they should migrate. Referring to the comment of 
the former Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam, Means wrote, 
'The government of most countries would become concerned 
about the 'brain drain' of highly educated professional and 
the loss of investments being transferred abroad. Instead, 
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Musa Hitam, after revealing that 16,864 Malaysians (mostly 
Chinese) had departed and acquired foreign citizenship, 
stated that they had been thorns in the flesh when they were 
still in this country.... Their departure is no loss to 
Malaysia'(1991: 135). 
The migration of the Chinese and Indians to other countries 
like Australia, Canada, the United States and Britain has 
always been seen as a result of their dissatisfaction and 
antagonistic attitude towards the ethnic preferential 
strategies and its constraints on them. Many non-Malay 
students who cannot obtain entrance to local universities, 
go overseas for further education. The Chinese (and other 
non-Malays) feel much more strongly than the Malays about 
racial discrimination in Malaysia. They also do not see any 
justice in encouraging any dissatisfied Malaysians to 
migrate. 
To other statements which refer to noble acts, or attitudes, 
like standing for the national anthem, Malaysia for all and 
advantage of a multiethnic Malaysian society, or general 
social issues like Indonesian immigrants, the Malays and 
Chinese agree largely. In the case of Malaysia for all, 
however, it is also interesting to take note of the 
differences between the Malays and Chinese on the emphasis, 
or level of their positive commitment to the statement. 81% 
of the Chinese very strongly agreed compared to 59% of the 
Malays who just agreed. There seem to be "second thoughts" 
among the Malays that makes them hesitate to agree promptly 
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with a very strong conviction of acceptance, like the 
Chinese, that Malaysia does not belong to the Malays alone, 
but to all Malaysians. 
The above attitude again seems to reflect, although not in 
an open manner, the fundamental contradiction of the 
political aspirations between the Malays and non-Malays. The 
principle political argument among the Malays in 
establishing the pro-Malay policies in nation building and 
development processes is that historically Malaysia is their 
country, whereas the Chinese and Indians are only 
immigrants, or the descendants of the immigrant peoples of 
China and India. For the non-Malays, their ideal aspiration 
has always been to see Malaysia not as a Malays' country, 
but a country for all Malaysians. This brought about the 
idea of Malaysians' Malaysia in the 1960's among some of 
their leaders. Although the non-Malays' leaders may have 
openly abandoned the concept of Malaysian Malaysia in their 
political struggle, especially after the 1969 riot, the 
issue and the aspiration still remains in the minds of the 
non-Malays. 
(d) Ethnic Relations 
It is not an easy thing for the Malays and Chinese to ignore 
their difference in perceiving certain important issues that 
strain their relations, in Malaysia. While any avoidance of 
open conflict in the society is very much appreciated in 
Malaysia, it may not possibly encourage people to view 
nF r. \ 
230 
ethnic relations in Malaysia in an overwhelmingly positive 
fashion. 
The subjects have indicated that although the quality of 
ethnic relations in Malaysia today is not bad; at the same 
time, the Malays and Chinese have demonstrated hesitation in 
expressing promptly the situation as good (Table 6.15). 
Among the Malays, 51% described the situation as only 
moderate and 49% described it as good. Similarly, about 51% 
of the Chinese chose to describe ethnic relations in 
Malaysia today as moderate, and 48% as good. Their opinion 
did not change much when describing the situation of 
residential locality, except a slightly higher percentage of 
Chinese showed confidence in the quality of ethnic 
relations. 
Table 6.15: Quality of Ethnic Relations in Malaysia and 
Locality at Present, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malaysia Locality 
Malays Chinese Malays Chinese 
Good 49 48 52 63 
Moderate 51 51 46 33 
Bad 0114 
100 100 100 100 
On the whole, the majority of the Malays in the society 
think that their disadvantaged position, compared to the 
Chinese, is still an important agendum to be solved in order 
to improve ethnic relations in Malaysia. They strongly feel 
that the continuation of the ethnic preferential economic 
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policy is still necessary and justified. The Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad said, 'The struggles of the Malays are not 
over. They have not achieved the development which can help 
them compete successfully with others in a plural society 
like Malaysia. Hence, they have not achieved the level where 
they can compete with other communities in the world' (quote 
from Goh, 1991: 91). For this reason, the Malays will not 
express an optimistic view of present ethnic relations 
either in Malaysia or in their specific areas. 
However, comparing the situation to five years ago, the 
majority of the Malay subjects believe that relations have 
improved in Malaysia (63%) and in their locality (60%) 
(Table 6.16). This is again consistent with their support 
for the ethnic preferential policy which seems to produce 
positive results. But among the Chinese, a lower percentage 
were inclined to perceive the present situation as an 
improvement (52% in Malaysia and 43% in the locality). 
Table 6.16: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia and Locality: 
5 years ago, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malaysia Locality 
Malays Chinese Malays Chinese 
Has Improved 69 52 60 43 
Remain the Same 27 42 38 54 
Has Deteriorated 4623 
100 100 100 100 
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As for the projection question, an optimistic view prevailed 
among 70% of the Malays and slightly lower among the Chinese 
subjects (60%) who think that ethnic relations in Malaysia 
will improve in the next five years (Table 6.17). A similar 
opinion was expressed about the situation in locality. An 
optimistic view was expressed by 67% of the Malays and 
56% of the Chinese. A more pessimistic view seemed to 
prevail among the Chinese (39% at national level and 44% at 
local level) than the Malays (30% and 33% at national and 
local levels respectively). 
Table 6.17: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia and Locality 
in the Next 5 Years, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malaysia Locality 
Malays Chinese Malays Chinese 
Will Improve 70 60 67 56 
Remain the Same 26 29 31 40 
Will Deteriorate 4 10 24 
100 100 100 100 
(iv) Ethnic Organisational Membership, Party and Leader 
On the question of ethnic organisational membership, it 
clearly shows that ethnicity is very much a central and 
continuing feature of Malaysian society. This ethnic 
orientation is reflected by 63% of the Malays, and 80% of 
the Chinese who have already become members, or wish to 
become members of an ethnic organisation that caters for 
their ethnic group interest (Table 6.18). 
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Table 6.18: Organisational Membership, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Yes 34 24 
Wish to 29 56 
Do Not Wish to 37 35 
Undecided 05 
100 100 
The inequality in political power distribution between the 
Malays and non-Malays in ruling and formulating public 
policies also appears to have effected their inclination to 
join ethnic organisations. The Malays seem to have less 
inclination (29%) than the Chinese (56%). Compared to the 
Chinese, the Malays have been enjoying the security of their 
political hegemony and economic and socio-cultural benefits 
under the stable Malay-dominated government. This feeling of 
political security and contentment that their ethnic group 
interests are taken care of, could have lowered the urgency 
for them to join any ethnic, chiefly political organisation. 
The situation is very much different for the Chinese. Having 
marginal political power and status in the ruling 
government, they may seek support through participation in 
various ethnic organisations. Among the most influential 
Chinese 'non-political' organisations are Chinese education 
and teachers' associations. Yet the non-Malays' marginal 
political influence within the larger political system could 
drain their enthusiasm from becoming members of ethnic 
organisation. Only 24% of the Chinese subjects actually have 
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become members of ethnic organisations compared to 34% of 
the Malays. 
The inclination in favour of ethnic organisations does not 
seem to stop the subjects from reflecting pragmatic 
attitudes by making common choices of political parties and 
leaders to rule the country. This pragmatic approach 
reflects the limited political choices that prevail in 
Malaysia. Both Malay and Chinese subjects show preferential 
attitudes towards the ruling National Front party and a non- 
royal Malay candidate as the best choice of leader, probably 
for the prime minister's post, than any others to govern the 
state (Table 6.19). 
Table 6.19: Choice of Political Party, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
National Front (NF) 76 76 
Democratic Action Party(DAP) 0 3 
Islamic Party (PAS) 14 0 
Socialist Party 2 2 
Do not Know 8 16 
Others 0 3 
100 100 
76% of the Malays and Chinese subjects have chosen the 
National Front as their preferred political party to govern 
Malaysia's multiethnic society. Among the Malays, 14% have 
also chosen the Islamic Party, PAS, and 2% the Socialist 
Party. Predictably none of the Malays was in favour of the 
non-Malay dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP). On the 
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other hand, none of the Chinese was in favour of the Islamic 
Party of the Malays. However, only a negligible 3% of the 
Chinese have indicated DAP as their choice. 
On the choice of hypothetical leader, 
' the Malay and Chinese 
subjects chose a Malay candidate instead of a Chinese as the 
best choice for leadership of the country (probably for the 
post of prime minister). They also indicated an ordinary 
Malay (Zulkifli) instead of a royal personage (Halim) as 
their preferred choice. As for the Malays, this was 
indicated by 86%, but for the Chinese, however, only 50% of 
them chose Zulkifli (Table 6.20). 
Table 6.20: Choice of Leader, by Ethnic Group (%) 
Malays Chinese 
Halim 9 12 
Ong Cheng Piaw 1 4 
Zulkifli 86 50 
Wong Ting Seng 1 17 
Others 3 18 
100 100 
We cannot conclude that the subjects have left behind their 
strong ethnic orientation. Ethnic political parties, ethnic 
leaders, and the manipulation of ethnic issues remain the 
core features of Malaysian politics as well as within the 
ruling coalition National Front party itself. We need not 
forget that the National Front disguises the ethnically 
1. The relevant hypothetical question was first introduced by Sanusi 
Osman (1981). Subsequently, this was repeated by Mansor (1992). 
236 
defined components within it (mainly UMNO MCA and MIC). 
Since Independence, UMNO, the dominant Malay power, and its 
leaders in the ruling Alliance/National Front party have 
been in the forefront of leadership representing Malay 
political hegemony in Malaysian politics. 
The political cooperation among the leaders of major ethnic 
political organisations has avoided direct political 
confrontation among ethnic groups. On the other hand, there 
is not (and has never been) any strong alternative single 
multiethnic, or coalition of ethnic parties which can 
mobilise support from all the ethnic groups to challenge the 
Alliance/Barisan Nasional for leadership. Alliance/National 
Front and the Malay leaders have since then become the only 
practical choices available for the majority of the people 
to form a stable government and consequently avoid overt 
ethnic conflict. 
Almost none of the Malay subjects seem to feel there is any 
relevance in choosing a Chinese candidate, probably as the 
Malaysian Prime Minister. For minority groups like the 
Chinese, it is also inconceivable to think of their ethnic 
candidate for any important leadership post, let alone the 
post of Prime Minister. The Chinese subjects obviously know 
this and for practical reasons they too indicate the Malay 
candidate as a best choice, although by a much lower 
percentage (50%) than the Malays (86%). While the Chinese 
may be reluctant, for practical reasons, to think of a 
Malaysian Chinese candidate for an important leadership post 
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in Malaysia, 21% of them still seem to think, or may 'wish 
the impossible to come true' by indicating their interest in 
the Chinese candidates. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter discusses some aspects of social changes among 
Malaysians that could indicate the development of 
commonalities in the process of development and nation- 
building of a multiethnic Malaysian society. The findings of 
the subjects' experiences and attitudes show vast 
contradictions between the Malays and Chinese in several 
ethnically important areas. The Malay and Chinese 
individuals seem to have more in common than differences 
only in the areas which are not ethnically very sensitive. 
Initial analysis of the associations between the genders and 
the responses pertaining to the discussion in this chapter 
indicated very small differences. Thus, this does not modify 
the validity of the conclusion presented here. This data is 
presented in Appendix III. 
Wide interethnic and intercultural exposure and contacts in 
modern social settings may, as some may argue, lead to a 
reduction in the salience of particularistic norms of ethnic 
group identity and orientations. But this study does not 
render support for such an argument in the case of Malaysia. 
Although the subjects in this study are bilingual in the use 
of common languages and experiencing wide interethnic 
contacts, these experiences, however, only show that they 
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have come to accept the importance of, or need for, some 
pragmatic attitudes with regards to the constraints and 
choices they can make in a multiethnic Malaysian society. A 
common practical attitude is also reflected in the subjects' 
choice of political party and leader to govern a multiethnic 
Malaysian society. They also share common attitudes in 
connection with national symbols and ideology and other 
social issues which are relatively trivial for one to 
anticipate strong ethnic sentiments. Therefore, one cannot 
possibly argue in support of the prevailing strength of 
integration over conflict as an overriding force in the 
relations among ethnic groups in Malaysia, or that ethnic 
divisions and the importance of ethnicity among Malaysians 
have diminished. 
In fact, the wide use among the Chinese and Malays of common 
languages like Malay and English, and other related media, 
cannot be perceived as having occurred at the expense of 
their ethnicity. This is definitely not the case with the 
Malays, since the promotion of their language as an 
important element of national identity is well taken care of 
by the government's policy. For the Chinese, on the other 
hand, their ethnicity, particularly the language component, 
could be perceived to be in direct competition for survival 
with the expansion of Malay as the common national and 
official language of Malaysia. But the Malay language has 
not yet taken the core position of Chinese or English as a 
communication language in their more personal, intimate, 
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informal and private interactions at the intraethnic circles 
of the Chinese community. 
We must instead take into consideration two important 
factors to ensure that what the subjects have reflected in 
their responses in this study is a real sign of the 
weakening in the strength of their ethnicity. First, we 
should examine the way in which the subjects have responded 
to the questions that are directly or indirectly related to 
controversial political or ethnic issues. Second, we should 
interpret their responses in the context of wider public 
policies and political scene that may have strongly shaped 
the subjects' experiences and the way in which the responses 
were expressed. We should not average the responses from the 
findings to form an overall impression. In this context, we 
obviously cannot overlook how and why the subjects have 
responded significantly in different ways to certain 
questions that are ethnically more sensitive or provocative 
than other questions. 
On some highly important questions, there is not a widely 
shared common concern. An ethnic perspective seems to 
influence the way in which the Malay and Chinese subjects 
express their concern over the social problems. The Malays 
and Chinese, for example, maintained different attitudes 
towards two problems which are ethnically more divisive and 
crucial than the others. These are unequal access to 
education and the significance of ethnic differences. The 
Malays could not see access to education as unequal, or in 
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general, ethnic differences as problems crucial to 
themselves. The Chinese view these two factors as crucial 
cultural and political issues in Malaysia. The Chinese' 
concern over these problems reveal the ongoing conflict in 
ethnic relations in Malaysia. The notable fact is that 
Malays see 'no problem'; whereas the Chinese see an 
important problem. 'No problem' is characteristic of the 
dominant group. 
The subjects have revealed some sharp differences in their 
attitudes on the issues of racial discrimination, migration 
of dissatisfied Malaysians, and subtly on the issue of 
Malaysia for all. It is not an easy thing for the Malays and 
Chinese to ignore their differences in perceiving these 
important issues that strain their relations in Malaysia. 
While any avoidance of open conflict in the society may be 
very much appreciated in Malaysia, this may not also 
possibly encourage people to view ethnic relations in an 
overwhelmingly optimistic way. The Chinese notably do not 
seem to regard the changes under the New Economic Policy as 
a positive trend towards integration. On the question of 
ethnic organisational membership, it clearly shows that 
ethnicity is very much a central and continuing feature of 
contemporary Malaysian society, although the need for a 
pragmatic approach to suit the political power relationship 
is very much recognised by the subjects. But the demand for 
such a practical political approach is much greater among 
the members of the minority ethnic group, the Chinese, than 
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among the members of the dominant ethnic group, the Malays, 
who possess political supremacy in the society. 
The subjects, as our discussion shows, have demonstrated 
that issues and strategies of differential treatments are 
still matters of great concern, discontent, and conflict 
among ethnic groups, especially between the Malays and 
Chinese. Their responses to a few important issues and 
problems are related to the fundamental divisions of unequal 
legitimate rights and unequal political, economic, cultural 
power and status between the Malays and non-Malays in the 
society. These political divisions which continue to persist 
in Malaysian society have not only enhanced the salience of 
ethnicity in the country but also can undermine the 




THE INFLUENCE OF EXPOSURE TO INTERETHNIC CONTACTS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
In chapter 1 we explored the development of the political, 
economical and social changes in Malaysian society from an 
historical perspective since the period of colonial rule. 
Since achieving independence, the Government has 
concentrated on the efforts of nation-building with the main 
aim of bringing greater unity among the peoples of different 
ethnic origins. The motto Satu bangsa, Satu bahasa which 
literally means one nation, one language', has been the 
idealistic political aspiration of the Malaysian government. 
Subsequent to the riot in 1969, the Government has 
intensified its efforts in creating a politically, 
economically and culturally integrated Malaysian society. 
The New Economic Policy was introduced as a twenty year 
master plan (1970-1990) with the main objective of 
'restructuring society'. In this context it becomes 
important to study the persistence or the weakening of 
ethnic divisions in Malaysia in the course of modernisation 
and economic development in the society. 
The major concern of the government in its efforts to bring 
about changes for 'restructuring society' is to reduce the 
disparities in the economic and social advantages between 
the Malays and the non-Malays. The Malays are the focus of 
this effort. This is because they are generally looked upon 
as a disadvantaged group in comparison to the non-Malays in 
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their participation in modern economic sectors and urban 
life. The disadvantaged position of the Malays is seen by 
the Government as the main cause for their radical and 
hostile attitudes towards the non-Malays, in particular the 
Chinese. The Chinese are far ahead of the Malays in their 
involvement and ownership of wealth in the modern economic 
sectors and employment, and participation in the modern 
urban life (see chapter 1). The continued confinement of the 
Malays to their traditional economy and rural areas has 
caused great concern among the Malay leaders. This has 
strengthened Malay economic nationalism and the political 
mobilisation of ethnic group solidarity in the post- 
independence period. The sense of economic inferiority may 
also strengthen their prejudice, distrust, and antagonistic, 
intolerant and unsympathetic attitudes towards the non- 
Malay's problems, aspirations and struggles for equal 
citizenship rights, multi-culturalism and equal 
opportunities. Similarly, by living separate lives from the 
Malays, the non-Malays are probably encouraged to preserve 
their own ethnic sentiments, prejudice, social distance, 
distrust, disregard and hostile attitudes towards the Malays 
and their problems. 
Modernisation in general is seen as a social process that 
would weaken traditional ethnic attachments by breaking up 
the physical, economical, cultural and social boundaries 
that reinforce ethnic consciousness and ethnic alignment. 
Living in ethnic neighbourhoods and working in these 
surroundings, such as that characterising traditionally 
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separated economic activity, reinforce such boundaries. By 
bringing modernisation to the Malays, the Government hopes 
to produce desirable social benefits for unity. When ethnic 
groups work together in modern sectors, primarily in 
manufacturing, and live in mixed ethnic residential areas in 
urban centres, they are expected to increase inter-ethnic 
sociability. The increase in social contacts is expected to 
reduce ethnic prejudice and intolerance. When Malays enjoy 
upward social mobility, this is expected to reduce the sense 
of being disadvantaged. This in turn would reduce their 
ethnically defined jealousies and resentment. All these 
changes mean that 'balanced' participation between the 
Malays and non-Malays in modern economic sectors and urban 
living is expected eventually to dilute the influence of 
ethnic sentiments in their daily lives, and in their social 
and political attitudes. If these changes can undermine 
parochial attitudes based on ethnicity, it is presumed that 
this will reduce ethnic conflict in society. However, this 
could be only one of the possible effects. Social changes in 
society may also reinforce the salience of ethnicity, 
exacerbating antagonistic attitudes and bringing about 
deterioration in relations between ethnic groups. 
It could be argued that social changes in the post- 
Independence period in Malaysia have brought about more 
universal values and shared attitudes in the society. Based 
on this assumption, the extent of the differences between 
the Malay and Chinese subjects was explored in Chapter 6. 
The aim was to examine to what extent there may have been 
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rapprochement among the Malays and Chinese, as a consequence 
of social changes in the society, and how they may have come 
close in their social and political attitudes through the 
use of a common language and in their interethnic proximity 
and contact. The survey showed that while the experiences of 
the Malay and Chinese subjects indicate that some common 
features and attitudes have developed in society, there is 
no reason for one to believe that the importance of 
ethnicity in Malaysia has been weakened. The Malay and 
Chinese subjects still maintain significant differences in 
their political attitudes when it comes to issues and 
problems that are ethnically salient. 
The main aim of the present chapter is to further explore 
the relationship between the measures of modernisation and 
social and political attitudes. By creating a new pattern of 
interethnic interactions and contacts in society, 
modernisation is believed to invoke changes in people's 
attitudes and their considerations for acts of ethnic 
preference and attachments. Among others, modernisation is 
expected to bring a greater understanding of the problems, 
needs, aspirations and political rights of the people of 
different ethnic groups. 
Among the important structural factors believed to produce 
such changes in attitudes, is the physical proximity between 
groups that were, to a large extent previously separated. In 
the present chapter, we propose to test the contact 
hypothesis contained in this theory of modernisation. For 
246 
this purpose, we shall concentrate on the effects of 
interethnic contact that arises from living in close 
proximity in mixed ethnic neighbourhood areas on the social 
and political attitudes of the Malay and Chinese subjects. 
Through such contacts people are expected to display the 
attitudes of an integrated society. To justify this, we need 
to demonstrate that the differences in the social and 
political attitudes among the Malay and Chinese subjects can 
be attributed to the measures of interethnic contact. 
Another factor that is closely related to modernisation and 
economic development and which may have an impact on 
ethnicity in a society is the emergence of different 
economic classes as a result of diversification of 
occupational and economic activities among the people. In 
observing this development, and its impact on ethnic 
relations in Malaysia, Ali pointed out that class divisions 
are not only formed within each ethnic group but also cut 
across ethnic groups, although the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians may be concentrated in different economic functions 
(1991: 105). Being in different economic classes may effect 
people's opportunity for intergroup contact. They may also 
act and show different attitudes toward the social and 
political issues and problems on the basis of their class 
positions in society. What we are interested in here is to 
see whether or not the Malay and Chinese subjects' social 
and political attitudes could also be attributed to their 
differences in economic class backgrounds. This forms the 
second aim of this chapter. 
247 
Exposures to Interethnic Contacts 
In the previous chapter, the data analysis showed that at 
present both the Chinese and Malays have wide contacts with 
one another (see Tables 6.11- 6.18). To restate the result 
briefly, it showed that the majority (86%) of the Malay 
subjects lived in Malay neighbourhood areas during their 
childhood. This figure has been reduced to 57% at present. 
However, there was not much change in the residence patterns 
of Chinese subjects. Those who had lived in a Chinese ethnic 
neighbourhood during childhood was 45%, compared with 48% at 
present. We will now proceed to speculate on the 
relationship between the different degrees of exposure to 
interethnic contact among the subjects and their responses 
to the questions on ethnic attitudes. In order to do this we 
need a clear understanding of the different degrees of 
exposures to interethnic contacts by taking into account 
both the childhood and present exposures of the subjects. 
In Chapter 6, different exposures to interethnic contacts 
among the subjects during their childhood and at present 
were measured and presented through four categories (Tables 
6.1-6.4). These represent those who lived, or are living, in 
areas where ethnic composition consists: (i) mostly of 
people from similar ethnic backgrounds; (ii) mostly Chinese 
(for Malay subjects) or mostly Malays (for Chinese 
subjects); (iii) of Malays and Chinese in equal proportions; 
or (iv) of other mixed areas. Before we analyse the impact 
of different degrees of exposures to interethnic contacts to 
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the attitude questions, it is essential to understand the 
patterns and degree of shifting and continuity in the 
subjects' interethnic contact from childhood to adulthood 
period. 
For the purpose of data analysis in this chapter, four 
categories of subjects reflecting the different types of 
changes in their interethnic contact experiences were 
classified. They are: 
(a) Those who have lived during their childhood, and are 
still living at present, in areas where the ethnic 
composition consists of own ethnic members (mostly). 
(b) Those who have lived during their childhood in their 
own ethnic areas but are now living in mixed areas. 
(c) Those who have lived during their childhood in mixed 
areas but now living in their own ethnic areas. 
(d) Those who not only have lived in mixed ethnic areas 
during their childhood but are also still living in 
such areas. 
In terms of the degree of changes, the two middle groups 
(b, c) have experienced a significant change in their 
contact experiences compared to the other groups. It is 
important to see whether these groups show any significant 
differences in their attitudes from those who still live 
within a traditional ethnic community, or even from those 
who have continuously lived in heterogeneous communities. 
Table 7.1 shows the continuity and shift in the Malay and 
Chinese subjects' interethnic contact exposure from their 
childhood to the present time. Among the Malays, out of the 
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139 subjects who initially lived in areas dominated by own 
ethnic members during their childhood, 81 (50%) now still 
live in Malay ethnic areas, whereas 58 (36%) have moved to 
ethnically mixed areas. Not many had lived in mixed ethnic 
areas during their childhood (23, or 14%). Among them, 12 
(7%) now live in areas where the ethnic composition is 
dominated by their own ethnic members. The other 11 (7%) 
remained in the areas of mixed ethnic members. 
Table 7.1: 
Continuity and Changes in Interethnic Contact 
Exposure Among The Malay and Chinese Subjects (X) 
Types of Changes Malay Chinese 
(a) E -> E 81 (50%) 45 (29%) 
(b) E -> M 58 (36%) 25 (16%) 
(c) M -> E 12 ( 7%) 29 (19%) 
(d) M -> M 11 ( 7%) 56 (36%) 
Total 162 155 
E->E: Ethnic areas (childhood) to Ethnic areas (now) 
E->M: Ethnic areas (childhood) to Mixed ethnic areas (now) 
M->E: Mixed areas (childhood) to Ethnic areas (now) 
M->M: Mixed areas (childhood) to Mixed areas (now) 
Among the Chinese subjects, 70 of them had lived in 'own 
ethnic' dominated neighbourhood, during childhood, and 85 
had lived in ethnically mixed areas. Out of those who 
originally lived in their own ethnic areas, 45 (29%) now 
still continue to live in such areas, whereas 25 (16%) now 
live in mixed areas. Of those who originally lived in mixed 
areas, 29 (19%) are now living in own ethnic dominated 
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areas, whereas 56 (36%) of them still continue to live in 
mixed areas. 
For the Malay subjects, we will concentrate on the attitudes 
expressed by the group who throughout their lives have lived 
in 'own ethnic' areas and the group who have moved to a 
mixed area. This is because the other two groups are too 
small in number for any meaningful conclusion to be drawn. 
For the responses of the Chinese subjects, for the same 
reason, we shall compare the attitudes between the group who 
throughout their life lived in 'own ethnic' areas and the 
group who throughout their life lived in 'mixed ethnic' 
areas. 
Responses to the Statements questions 
Seven statements asking the subjects to indicate their level 
of agreement, or disagreement were presented to them. As we 
already know, the statements are in regard to: (i) standing 
for national anthem; (ii) racial discrimination in Malaysia; 
(iii) dependency on government programmes; (iv) Indonesian 
emigrants; (v) emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians; (vi) 
Malaysia as a country for all Malaysians; and (vii) 
advantages of a multi-ethnic population. 
Four issues from the above statement questions need our 
attention more than the others in this analysis. These are 
issues pertaining to racial discrimination, Malaysia for all 
Malaysians, the emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians and 
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the advantages of a multiethnic population in Malaysia. 
These issues directly or indirectly touch on the main issues 
of ethnic relations in Malaysia. The Malay subjects' 
responses are presented in Table 7.2. The categories of 
agree and disagree respectively also include those who have 
strongly agreed and strongly disagreed to the statements. 
Table 7.2: The Malay Subjects' Responses to Statements 
Questions, by Interethnic Contact Exposure (X) 
Issues EE EM 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 92 91 
Disagree 4 7 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Agree 13 12 
Disagree 85 85 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 77 90 
Disagree 22 10 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 52 50 
Disagree 43 47 
5. Emigration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 68 76 
Disagree 27 22 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 91 88 
Disagree 9 12 
7. Advantageous of Multiethnic 
Agree 83 78 
Disagree 14 19 
EE: Ethnic areas (childhood) to Ethnic areas (now) 
EM: Ethnic areas (childhood) to Mixed ethnic areas (now) 
Among the Malay subjects, no great difference in attitudes 
was observed between the group with greater contact 
experience and the group with less contact experience 
concerning the above issues. Both groups of Malays show 
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strong agreement in standing for the national anthem (91% to 
92%), dependency on government programmes (77% to 90%), 
emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians (68% to 76%), 
Malaysia belongs to all Malaysians (88% to 91%) and 
the advantages of a multiethnic population (78% to 83%). 
Both groups are equally divided on the issue of Indonesian 
migrants, and on the issue of racial discrimination they 
expressed strong disagreement. 
None of these responses indicates that greater interethnic 
contact among the Malay subjects has produced a more 
'soothing' effect on their political attitudes concerning 
key issues. Their all-embracing attitude to see Malaysia as 
a country for all Malaysians cannot be attributed to the 
'contact effect'. This is because the Malays without wider 
contact experience have also demonstrated the same attitude. 
A synonymous argument also applies in the response to their 
greater appreciation of the multiethnic feature of Malaysian 
society. 
On the issues of racial discrimination and emigration of 
dissatisfied Malaysians, evidence clearly show that 
interethnic contact did not bring about greater concern 
among the Malays on the ethnic problems in Malaysia. The 
Malays who lived in ethnically mixed areas equally show a 
strong tendency to reject the view that racial 
discrimination in Malaysia is higher or worse than other 
countries. Although the Malays are aware that the New 
Economic Policy is an ethnic preferential policy in favour 
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of them, they could not perceive it as a discriminating 
policy towards the non-Malays. In the case of the emigration 
of dissatisfied Malaysians, greater contact again failed to 
produce a more 'tolerant' attitude towards those who may not 
be happy with the government policy. They supported the 
emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians. 
Among the Chinese, despite their differences in contact 
experiences, there was not much difference in their 
attitudes on all issues (Table 7.3). They expressed 
agreement to standing for the national anthem (93%-96%), 
dependency on government programmes (84% to 85%), Indonesian 
migrants (54% to 55%), Malaysia for all Malaysians (96% to 
100%) and the advantages of a multiethnic population (85% to 
87%). On the issue of racial discrimination, both groups 
were rather divided in their attitudes, compared to that of 
the Malays (45% to 58% agree and 35% to 53% disagree). On 
the issue of Indonesian migrants, the division is more equal 
among both groups. 
The Chinese response, however, indicates that those with 
wider contact experience are slightly less concerned about 
racial discrimination in Malaysia. This seems to suggest 
that contacts have produced more positive and tolerant 
attitudes towards the ethnic preferential policy. They also 
show slightly higher disagreement on the emigration of 
dissatisfied Malaysians. But their disagreement could also 
mean a greater awareness of and opposition to the government 
policy that may force the non-Malays to emigrate. 
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Table 7.3: The Chinese Subjects' Responses to Statements 
Questions, by Interethnic Contact Exposure (X) 
Issues EE MM 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 96 93 
Disagree 2 4 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Agree 58 45 
Disagree 35 53 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 85 84 
Disagree 11 16 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 54 55 
Disagree 44 43 
5. Emigration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 36 34 
Disagree 53 59 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 100 96 
Disagree 0 4 
7. Advantageous of Multiethnic 
Agree 85 87 
Disagree 13 11 
EE: Ethnic areas (both in childhood and now)) 
MM: Mixed ethnic areas (both in childhood and now) 
Rating on National Problems 
Among the issues presented to these respondents, there are 
two issues which are the most salient to ethnic relations in 
Malaysia. These are unequal access to education and ethnic 
differences. Ethnic differences refer to the more general 
way in which people perceive problems that may exist between 
the ethnic groups in the society. But the problem of unequal 
opportunity to education is actually one of the strategies 
in the government's New Economic Policy. 
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Regardless of the differences in the levels of exposure to 
interethnic contact, the Malay subjects maintained a very 
similar pattern of high and low concerns as to the various 
national social problems (Table 7.4). For example, in all 
the groups, drug addiction and corruption were considered 
the most serious social problems. A medium level of concern 
was expressed over political disunity, poverty, or ethnic 
differences. The problems with the lowest rating among these 
groups were religious deviation and unequal access to 
education. This shows that the Malays with a wider contact 
experience did not show any greater concern for the problems 
related to ethnic relations in Malaysia. Their concern 
almost equalled the group without much contact experience, 
on the problems of unequal access to education (26% compared 
to 27%) and ethnic differences (3% compared to 4%). 
Table 7.4: 
Percentage of Malay subjects who believe this is a 
National Problem, by Interethnic Contact Exposure 
Problems EE EM 
Corruption 41 47 
Religious Deviation 5 7 
Poverty 36 28 
Drug Addiction 58 62 
Political Disunity 41 34 
Unequal Access to Education 4 3 
Ethnic Differences 27 26 
The Chinese subjects, too, did not show much difference in 
the rating of various national problems (Table 7.5). The two 
most pressing problems for these subjects were corruption 
and drug addiction. However, two additional problems have 
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also been rated as crucial throughout all the groups 
besides corruption and drug addiction. These are ethnic 
differences and unequal access to education. The percentage 
of subjects who stressed these problems in all groups come 
close, if not equal, or higher in some instances to those 
who stressed corruption and drug addiction. Less concern 
was shown over poverty and political disunity. While the 
concern for unequal access to education is very high and 
drastically opposite to that of the Malays' response, no 
differences were noticed between the 'contact' groups among 
Chinese (52% and 53%). But the positive effect of contact 
seems to have reduced their concern for ethnic differences 
from 58% to 34%. 
Table 7.5: 
Percentage of the Chinese Subjects who believe this is a 
National Problem, by Interethnic Contact Exposure 
Problems EE MM 
Corruption 66 71 
Religious Deviation 9 14 
Poverty 22 27 
Drug Addiction 56 59 
Political Disunity 22 25- 
Unequal Access to Education 53 52 
Ethnic Differences 58 34 
Rating on Ethnic Relations 
As shown in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 wider contact experience 
among the Malay and Chinese subjects was not able to produce 
a favourable attitude concerning 'ethnic relations' in 
Malaysia. Both the Malay groups with different levels of 
interethnic exposure, hesitated to describe 'ethnic 
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relations' in Malaysia as being 'good'. 43% of the subjects 
with a wider contact and 46% of the subjects with a lower 
contact experience described the relations as moderate. 
Among the Chinese subjects an unfavourable attitude was even 
higher without much difference between the groups (51% to 
52%). 
Table 7.6: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by 
Interethnic Contact Exposure among Malays (%) 
EE EM 
Good 55 57 
Moderate 46 43 
Bad 0 0 
100 100 
Table 7.7: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by 
Interethnic Contact Exposure among Chinese (X) 
EE MM 
Good 47 48 
Moderate 51 52 
Bad 2 0 
100 100 
Occupational Background 
A modern occupational structure based on economic classes, 
has become an important foundation for social stratification 
in modern society. The occupational hierarchy offers 
different status and material benefits to people in society. 
People assess their success according to the position they 
occupy in the occupational hierarchy compared with others. 
Those who experience an upward mobility, or occupy a higher 
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occupational class position, would relatively be the most 
'satisfied' group compared to those in the lower or 
disadvantaged class positions. Class situation forms the 
basis for people to estimate their comparative advantages 
and disadvantages in relation to other ethnic groups. In a 
society like Malaysia, higher class positions also would 
mean that these people have a better chance of being exposed 
to modern lifestyles and attitudes. Higher occupational 
status could also be more conducive than lower occupational 
status for intergroup contact. In observing these changes in 
Malaysia, Ali (1991: 103-105), for example, sees greater 
interconnection and cooperation politically, economically 
and socially between the Malays and Chinese of upper and 
middle classes in Malaysia (1991: 103-105). While he agrees 
that there may be some interethnic cooperation among the 
lower class especially among factories workers occasionally, 
overall he states, 'between the predominantly Malay peasants 
and the largely Chinese workers, there is a great social 
distance, and often their ignorance of each other's values 
has led to stereotyping and suspicion' (p. 104). 
The Malays, in the contexts of modernisation and economic 
development in Malaysia, are part of the newly-expanding 
middle and upper classes in the modern urban sectors 
following the implementation of the New Economic Policy. The 
government-'sponsored' upward mobility among the Malays in 
Malaysia could produce such a satisfying 'class mobility' 
effect among them. This may reduce their sense of being a 
disadvantaged group, and promote more tolerable and less 
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antagonistic attitudes towards the non-Malays and their 
problems. In general, more sympathetic, favourable and less 
antagonistic attitudes between ethnic groups are expected to 
increase with the increase in their class positions, or with 
upward class mobility. Our main objective here is to explore 
the likelihood of the subjects' economic class backgrounds 
influencing their ethnic attitudes concerning the social and 
political issues and problems that we have discussed above. 
There is a major obstacle in using the subjects' own 
occupational backgrounds for the above analysis. Most of the 
Malay and Chinese subjects in this study come from the 
general services group, comprising general office 
administrators, clerks, technicians, teachers and nurses. 
This group forms about 80% of the subjects. The other 
occupational groups are small in number. This does not 
permit us to explore the differences by class in the social 
and political attitudes. On the other hand, all the subjects 
in this study are at the moment pursuing their university 
degree courses. There is a high possibility that their 
present occupational position may change for the better in 
the future. Because they are still in the transitional 
phase, it will be difficult for us to think of any really 
strong class related consciousness or interests among them, 
or to effect their social and political attitudes. But we 
can examine their parents' occupational backgrounds. It is 
likely that the parents' occupational backgrounds play an 
important role as an influence on their children's 
attitudes. The parents' occupation, especially for the 
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immediate generation, can in fact be considered as a part of 
the subjects' own continuing social background, as most of 
them retain close contact with their parents and their other 
related social surroundings. In this respect, the attitudes 
of the subjects who are students are most likely to be 
influenced by their estimation of the social advantages and 
disadvantages in relation to the class position of their 
parents. 
The occupational backgrounds of the Malay subjects derived 
from their parents' occupation is shown in Table 7.8(a). The 
distribution of the subjects in occupational groups is more 
dispersed than the distribution based on the respondents' 
own occupations. This, however, is only true notably between 
occupational groups one (47%) and three (34%). The 
representation of the subjects in occupational groups two, 
four and five is still small. This very low frequency 
limits the basis for generalising and understanding the 
influences of socio-economic classes. 
In the analysis, we have collapsed the occupational 
categories as shown in Table 7.8(b). The same strategy was 
used to redistribute the Chinese subjects. Table 7.9(a, b) 
shows the distribution of the Chinese subjects in various 
occupational backgrounds and levels based on their parents' 
occupations. In the following analysis, the term 
'occupational background or level' refers to that of the 
subjects' parents. 
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Table 7.8: The Distribution of The Malay Subjects, 
by Parents' Occupational Background and Level (%) 
a. Occupational Group Total 
1. Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small 47% 
farmer, odd job worker, petty trader (76) 
2. Manual worker, factory worker, 9% 
sales assistant (14) 
3. General services worker, general office 34% 
administrator, technician, teacher, nurses (55) 
4. Businessman, merchant, wholesaler 7% 
(12) 
5. Executives and professional in 1% 
the private and government sectors (3) 
b. Occupational Levels 
1. Lower (1,2) 90 (56%) 
2. Middle (3) 55 (34%) 
3. Upper (4,5) 15 (10%) 
Table 7.9: The Distribution of The Chinese Subjects, 
by Parents' Occupational Background and Level (X) 
a. Occupational Group Total 
1. Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small 36% 
farmer, odd job worker, petty trader (55) 
2. Manual worker, factory worker, 28% 
sales assistant (44) 
3. General services worker, general office 22% 
administrator, technician, teacher, nurses (34) 
4. Businessman, merchant, wholesaler 12 % 
(20) 
5. Executives and professional in 1% 
the private and government sectors (1) 
b. Occupational Levels 
1. Lower (1,2) 99 (64%) 
2. Middle (3) 34 (22%) 
3. Upper (4,5) 21 (14%) 
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Responses to the Statement Questions 
The Malay subjects did not show any significant difference 
by occupational backgrounds in their responses to various 
issues raised by the statement questions (Table 7.10). All 
the groups have expressed their strong support on standing 
for national anthem, issues of dependency on government 
programmes, emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians, Malaysia 
for all Malaysians and the advantages of a multiethnic 
society. They strongly expressed disagreement on the issue 
of racial discrimination while on the issue of Indonesian 
migrants they are divided in their attitude. The subjects 
from the middle and upper occupational backgrounds still 
maintain the same attitudes as those from a lower 
occupational background on all the key ethnic issues. 
The data does not show any tendency to support that 
favourable attitudes with regards to ethnic relations will 
become prominent with the improvement in occupational 
backgrounds. Although the favourable attitude on the issue 
of racial discrimination seems to be greater among the 
subjects of the middle occupational background (20%), the 
higher percentage is not consistent with the attitude showed 
by the subjects from the upper occupational background 
(14%). On the issue of emigration of dissatisfied 
Malaysians, an unfavourable attitude was indicated among 
subjects from higher occupational background. A similar 
tendency also occurs in perceiving the advantages of a 
multiethnic society. The subjects from the middle 
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occupational background also show more inclination to reject 
the idea that Malaysia is for all Malaysians. 
Table 7.10: The Malay Subjects' Responses to 
Questions, by Parents' Occupatio 
Issues Lower 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 94 
Disagree 5 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Statements 




Agree 12 20 14 
Disagree 87 74 80 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 80 80 93 
Disagree 20 16 7 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 55 46 47 
Disagree 42 53 47 
5. Emigration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 70 75 80 
Disagree 27 20 20 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 92 84 93 
Disagree 8 14 7 
7. Advantageous of Multiethnic 
Agree 83 74 80 
Disagree 16 19 20 
The responses from the Chinese subjects, too, do not 
indicate any significant influence of the occupational 
backgrounds on their social and political attitudes (Table 
7.11). Subjects from all the occupational backgrounds 
maintain similar patterns of attitudes. They have expressed 
strong agreement on standing for national anthem, dependency 
on government programmes, Malaysia for all Malaysians and 
advantages of a multiethnic society. They are more inclined 
to disagree with the emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians 
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and showed a divided attitude on the issue of racial 
discrimination. No favourable effects were reflected 
consistently on the important key ethnic issues with an 
increase in the occupational backgrounds. 
Table 7.11: The Chinese Subjects' Responses to Statements 
Questions, by Parents' Occupational Levels (%) 
Issues Lower Middle Upper 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 94 94 95 
Disagree 4 3 0 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Agree 53 50 43 
Disagree 45 50 43 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 82 85 81 
Disagree 17 15 14 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 49 59 57 
Disagree 48 38 38 
5. Emigration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 32 38 33 
Disagree 58 59 53 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 98 97 100 
Disagree 2 3 0 
7. Advantageous of Multiethnic 
Agree 91 79 95 
Disagree 8 15 5 
Rating on National Problems 
In general, the Malay subjects from all occupational 
backgrounds showed a greater similarity in their rating of 
urgency, or importance of the different national problems 
(Table 7.12). Drug addiction and corruption are the two most 
highly rated social problems throughout. The problems that 
fall second in priority are political disunity, poverty and 
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ethnic differences. Only a small variation in emphasis on 
most of the problems listed was found among the subjects of 
different occupational backgrounds. 
Table 7.12: 
Percentage of the Malay Subjects who believe 
this is a National Problem, by Occupational Levels 
Lower Middle Upper 
Corruption 47 49 40 
Religious Deviation 4 13 0 
Poverty 34 31 20 
Drug Addiction 61 64 60 
Political Disunity 33 40 40 
Unequal Access to Education 6 5 7 
Ethnic Differences 24 29 40 
The most significant difference between the classes among 
the Malays is the 'upper class' group, which is more 
conscious of ethnic differences. Being the most 'satisfied' 
group, they did not reflect favourably by being less 
concerned with ethnic differences. In fact, the Malays' 
awareness of ethnic differences has steadily increased with 
an improvement in their class backgrounds, that is 24% among 
the 'lower class', 29% among the 'middle class' and 40% 
among the 'upper class' groups. 
The rating on the various national problems among the 
Chinese, also did not vary in relation to their differences 
in occupational backgrounds (Table 7.13). Subjects from the 
middle occupational background rated unequal access to 
education and ethnic differences as much more serious 
problems compared to other groups. As these are the most 
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crucial in the field of ethnic relations, the increase in 
their concern indicates unfavourable attitudes from the 
'middle class' group, although no further increases were 
noticed among the 'upper class' group. 
Table 7.13: 
Percentage of the Chinese Subjects who believe this 
is a National Problem, by Occupational Levels 
Lower Middle Upper 
Corruption 66 76 52 
Religious Deviation 10 18 5 
Poverty 31 26 19 
Drug Addiction 60 65 38 
Political Disunity 23 21 10 
Unequal Access to Education 49 62 38 
Ethnic Differences 37 59 38 
Rating on Ethnic Relations 
Different occupational backgrounds did not produce any 
significant variations in the Malay subjects' opinion 
concerning prevailing ethnic relations in Malaysia today 
(Table 7.14). Subjects from all the occupational backgrounds 
were strongly divided in their opinions. Favourable positive 
attitudes among the middle and upper class groups (45% and 
53% respectively) were not much higher than the 51% among 
the lower class group. 
Among the Chinese subjects, as high as 62% of the upper 
class group showed an optimistic attitude towards the 
quality of ethnic relations in Malaysia as compared to 47% 
among the lower class group (Table 7.15). But again, the 
increase is not consistent with the opinion expressed by the 
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middle class group. Only 38% of them expressed a positive 
view on the prevailing ethnic relations in Malaysia. 
Table 7.14: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by 
Parents' Occupational Level among Malays (%) 
Lower Middle Upper 
Good 51 45 53 
Moderate 49 55 47 
Bad 0 0 0 
100 100 100 
Table 7.15: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by 
Parents' Occupational Level among Chinese (X) 
Lower Middle Upper 
Good 47 38 62 
Moderate 53 59 38 
Bad 0 3 0 
100 100 100 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The data analysis in this chapter aims at exploring the 
relationship between some of the social and political 
attitudes of the subjects and the measures of modernisation, 
in particular, the measures of interethnic contact exposures 
and occupational backgrounds. We are looking at the way in 
which different groups of Malay and Chinese subjects with 
different levels of interethnic contact exposures and 
occupational backgrounds expressed their attitudes 
concerning some of the social and political issues in 
Malaysia. The main aim in presenting this analysis is to see 
whether or not there is any ground for believing that 
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'modernisation' in Malaysia has brought together some 
sections of people belonging to different ethnic groups to 
share similar social and political attitudes across their 
ethnic boundaries. Secondly to see whether or not economic 
class differences could be accounted for any variation in 
their ethnic attitudes. Now in this section, we will discuss 
the implications of the findings to the argument of the 
contact hypothesis, which predicts a greater flexibility in 
interethnic attitudes as a result of modernisation, in 
particular, through extensive interethnic contacts. 
In the beginning of this chapter, we discussed why the 
present observations are especially important in the case of 
the Malaysian society. To study the effects of modernisation 
on ethnic relations, especially on the ethnic attitudes in 
Malaysia, one would obviously have to give more attention to 
the effects of modernisation on the attitudes of the Malays 
specifically. This is because the latter are as we have said 
the main target group in the governments' strategies for 
modernisation in Malaysia. Governmental policies such as the 
education and economic programmes were implemented with the 
aim of integrating the Malay population into the main stream 
of modern economy and occupational structures, and urban 
living. The main theme, or assumption, that underlines the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy since 1970 is that 
modernisation of the Malays will produce a more integrated 
Malaysian society. 
269 
Now let us turn to the results of the above data analysis 
and try to understand its implications for the argument of 
the modernisation theory. The results of the Malay's answers 
show the following findings: 
(1) Differences in interethnic contact exposures and 
occupational backgrounds among the Malay subjects did 
not invoke significant variations in their attitudes. 
Their attitudes in relation to these factors show: 
(a) Wide and strong support on standing for national 
anthem. 
(b) Wide and strong rejection of the view that racial 
discrimination is worse in Malaysia than in any 
other country. 
(c) Wide agreement, however not strongly, supporting 
the view that the government's programmes will 
eventually destroy people's ability to look after 
themselves. 
(d) A rather divided attitude, but with a strong 
opposing view, about the Indonesian immigrants as 
socially undesirable people in Malaysia. 
(e) Wide support for emigration of dissatisfied 
Malaysians. 
(f) Wide agreement but not always 'strong agreement', 
on seeing Malaysia as a country for all Malaysians 
and not just for the Malays. 
(g) Wide agreement but not always 'strongly', about 
the advantage of the multiethnic feature of 
Malaysian society. 
(h) A common pattern of rating on national problems. 
To a la ge degree, top priority goes to drug 
addictio and corruption, second to poverty, 
political disunity and ethnic differences, and 
third to unequal access to education and religious 
deviation. 
(i) That to a large extent, the description of the 
condition of ethnic relations in Malaysia today is 
rather divided. While no one likes to describe it 
as in a bad state, neither does a majority want 
to express it with full confidence. The positive 
view also tends to decline with the increase in 
interethnic contact exposure. 
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(2) Among the Chinese subjects too, their differences in 
interethnic contact exposure and occupational 
backgrounds did not cause significant changes in their 
attitudes. Their attitudes in relation to these factors 
show: 
(a) Wide support on standing for national anthem. But 
their strong support tends to decline among 
subjects of middle and upper occupational 
backgrounds. 
(b) A rather divided, but not always 'strongly', in 
endorsing racial discriminations as worse in 
Malaysia than any other country. 
(c) Wide agreement, but not always 'strongly', in 
seeing the government's programmes as destroying 
people's ability to help themselves. 
(d) A rather divided, although often 'strongly' 
expressed view in favour of rejecting the 
Indonesian immigrants as socially undesirable. 
(e) Wide disapproval and often 'strongly', on the 
emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians. 
(f) Strong resolved attitude, if not complete 
agreement, on endorsing that Malaysia is a country 
for all Malaysians and not just for the Malays. 
(g) Wide agreement on the advantage of the multiethnic 
feature of Malaysian society. The confidence is 
much stronger among subjects of the middle and 
upper occupational backgrounds. The confidence, 
however, tends to decline among the subjects of 
high interethnic contact exposure. 
(h) A common pattern of rating on national problems. 
Top priority goes to corruption and drug 
addiction. Second priority to ethnic differences 
and unequal access to education, and the third to 
political disunity and religious deviation. 
(i) A rather divided view when assessing the quality 
of ethnic relations in Malaysia today. The 
positive view was not expressed with a clear 
majority by any group of subjects, except among 
the subjects of upper occupational background who 
see it with greater confidence. 
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There are several instances where some differences exist 
between groups with different interethnic contact 
experiences and occupational backgrounds. We will discuss 
these variations in relation to the possible effects of 
'modernisation' and economic class differences on Malaysian 
ethnicity later. 
Our assumption in this present chapter is more tolerant 
attitudes could be formed among those most 'favourably' 
effected by modernisation. This can be expected to occur 
among the group with greater inter-ethnic exposure. Also, as 
some may suspect, the upper and middle occupational groups 
in Malaysia are less likely to express intolerant, pro- 
ethnic attitudes than the lower occupational group because 
of their greater westernised life styles and opportunities 
for inter-group contact. Groups with a relatively higher 
intergroup contact experience and who enjoy better 
occupational status, quality of life and westernised life 
styles are more likely to stress values and perspectives 
incompatible with ethnocentric attitudes and formal 
discriminatory policies and practices. The 'modernised' 
Malays are the most important group whose views are to be 
explored because of the rapid modernisation processes that 
they are undergoing since the last two decades. But we are 
also interested in looking at the way in which the Chinese 
who possess similar attributes of modernisation would 
respond to the important key ethnic issues and problems. 
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Although in some respects both the Chinese and Malays may 
share common beliefs and attitudes, the findings in general, 
did not render, if any, a clear support to the weakening of 
the importance of ethnicity in Malaysia. Chinese and Malays 
from all the different 'contact' and 'class' groups have 
consistently expressed different attitudes to certain key 
issues. More importantly, the results did not support the 
speculation that 'modernisation' and economic development 
has induced more flexible, universal and tolerable ethnic 
attitudes among certain quarters of the ethnic groups who 
are exposed to greater interethnic contact. 
As we already know from Chapter Six, the Malays and Chinese 
did express common attitudes through their views and 
concerns, but not in all the issues forwarded to them. The 
present analysis shows that these common attitudes to a 
large extent prevail throughout all the groups among the 
Malay and Chinese subjects regardless of their differences 
in the exposure of interethnic contacts and parents' 
occupational backgrounds. 
There are three issues on the statement questions to which 
both the Malay and Chinese subjects consistently showed 
greater agreement in their responses. These are issues 
concerning standing for national anthem, dependency on 
government programmes and the feeling about the Indonesian 
immigrants. These issues, as argued in chapter six, are not 
sufficiently ethnically sensitive matters to expect diverse 
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responses from the different groups of Chinese and Malay 
subjects. 
On the other hand, in some other matters which are 
politically sensitive to the relations between the Malays 
and the non-Malays, the Chinese and Malay subjects did not 
show attitudes that were consistent with the desirable 
effect of modernisation. The Chinese and Malay subjects with 
a higher interethnic contact exposure by and large do not 
indicate that they are alike in their attitudes, nor are 
they willing to demonstrate attitudes of tolerance and 
understanding towards each other, or express an optimistic 
view about ethnic relations and society in general. 
Firstly, higher interethnic contact exposure among the 
subjects fails to produce common non-hostile and sympathetic 
attitudes among the Chinese and the Malays concerning the 
issue of racial discrimination. Ethnic contact does not seem 
to have either reduced the Chinese' antagonistic view 
towards the government's policy to help the Malays, or to 
change the Malays opinion about accepting such a policy, at 
least in principle, as discriminatory or unfair to others. 
For the Chinese to deny the policy as a discriminatory would 
mean that they have accepted the importance of the 
Government's pro-Malay economic policy, and more 
importantly, they are willing to identify and be sympathetic 
to the Malays' needs and frustrations as a disadvantaged 
group. On the other hand, for the Malays to view such a 
policy as one of racial discrimination would mean that they 
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are sympathetic with the non-Malays' feeling of injustice, 
frustration and concern about the adverse effect of such a 
policy on the non-Malays. Modernisation through greater 
contact between ethnic groups should diminish the 
antagonistic and conflicting views of the Malays and Chinese 
regarding the issue of racial discrimination. Instead, both 
groups of subjects with higher interethnic contact have 
expressed their contradicting attitudes, consistent with the 
attitudes expressed by the group with less contact. The 
Malays' rejection and the Chinese' approval of the notion 
that racial discrimination is high in Malaysia was widely 
shared within their own groups regardless of their members' 
differences in the level of interethnic contact exposures 
and occupational backgrounds. 
Secondly, the absence of difference by social contact again 
became evident with regards to the issue of emigration of 
dissatisfied Malaysians. The issue of emigration of 
dissatisfied Malaysians, as we have indicated in chapter 6, 
specifically refers to the emigration of the non-Malays who 
are not content with the government's ethnic preferential 
policy (Means, 1991: 135). To this, higher interethnic 
contact exposure among the Malays does not invoke greater 
understanding of the non-Malays' frustration and its reason. 
It did not stop them from showing openly that the non-Malays 
should emigrate to some other country if they are not happy 
with the governmental policy of helping the Malays, or of 
promoting Malay culture. This clearly does not accept as 
legitimate the non-Malays' opposition to the Government's 
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pro-Malay policies. Although the contemporary Malays may 
experience greater interethnic contact in an urban 
neighbourhood, they did not think that the non-Malays' right 
to stay in Malaysia was unconditional. We need not forget 
how the Malays in Kuala Lumpur in the 1969 riot reacted 
immediately and forcefully to the Chinese' opposition and 
celebration of 'victory' in the elections. Despite 
residential proximity, 'modernisation' did not promote a 
wider cohesive polyethnic community feeling and 
understanding. 
Although the Chinese have responded differently from the 
Malays, their rejection of the idea of emigration again 
cannot be associated with the desirable effect of 
modernisation, except to view it also as an expression of 
opposition to the Malays, i. e. their fundamental rights to 
stay as well as to express their dissatisfaction towards the 
governmental pro-Malay policies. This is evident when we 
take into consideration the Chinese subjects' expression of 
the very same attitude throughout all their different groups 
regardless of differences in interethnic contact exposure 
and occupational backgrounds. It is not exclusively the view 
of the Chinese of higher interethnic contact exposure. This 
same interpretation of Chinese response should also apply in 
other cases where all the Chinese groups have answered 
differently from that of the Malays. 
Thirdly, both the Chinese and Malays, despite their higher 
interethnic contact backgrounds, did not express outrightly 
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their positive or optimistic view about their relations with 
others, or about the advantage of living together in a 
multiethnic society like Malaysia. In addition the Malays, 
in particular, do not seem to have full confidence in 
appreciating the value of the multiethnic feature of 
Malaysian society. 
Fourthly, especially among the Malays, despite their higher 
degree of interethnic mixing, they have not really opened 
their minds to the idea of equal rights among all 
Malaysians. While like others they may have generally 
accepted the idea that Malaysia belongs to all her citizens, 
they could not commit themselves strongly to the principle 
of equality of citizenship, or more importantly, deny their 
deep-rooted feelings that Malaysia basically belongs to the 
Malays. This kind of narrow ethnic perspective again seems 
to continue to restrain them from being more universalistic 
in their view of the national problems. Their wider 
interethnic contact exposure does not seem to have led them 
to disregard their own 'ethnic perspective'. They do not 
feel strongly the desire to share, or acknowledge the 
problems of others as equally serious national problems. For 
example, they never regarded the non-Malays' problem, 
especially the one that has arisen from the government's 
ethnic preferential policy, such as unequal access to 
education, or to scholarships, as worthy of serious 
consideration as national problems. This again reflects that 
'modernisation' through wider contact has failed to create 
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wider universalistic attitudes, or consciousness of the 
polyethnic community. 
In all the above examples, the Malays' and Chinese' 
attitudes were expressed in a very consistent pattern 
throughout all the internal groups among the Malay and 
Chinese subjects. Within the Malay and Chinese groups, their 
internal differences in the interethnic contact exposure and 
occupational backgrounds did not cause any meaningful 
variation in their attitudes. To put it differently, we do 
not have any substantial evidence from this study to argue 
that greater interethnic contact exposure has produced 
flexible, tolerant and universalistic attitudes among the 
Malays and Chinese in politically important issues. 
There are, however, a few instances where small variations 
in the responses were expressed among the subjects who are 
experiencing a relatively higher degree of 'modernisation', 
i. e. higher interethnic contact exposure. Some of these 
differences which are contrary to the argument of 
'modernisation', tend to give an impression that the 
greater the contact, the greater may be the people's 
awareness of their conflict and ethnic differences. These 
small variations, however, should not be overstated. But 
these findings are consistent with the general argument 
which sees an increase in ethnic group awareness and 
conflict as a consequence of direct and greater contact and 
competition for material and social interests between ethnic 
278 
groups. It is worth taking note of this possible evidence 
with some degree of caution. 
The Chinese and Malay direct and continuous contact in the 
highly competitive social, economic and political 
circumstances in urban centres, could have produced more 
negative, pessimistic and hostile attitudes rather than 
positive, optimistic and tolerant attitudes among these 
groups. The disadvantaged or imbalanced relationships in the 
social lives, economics and politics between them could have 
possibly created more frustrations, dissatisfactions and 
counter-reactions especially in the middle and upper social 
classes of the Chinese and Malays. Among the small 
variations that may indicate this counter development to 
that of contact argument are: 
a) more middle and upper class Malays are less concerned 
about dissatisfied Malaysians (non-Malays) leaving 
Malaysia; 
b) fewer upper and middle class Malays show universal 
attitudes to admit Malaysia belongs to all Malaysians, 
or feel strongly about it; 
c) more upper class Malays are aware of the ethnic 
differences as a national problem; 
d) Malays with higher interethnic contact feel strongly 
about Malaysia belonging just to the Malays. They also 
supported emigration of dissatisfied Malaysians and 
showed less confidence in the prevailing ethnic 
relations; 
e) more middle class Chinese are aware of the unequal 
access to education and ethnic differences as serious 
national problems. 
A few additional cross-tabulations of variables were also 
carried out to see whether there is any indication of 
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relationship between these measures of modernisation and the 
subjects' responses to the hypothetical questions on Tan 
Seng Seng that we observed in chapters 4 and 5. We are aware 
that in these hypothetical questions we are not measuring 
the subjects' own ethnic preferential actions, or attitudes 
per se. But it is plausible to suspect that the subjects' 
own experience, or attitude may play an important role in 
deciding how they predict the other person will make a 
choice. In other words, we are being suspicious of the 
relationship between the subjects' prediction of ethnic 
preference choice and their own different experiences in the 
interethnic contact exposure and occupational background. 
For the above purpose, three hypothetical questions in which 
more than 50% of the Chinese and Malay subjects made ethnic 
preference choices were explored. These were child adoption, 
mixed marriage and the zoo trip. The findings again did not 
produce any significant different results to believe that 
'modernisation' in Malaysia has drastically reduced the 
importance of ethnicity (Table 7.16 & 7.17). The ethnic 
preference choices were still given priority among all the 
different groups of the Chinese and Malay subjects. The 
subjects with greater interethnic contact exposure, both 
during their childhood and currently, and those who have 
moved to mixed ethnic neighbourhoods in their adulthood, as 
the results show, are still strongly influenced by their 
ethnic preference. Similarly, there is also no ground to 
believe that their ethnic preference will be influenced by 
280 
their economic class backgrounds, although there may be 
small variations in their responses. 
Table 7.16: Ethnic Preference Choice, by Interethnic 
Contact Exposure and Ethnic Group (%) 
Chinese Malay 
EE MM EE EM 
Zoo Trip 73 64 54 64 
Child Adoption 80 79 74 65 
Mix Marriage 69 64 80 81 
Table 7.17: Ethnic Preference Choice, by Occupational 
Backgrounds and Ethnic Group (%) 
Chinese Malay 
Low Mid Upp Low Mid Upp 
Zoo Trip 68 56 76 63 46 66 
Child Adoption 84 79 86 73 62 73 
Mix Marriage 65 79 76 85 71 80 
The observations made in this chapter reveal that views, 
concerns and priorities expressed by the Chinese and Malay 
subjects were to a large extent widely shared within each 
group regardless of their differences in their degree of 
exposure to modernisation. Among the Malays and Chinese, 
'modernisation', i. e interethnic contact exposure and higher 
class situations, does not appear to be an influential 
factor in reducing the disparity in their attitudes 
concerning politically important ethnic issues and problems. 
These issues and problems that have developed around the 
issues of Malay power, privileges and ethnic preferential 
policies seem to mobilise strongly the Malaysian ethnicity 
and sustain ethnic conflict. Malay and Chinese attitudes are 
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still very much a mirror of an antagonistic, intolerant, 
non-accomodating kind of ethnic attitudes and disregard for 
each others' aspirations and problems. These attitudes and 
the act of ethnic preference continue to persist among the 
'modern' Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. The present 
observations do not indicate that 'modernisation' in 
Malaysia has brought considerable flexibility in the 
political attitudes and behaviour that are ethnically 
defined among the Malays and Chinese. The present results 
reveal great disparity with most of the findings we obtained 
from the ethnic preference tests in the hypothetical cases 
in which the majority of the cases tested were trivial and 
not ethnically sensitive social matters of interactions at 
the personal level. 
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Chapter 8 
ETHNIC PREFERENCE, STRUCTURES AND ETHNICITY IN MALAYSIA 
On reaching this concluding chapter, we need to address 
critically the major objective of this study. In this study 
we attempt to assess the salience of ethnic preference in 
relation to Chinese ethnic alignment in Malaysian society. 
We also need to address two further questions: one is to 
assess the suitability of the individualistic approach in 
studying ethnic loyalties, and the second is to ask how far 
we can go in generalising from this study to the whole 
structure of ethnic relations in Malaysia. 
The basis of the study was the survey of Malay and Chinese 
respondents, in which they were asked how in their view a 
representative Chinese person would express his ethnic 
preferences relative to other interests. These interests 
were presented as conflicting values in different 
hypothetical social situations which the ethnic 
representative may possibly face in his everyday 
interactions with members of other ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. 
One conspicuous conclusion that can be drawn from this study 
is that although the Chinese in Malaysia do not appear to 
express attitudes of a kind overtly consistent with 'blind' 
ethnic loyalty, there is no reason for us to believe that 
the importance people attach to their ethnicity is weakening 
in Malaysia. This conclusion is derived from the Chinese 
283 
subjects' perception of the behaviour or action of their own 
ethnic representative in various hypothetical social 
situations where ethnic interest is presumed to come into 
conflict with other interests, in particular, self-interest 
of material and status kinds and personal obligations. In 
most circumstances, the Malay subjects' estimation of 
Chinese ethnic preference also does not differ very much 
from that of the Chinese themselves. 
The finding is consistent, in some respects, with Mansor's 
earlier study (1992) on the strength of Malay ethnic 
alignment. This is true, at least as far as the statistical 
pattern is concerned in most of the cases observed. The 
comparison of the percentage of subjects who made ethnic 
preference choices from both the studies is presented in 
table 8.1. Mansor has interpreted his findings as showing a 
relative weakness of Malay ethnic loyalty. It may not be as 
conclusive as he believed it to be. 
In seven out of the twelve observations in Mansor's study, 
the ethnic preferences are in fact much higher than the 
present study's observation. In two cases (shopping choice, 
renting out house) the differences are very marked. Mansor 
may have been convinced by the fact that in 10 out of the 12 
cases no more than two-thirds of the subjects do believe in 
the influence of ethnic preference. Only in the case of 
shopping choice does the percentage comes a little closer to 
50%. In 7 cases only less than one-third express their 
belief in the possibility of such an influence. According to 
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Mansor these findings showed the weakening of Malay 
ethnicity, as well as ethnicity in general in Malaysia. He 
argued that this weakening is due to the effects of 
modernisation and economic development in the society that 
allow universalistic norms (self-interests and personal 
obligations) to take a strong hold in reducing the 
significance of ethnic alignment (1992: 180- 197). 
Table 8.1: Percentage of Subjects Making Ethnic 
Preference Choices: Comparison with Mansor's Study 
Social Presenta Mansor'sb 
Circumstances study study 
1. Shopping Choice 14 47 
2. Renting Out House 4 31 
3. Child Minding 17 23 
4. House Key 1 0 
5. Child Adoption 82 67 
6. Zoo Trip 66 74 
7. Wedding Invitation 34 27 
8. Bringing a Friend Home 1 6 
9. Child's Playmate 9 14 
10. Wedding Party 0 18 
11. Supporting Boss 25 20 
12. Mixed Marriage 69 28 
a- Chinese ethnic preference according to the 
Chinese subjects' estimation 
b- Malay ethnic preference according to the 
Malay subjects' estimation 
A similar pattern of results seems to recur in 9 out of 12 
cases in the present survey. If we use the similar two- 
thirds, or more than 50% percentage criteria, then the 
results of the present study may also give an impression 
that the Chinese in Malaysia act in a manner less consistent 
with the notion of ethnic preference. By Mansor's standard, 
people of different ethnic groups in Malaysia will act in a 
manner less consistent with the notion of ethnic sentiment, 
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or that ethnic identities and loyalties are applied and 
enacted with considerable flexibility. 
The present study is a replication of Mansor's study and in 
some respects has resulted, as the above table shows, in 
similar findings. But on analysis we must question the way 
in which Mansor proceeds from his survey of attitudes 
expressed by his respondents to a more general set of 
conclusions about the sharpness, or otherwise, of ethnic 
conflict in Malaysia. For Mansor, in doing so, ignores some 
important potential errors. He may underestimate the 
difficulties involved in the interpretation of his own data. 
This is particularly evident in advancing possible reasons 
for the judgements which respondents make. 
Firstly, in data of this kind, we simply do not know with 
certainty why respondents make their choices. We know only 
the choices which they record. Secondly, the social 
situations investigated are hypothetical. So a Malay person 
may well say that, given a particular situation, he may make 
a universalistic choice. But in practice this situation may 
rarely, if ever, present itself. Daily life may reinforce 
ethnic sentiments even if in theory it could be broken. 
Thirdly, even if we take the responses more or less at face 
value, to extrapolate from them to the generality of ethnic 
relations in Malaysia constitutes a failure to recognise the 
levels at which ethnic conflict may exist. A typical Malay 
may say 'Yes, under certain circumstances I would shop at a 
Chinese shop (even in preference to a Malay shop). But 
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politically I don't trust them'. Likewise the typical 
Chinese may also say 'Yes, I would attend my Malay friend's 
wedding. But politically I don't agree with the Malays' 
special constitutional privileges'. 
The following discussion will show that not only uncertainty 
can arise from such interpretations, but there are also 
sound reasons to believe that ethnicity, ethnic identity and 
ethnic conflict are still very much an influential force in 
Malaysian society. It is however important to see first how 
Mansor has argued in opposing the majority of previous 
observations to uphold his optimistic view about ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. 
Mansor's Optimistic Views 
In looking at the implications of the findings, we may ask 
what the results of both the present and Mansor's studies 
can disclose about ethnic relations or ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia. At a 'face-value' interpretation, the findings 
seem to indicate that there now prevails in Malaysia more 
flexible ethnic relations among the different ethnic groups. 
The Chinese and Malays, for example, as indicated in both 
the studies, do not seem to be strongly influenced by their 
sense of ethnic attachment which otherwise could possibly 
hinder, minimise or polarise ethnic relations with one 
another or vice-versa; for ethnic attachment is both cause 
and effect. Their willingness to give priority to other 
interests, in particular to the self-interest of material 
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and status kinds, and personal obligation over their ethnic 
preference appear to indicate that they are now more willing 
to act voluntarily in a manner that may undermine any form 
of ethnic prejudice that might go hand in hand with their 
strong urge for ethnic preference, attachment, alignment, or 
chauvinism. 
The other interests that are tested against ethnic interests 
seem to have exerted a greater influence for the Chinese and 
Malays to forge interactions that are free from ethnic 
prejudice, suspicion and consideration, or simply create 
better interethnic relations across the ethnic boundaries in 
society. Malaysians of Malay and Chinese origin seem to have 
acted 'rationally' in many social circumstances to make non- 
ethnic instead of ethnic preference choices as an optimizing 
act through the daily course of their lives. But we do not 
know for certain whether this is what the result actually 
implies, especially when acting 'rationally' is equated with 
not acting out of 'blind' ethnic loyalty. For example, 
choosing to patronise a shop belonging to a co-ethnic member 
instead of the other ethnic shop, which is much lower in 
price, may still be a rational choice. It cannot be 
interpreted as irrational 'blind' ethnic loyalty if a person 
has, for example, carefully calculated the benefit of his 
own cultural choices, or the flexible credit purchase he or 
she may obtain from his own ethnic shop. 
From Mansor's point of view, the real problem in the society 
is, however, that of pluralistic ignorance, a term 
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introduced by Allport (1924). Researchers have used the 
concept to describe the misjudgement of the members of one 
group about their own, or the attitudes and behaviour of 
other racial or ethnic groups (Banton, 1986; Fields & 
Schuman, 1976; O'Gorman, 1976; Hewstone & Ward, 1985). 
Mansor believes, 
The data collected on pluralistic ignorance demonstrated that a 
sociologist who collects such data has a source of information 
superior to that of the people going about their daily lives. 
Malaysians' images of their society and its ethnic relations, even 
if widely shared, failed to correspond with the facts collected'. 
The findings on the problems of pluralistic ignorance indicate 
that the whole Malay group in Petaling Jaya, be it in terms of 
gender or age, is more sympathetic towards universalist norms than 
individuals of the group (Malay) realise (1992: 185). 
He further comments that the inaccurate picture of 
pluralistic ignorance about ethnic relations in a society 
like Malaysia is due to the strong influence of Furnivall's 
images of conflict, and a highly divided plural society 
among the scholars studying race and ethnic relations 
(1992: 186). Yet Mansor has failed to realise here that in 
most of the social circumstances he studied, the Chinese 
actually have underestimated Malay ethnic influence. This 
kind of pluralistic ignorance after all cannot be said to be 
'good news' for the Chinese, since the Malays are not as 
universalistic as the Chinese have thought them to be. 
Pluralistic ignorance, if at all, is the real problem in 
Malaysia, then it should indicate that the Malays are in 
fact more open, liberal and tolerant in their attitudes, 
than the Chinese have estimated. 
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Mansor is correct in commenting that the differences 
portrayed in the images of society and ethnic relations lie 
in the kinds of social relations analysed. He says, '... in 
a changing society, there are situations where individuals 
are governed partly by universalistic and partly by ethnic 
norms.... The images of polarisation and the dominance of 
ethnicity in the Malay-Chinese relations emerged from group 
competition over the benefit of economic growth' (p. 184). 
Although Mansor seems to recognise that different kinds, or 
different levels, of ethnic relations and conflicts might be 
involved in the analysis, he seems to over-generalise the 
implication of his findings without further exploring these 
different levels of ethnicity in Malaysia. It is rather 
absurd to think that the Malay-Chinese competition over the 
benefit of economic growth has disappeared in the society, 
or to think that the ethnic preferential New Economic Policy 
is not a controversial, or sensitive issue in Malaysian 
ethnic relations. Yet Mansor goes on to generalise: 
... new relationships governed by universalistic rather than ethnic 
norms are being introduced into Malaysian society. Malays and 
Chinese are relating to one another in social relations that 
attribute little significance to ethnic sentiment and 
loyalty... The new relationships provide opportunities for Malays 
and Chinese to relate to one another as individual men and women, 
and in this way restrict the applicability of ethnic norms 
(p. 180).... while people may be sensitive to ethnic considerations 
in certain circumstances,... large areas of their life come under 
the influence of non-ethnic norms. This changing social reality of 
Malay-Chinese relations has been brought about by individual 
actions and has weakened the concern for group boundaries (p. 
184). 
He may intend to show that society is changing, and there 
are now more non-ethnic norms than before that have started 
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to weaken the ethnic boundaries, especially in urban 
settings. But he appears to neglect many other researchers' 
and scholars' views which indicate that ethnic conflict and 
ethnicity are very important features of Malaysian society. 
Instead, he continues by arguing against the observations of 
many other researchers and scholars (such as Basham, 1983; 
Milne, 1981; Mutalib, 1990; Jesudason, 1989; Lee, 1990; 
Snider, 1977; Ting, 1982; Von Vorys, 1975. ) to make a kind 
of an over-emphasis on his findings. 
Mansor has clearly indicated his preference for the 'bottom- 
up'. approach which he employed in his study. He criticised 
sociologists for being more interested in large scale social 
trends in society rather than trying to explore the 
different processes involved in generating and maintaining 
ethnic groups (p. 196). He also criticised previous studies 
of ethnic relations in Malaysia for having concentrated more 
on Malay-Chinese differences, or conflicts. He believes that 
the method he employed in his study has revealed instead the 
Malay-Chinese similarities which have been overlooked 
before. He seems to be convinced by his description of how 
Malays and Chinese interact and participate in many social 
situations which he refers to as a 'non-ethnic universalist 
sphere'. He believes this to be a new trend in ethnic 
relations in Malaysia where Malaysians, according to him, 
have come to ignore their ethnic origin or sentiment in such 
situations. 
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While the present study may have produced a similar pattern 
of statistical findings, it offers an alternative view. This 
view instead will take into consideration developments in 
the wider socio-political system to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of Malaysian ethnicity and 
ethnic relations in society. Before proceeding to look 
closely into the present findings, it is vital to assess 
critically the changes in the society that may have 
influenced the way people perceive progress made in ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. 
Critical View of Changes in Ethnic Relations 
In this section, we will look into some of the changes in 
Malaysian society critically, in particular the interethnic 
groups' experiences which provide reasons why we should be 
cautious in interpreting findings from limited observations 
like Mansor's as well as the present one. We cannot simply 
conclude from this kind of data that ethnic relations have 
improved in Malaysia, or that the importance of ethnicity 
has weakened. We cannot be persuaded by conclusions which 
appear to be partly driven by the wish to show the virtues 
of an individualistic approach. 
' In Malaysia we certainly 
have to examine the view of many other scholars who have 
concluded that ethnic loyalties and identifications continue 
to structure political, economic and social life with an 
underlying potential for persistent conflict. A question 
1 In his latest article (1994), Banton has elaborated Mansor's 
method to support the argument for 'methodological individualism' 
in the study of ethnicity. 
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which is wholly connected, but which may be treated as a 
separate issue, is the question of the circumstances in 
which these underlying tensions erupt into violence. The 
findings of both studies should not be over-emphasised as 
conditions reflecting an overall situation or all levels of 
interactions or social contexts in the society, but instead 
should be treated with caution. 
There is no doubt that the interactions amongst the members 
of the different ethnic groups in Malaysia have increased 
since Independence. The evidence of this study itself shows 
that a high percentage of the Malay and Chinese are at 
present frequently engaged in interethnic contact (see 
tables 6.6 - 6.9). It is impossible to limit interethnic 
interactions from occurring in a society like Malaysia. 
Basically this is because their interactions are not 
controlled or regulated by any strict rules or laws such as 
those under the apartheid system in South Africa, and those 
of the slavery or post-slavery period in America. Even in 
these rigidly divided societies, some form of voluntary 
interaction between members of different ethnic groups is 
unavoidable. In Malaysia, during the British colonial era, 
there were very limited interethnic interactions, owing to 
compartmentalisation of ethnic groups in separate 
geographical areas and economic activities (see Chapter 1). 
In the situation of colonialism, structural segregations, 
cultural pluralism, and limited 'market place' interaction, 
as described by theorists of plural society (Furnivall, 
1948; Smith, 1965), are features of the conditions of 
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interethnic interactions and relations in the Malaysian 
society during this era. 
Keeping the Malays, Chinese and Indians apart, as we have 
discussed in chapter one, can be seen as a deliberate policy 
of colonial administration. It helps to manage the colonial 
multiethnic society much more easily, as well as keep under 
control any possibilities of anti-colonial struggle on the 
part of Malays and non-Malays. By keeping them working in 
different economic functions and living in geographically 
different areas, very minimal opportunities for interethnic 
interactions were provided under the colonial system, 
although ethnic groups were prevented from being thrown into 
direct conflict. But these separations have at the same time 
created some form of ethnic suspicion, cultural prejudice 
and stereotyped images and social distance in this early 
period among these peoples of different cultural 
backgrounds. The colonial British pro-Malay policy has too 
directly intensified these internal divisions and conflicts 
among the people. This was apparent in the emergence of 
communal politics, nationalism and issues of citizenship 
among the Malays and non-Malays in the country. Lack of 
interethnic interaction and integration are the main 
features of colonial Malaysian society. Relations between 
the Malays and the Chinese later became deteriorated during 
the period of the Japanese Occupation and the Emergency, and 
in the struggle over the Constitution since the 1940s. 
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Since Independence, the creation of new opportunities for 
greater interethnic interactions in various sectors and 
areas has increased as a consequence of industrialization, 
urbanization and rural-urban migration. As the Government 
has fostered the growth of industries in urban centres, it 
has also aimed to increase Malays' participation and their 
wealth in the modern economic and occupational sectors. The 
expansion of educational and training opportunities, and the 
creation of wider job markets, especially via the New 
Economic Policy, has encouraged rapid rural-urban migration 
of the Malays and has consequently increased the Malay 
population in cities and towns in Malaysia (see chapter 1). 
These have not only provided opportunities for interethnic 
contact and familiarity, but have also provided 
possibilities for the creation of new norms, values and 
interests as a basis for interaction between peoples that 
could have broken some of the traditional ethnic social 
barriers as well as prejudice and stereotyped thinking. 
It cannot be denied that some people do tend to think that 
there has been an improvement in interethnic relations in 
Malaysia. For example, in this study, such opinions were 
indicated by more than 50% of the Malay and Chinese 
subjects (see tables 6.16 and 6.17). People do sometimes 
tend to associate the increase in the volume of interactions 
between groups with improvement in ethnic relations. The 
Malaysian government's aim of 'restructuring society' under 
the New Economic Policy is also partly based on the 
assumption that increase in the opportunities or frequencies 
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of social contact among different ethnic groups might well 
bring greater unity among the people. 
There may be some truth in associating interaction with 
improvement in ethnic relations, especially when we compare 
it with the situations in some previous societies where 
interaction among different groups is rigidly divided by the 
law supporting ethnic, or racial discrimination. But on the 
other hand, interaction without integration or unity is also 
a possible situation in a society. What is equally, if not 
more, important is to understand the factors that may 
provoke and sustain potential interethnic conflict and the 
importance of ethnicity in a society from a higher political 
level. In other words, the interethnic conflict at a higher 
macro-level in society might prevail independently over that 
of the lower level everyday interactions. For example, Robin 
Williams, in his study (1964) of the interethnic 
interactions in United States, made interesting 
observations. He noted that while many interpersonal 
interactions may take place daily in a multiethnic society 
such as that of the United States, he comments, 
... they (interpersonal interactions) may serve to bridge interethnic cleavages to some extent without having marked effects 
upon the basic structure of power within which ethnic categories 
have their life chance defined for them (p. 362) 
Social interaction does not only possibly create 
cooperation, sharing of new norms or unity, but it also 
creates new conditions for conflict in society. In fact, the 
very problem of self-awareness of ethnic identity among 
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members of different ethnic and racial groups in the modern 
world has resurged or intensified through the increase in 
social contact between them. The most isolated group of 
people is probably the least ethnically self-defined. As 
Fishman stressed, 
Premodern ethnicity is, so far as the ordinary actor is concerned, 
minimally self-conscious. At best, it recognizes ethnic 
categories; ethnic blocs for the purposive, instrumental 
exploitation of ethnicity are unknown (1977: 35). 
This has openly challenged the prediction by Marxist and 
liberal scholars, as well as scholars of modernisation 
theories, of the collapse of ethnic identity or ideologies 
as modernisation and industrialisation become prominent 
features of society. It is believed that liberal democratic 
principles, i. e. equal rights citizenship and equal and fair 
treatment for all before the law, at least in principle, 
would deny the interference of ethnicity in the 
implementation of the above universal principles in modern 
democratic societies. But even in a highly democratic and 
modern society like the United States, ethnicity does not 
seem to have diminished, or followed the prophecy of the 
'American melting-pot'. Eriksen (1993), in his comments on 
Glazer and Moynihan's study, stated, 
They argued that rather than eradicating ethnic differences, 
modern American society has actually created a new form of self- 
awareness in people, which is expressed in a concern about roots 
and origins. Moreover, many American continue to use their ethnic 
networks actively when looking for jobs or a spouse. many prefer 
to live in neighbourhoods dominated by people with the same 
origins as themselves, and they continue to regard themselves as 
'Italians', 'Poles' and so on in addition to being Americans - two 
generations or more after their ancestors left the country of 
origin (p. 8). 
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Apart from comparing the situation with that in the colonial 
period, there may be other reasons for some people to see 
Malaysian's ethnic relations as a successful story. Firstly, 
the political stability that Malaysia enjoys, with only one 
major outbreak of ethnic violence in 1969, seems to support 
the notion of improvement in ethnic relations since 
Independence. For example, in comparison with Sri Lanka, 
Malaysia's success in encountering severe ethnic conflict, 
according to Horowitz (1989), is due to the incentives of 
the Malaysian political parties to seek votes across ethnic 
lines and to form an interethnic coalition party. The only 
major open ethnic violence that has come to be recorded in 
Malaysia's history since Independence is the May 13th riots 
in 1969. This event happened mainly in the area around the 
capital city of Kuala Lumpur. Fear of another outbreak of 
violence in 1987 was successfully allayed, but rather at the 
expense of 'demonstrated freedom'. After the 1969 incident, 
strategies for integration were implemented via the national 
language and education policy, national cultural policy, and 
most importantly, the New Economic Policy (see chapter 1). 
The political strategies include the formulation of a bigger 
coalition government under the National Front Party and the 
implementation of different acts to suppress ethnic 
politicking and extremists. All these policies and 
strategies since then have influenced the way in which 
people express, or suppress, their ethnicity, including the 
way people express their general opinion about the ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. 
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It is important to understand that there is a real tendency 
for people in Malaysia to be influenced by this ethnic 
violence of 1969 when they come to assess the present 
interethnic situation. With the May 13th incident in mind, 
present interethnic relations can create an impression that 
there is an improvement on the previous conditions. 
Politicians frequently remind citizens, Malay, Chinese, 
Indian and others, of the 1969 conflict. In effect, people 
are told: 'You never want that to happen again'. The very 
fear of a repetition produces a strong urge among 
politicians to spread the view that 'things are getting 
better'. Citizens themselves, of all ethnic origins, may 
retain their fears and suspicions but they cannot help being 
influenced by the kind of propaganda that denies the depth 
of ethnic suspicion. Although this may create reasons for 
'compromise' or 'tolerance' among the Malaysians, they are 
not the product of modernisation. 
Without other open ethnic clashes after the 1969 riots, 
ethnic relations, or 'integration' in Malaysia may outwardly 
appear to have improved. But this can be misleading. Ethnic 
relations cannot be judged as improved simply because there 
is no 'ongoing' open riot in the society. Open ethnic 
violence like that of May 13 is only one of the indicators, 
or more precisely, is only a consequence of ongoing ethnic 
conflict. Ethnic ill-feelings and resentment among people 
can continue to exist. These too determine the quality of 
ethnic relations in a society as well as reflecting a 
fragile polyethnic society. People also fear and do not 
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easily want to be drawn into a highly risky open ethnic 
violence. It also can be suppressed through various laws, as 
during the 1987 crisis. In Malaysia, the Internal Security 
Act and Sedition Act has been effectively used for this 
purpose, as well as for preventing people from publicly 
discussing any controversial issues that are sensitive to 
ethnic relations (see chapter 1). 
Relations between ethnic groups tend to alter as a society 
changes, or progresses. World-wide experiences show that the 
nature of collective identity and relationships among ethnic 
groups can change, or take different forms. Ross, for 
example, sees communal, minority, ethnic and national groups 
as a progression of identity modes that manifests at 
different stages in accordance with changes in contact, and 
above all, by political changes in a society (Ross, 1979: 4- 
11). In the early stages of modern multiracial societies, 
for example during the period of slavery in the United 
States, the people were much more strictly divided or 
segregated spatially, culturally, socially and in some 
circumstances, legally. In such situations, racism has been 
a dominant social force that voluntarily or involuntarily 
influences the attitudes and behaviours of the members of 
social groups. Race relations and interactions between the 
Whites and the Blacks in this society were governed 
essentially by the law and, and also implemented by force. 
Any openly close and friendly social interaction, or mixed 
marriages in such situations were not expected to happen. 
But such interactions or unions would never be considered 
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unlawful, or even socially unexpected among the people of 
the current American society, although racial preference 
can still be a powerful influence. 
In the same way, in the present Malaysian society, the 
experiences encountered by members of ethnic groups can no 
longer be perceived as strongly confined to the rigidity of 
their own ethnic boundaries. But neither can one ignore 
totally the influence of ethnic boundaries. The situation of 
ethnic relations in Malaysia cannot be assumed never to have 
changed at all since the colonial period. One cannot presume 
that the Malays have not yet completely accepted the Chinese 
as co-citizens of Malaysia, or that Malaysia belongs to all 
its citizens and not just to the Malays; that the Chinese 
will definitely join the Chinese Society in London because 
they do not consider themselves Malaysians yet; or that 
these Chinese will in fact want to go back to China because 
of their blood ties with their country of origin. 
2 To be 
surprised if the above assumptions do not confirm the facts 
only means an unrealistic exaggeration of these situations. 
But at the same time, to use them as evidence of harmonious 
ethnic relations will also be equivalent to ignoring the 
salience of ethnicity and ethnic conflict that may exist or 
2 At one stage Mansor stressed how a Malay government servant was 
surprised with his findings but ... reckoned that Chinese must be 
changing for them to accept the country's national symbols such as 
the national anthem, etc..., surprised that Malays in Petaling 
Jaya were observed to be changing and able to recognise that 
Malaysia is not just for Malays.... A Chinese friend told (him) 
that he was asked to join a Chinese society at a university in 
London, but refused to do so as he is a Malaysian. Another said he 
would not want to go back to Chinese mainland as there was no 
reason for him to do so. He had no blood ties there any more (p. 
194). 
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devolve from different levels on to the people. Responsible 
judgements therefore must also consider other possible 
influential factors. The power balance between ethnic groups 
at a wider political level is among the influential factors 
in Malaysian society. People may not necessarily or overtly 
refer to this macro-level ethnicity at micro-level 
interactions which mainly focused in specific interactional 
contexts. 
In order to establish any meaningful conclusion about the 
strength of ethnic alignment, ethnic conflict or the 
importance of ethnicity in Malaysian society, one cannot 
merely concentrate on some aspects of cultural adaptations 
or universal norms that may have come to exist in the 
process of social changes in society. In the same way, we 
also cannot determine the situation based alone on evidence 
that shows a lack of strength or interest among people to 
express ethnic preference, loyalty, negative feelings, or 
racist attitudes 'blindly' or overtly towards other groups 
which otherwise would lead to continuous open conflict. It 
is no longer legitimate, or considered appropriate in the 
present context of modern democratic societies, for people 
to express their attitudes or support openly the act of 
discrimination and oppression, hostility, negative 
stereotypes, social distance and segregation. Racism is seen 
as an evil, inconsistent with the universalistic values of a 
truly democratic society. It is possible that Malaysian 
citizens are aware of this or are at least aware of the 
propaganda which tells them this. But the mere existence of 
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a developing market economy, a democratic political regime, 
and an ideology of universalism are not enough on their own 
to guarantee the disappearance or submergence of communalist 
sentiments. 
If recent ethnic political conflicts in many societies can 
assist our discussion, one has to ask at least, why in a 
society like the former Yugoslavia, people of different 
ethnic origins and religious affiliations who used to engage 
in everyday interactions and dealings peacefully at the 
micro-level at one time, can now turn back and fight and 
kill one another, including neighbours and close friends, as 
a result of their ethno-religious political conflict? Even 
in a democratic, liberal and developed society like the 
United States of America, which eagerly prompted the idea of 
a melting-pot society and being the case study for the 
weakening of ethnicity in a highly modernised society, 
ethnicity, racial division and conflict do not appear to 
fade away. The cases of Rodney King and O. J. Simpson have 
not only indicated that American society too can be thrown 
into serious racial riots and tensions, but also the deep- 
rooted divisions and conflicts that persist among the people 
can be brought to the surface. In Europe too, racism, 
ethnicity and nationalism have disfigured the contemporary 
period of modern, democratic, liberal and affluent societies 
of the Western World (Rattansi and Westwood, 1994). The 
everyday scenario of micro-level interethnic interactions of 
these modern societies would hardly represent the underlying 
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political issues that may sustain racial and ethnic problems 
in these societies. 
The 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur itself did not happen because 
the Malays and the Chinese in Malaysia, or in the city, did 
not interact or engage in transactions peacefully through 
their daily course prior to the event. There was no report 
or anything written to indicate that this was the cause of 
the incident. The very reasons which prevailed at the wider 
societal level were economic and political . The Malays felt 
frustrated with their economically disadvantaged position 
compared with that of the Chinese, although they were 
granted special rights in the Constitution. As for the 
Chinese and Indians, they could not come to terms with the 
effects of Malay special rights and political hegemony. It 
was a politically frustrating experience for the non-Malays. 
The situation at the societal level was highly sensitive. 
The 1969 election was only the immediate circumstance that 
brought the underlying tensions into open violence. The 
overwhelming support of the Chinese for the opposition in 
the 1969 elections and their outrageous celebrations of the 
success was only a mere 'good starting point' or 
circumstance that brought these macro-societal levels of 
economical and political frustrations between them into an 
open clash. 
Again the crisis in 1987 which almost threw the country into 
another riot was started from 'above', political and 
administrative decisions made by the Government on the 
ý-. . 
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promotion of non-Mandarin trained headmasters and 
administrators in Chinese schools. The Chinese saw this as a 
threat to their culture and language. In response to the 
Chinese public rally of protest at the decision, the Malays' 
UMNO Youth launched a massive counter rally of the Malays in 
support of the Government's decision. The crisis brought 
about the famous massive detentions called operasi lalang in 
1987, to stop the outburst of another conflict in the 
country. This decision of the government again can be seen 
as another circumstance that almost brought the underlying 
conflict between the Malay political supremacy and the 
political demands of the non-Malays into open riot. 
No observer of Malaysian politics would deny that the 
fundamental ethnic problems related to the political and 
economical power relations between the Malays and non- 
Malays, especially those institutionalised in the political 
system, are still the very source of ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia. Ethnic conflict in the society, as such, cannot 
be understated. As one observer states: 
Our ethnic problems are a consequence of our colonial 
history .... But what have we done in the past 30 years to diminish our diversities? The first decade of our existence 
as an independent country has been wasted, and the last two 
decades have seen exacerbation of ethnic tensions. Now after 
a third of a century of political independence, a decade 
away from the twenty first century, we are still pre- 
occupied with racial and religious issues that may bring 
catastrophe to this beautiful land of ours (Rajakumar, 1989: 
2). 
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Many observations by Malaysian scholars have reiterated the 
very persistence of ethnic problems in Malaysia. A political 
economist, Sundaram, observed: 
Malaysian society and culture has been dominated by racial and 
ethnic preoccupations. It is widely agreed in Malaysia today that 
the greatest threat to stability, especially since the late 1960s, 
has been inter-ethnic disharmony.... Most Malaysians would no 
longer deny that inter-ethnic relations have been deteriorating 
since the 1950s, and especially since the mid-1960s. This 
deterioration is clearly evident on at least three fronts: 
economic, cultural and political. Although involving many non- 
ethnic dimensions, it is the ethnic dimensions of these 
developments which have received most public and political 
attention (1990: 229). 
The twenty-year period from 1970 to 1990 is a very important 
era. The New Economic Policy was implemented as a major 
policy to overcome the imbalance between the Malays and the 
non-Malays in the economic sector in order to achieve the 
goal of national unity. The policy clearly based its 
assumptions on, first, poor ethnic relations as result of 
the Malays' economic disadvantage, and second, as a remedy, 
overcoming the Malays' disadvantage to improve ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. But as Osman Rani, another 
researcher, observed: 
The first question is: if the National Economic Policy's 
(NEP) assumption can be accepted, i. e. ethnic relations can 
be improved through interaction and cooperation between 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra via participation in the same 
and equal economic activities, than any change towards 
achieving the goals of the NEP should reinforce this process 
of integration. Unfortunately, this did not happen. On the 
contrary, ethnic relations in Malaysia seem to have become 
more serious, more so ever, after the economic depression in 
the mid 1980s, and towards the end of the 20 year period of 
the implementation of the NEP (1989: 12-13). 
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A. similar view was also expressed by Sanusi Osman, a 
researcher in Sociology: 
After 31 years of independence, and after the period of New 
Economic Policy has almost come to an end, the question of 
national unity is still a problem that has become more serious. Zn 
fact, ethnic relations have become more strained to the extent 
that even petty issues which are not important could bring about 
opposition and animosity between ethnic.... Among the majority of 
the people, there still exists feelings of suspicions, jealousy 
and dissatisfaction among one another. Each ethnic group feels 
that they are not given fair treatment by the government (1989: 
13). 
Sanusi Osman has also argued in one of his earlier articles 
(1983) that ethnic ties among the Malaysians are still an 
influential factor which promotes unity within each ethnic 
group, and undermines or weakens cross border integration 
such as class integration. This observation is again very 
much consistent with others' observations (Ackerman, 1986; 
Nagata, 1975). Ackerman's study on trade unionism in 
Malaysia shows that the class loyalty strategy to unify co- 
workers in factories was always subverted by the pressure of 
ethnicity at both lower and higher levels. Statistical 
findings from research carried out by a group of academics 
in 1988 also indicates that the majority of ethnic leaders 
believe that although economic disparity between the ethnic 
groups has reduced since the implementation of the New 
Economic Policy, ethnic relations have deteriorated (iialim, 
et Al, 1989). 
All the above observations contest the 'harmony' views, 
although these observers are well aware that the everyday 
transactions at the micro-level between Malays, Chinese and 
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Indians are taking place 'as usual' without them openly 
arguing, or quarrelling about the macro-level ethnic issues. 
We must ask whether the evidence from Mansor's study and the 
current one, which mainly concentrates on this level, 
necessarily means that the importance of ethnicity for the 
Malays and Chinese, or the potency of ethnic conflict, has 
reduced in the lives of Malaysians. 
Changes in the geographical distribution of the people which 
may bring together people of different ethnic origins does 
not necessarily bring about changes in their attitudes to 
promote a sense of unity, or a cohesive polyethnic 
community. While the Chinese and Malays may now be more 
frequently 'thrown together', particularly in the modern 
urban context, we cannot simply assume that the barriers to 
ethnic interactions at all levels and spectra of Malaysian 
life have been eliminated satisfactorily, or that attitudes 
have changed. We cannot assume that an increase in 
interethnic transactions will automatically lead to more 
harmonious ethnic relations. Even in the urban environment, 
as Raymond Lee's study of social networks and ethnic 
interactions tends to support, the ethnic affiliations have 
been reinforced continuously via political and religious 
organisational membership, friendship pattern and kinship 
contacts (1986). From his survey Lee summarises, 
The data seem to suggest that outside the work situation, 
interaction tends to be more oriented towards kin and fellow 
ethnics than colleagues and other ethnic group members... The 
survey findings provide some support for the idea that the urban 
environment reinforces ethnic affiliations (1986: 122). 
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It may be useful at this juncture for us to make a 
distinction between 'ethnic traditionalism' and 'ethnic 
antagonism'. These are among the important manifestations of 
ethnic phenomena which could explain the possible trends 
that influence ethnic relations in the changing character of 
Malaysian society. By 'ethnic traditionalism' we refer to 
trends in the society that support the preservation of 
ethnic culture and ethnic religious beliefs and practices. 
To some extent it is happening in Malaysia, but in quite an 
uneven way, because the ethnic culture and religion which 
are most preserved in Malaysia are that of the Malays. This 
is because their cultural and religious attributes are given 
a kind of privileged position within Malaysia, thus 
preserving the traditional aspects of Malay culture and 
religion (Islam) and therefore in that sense, Malay 
ethnicity; whereas there is not the same provision to 
protect or promote Chinese or Indian culture, religious 
beliefs or practices, or to protect their languages. 
The survey on the usage of language among the subjects in 
this study, for example, shows a kind of acculturation that 
is very one-sided (see chapter 6). It is the Chinese who are 
learning to speak Malay. But the Malays uniformly speak 
Malay and a very high percentage of them may also speak 
English especially among the educated group like the sample 
in the study. But the Chinese subjects speak Chinese, Malay 
and English which makes them trilingual (the same is true 
for the Indians). The Malays, however, speak just either 
Malay or Malay and English. From this we could say that 
309 
cultural differences are diminishing because there no longer 
is a situation where the Malays speak only Malay, Chinese 
speak only Chinese and Indians speak their language as the 
non-Malay groups are acculturated towards the Malay 
language. On the other hand, it does not so much reflect 
acculturation and modernisation, i. e. the modern society 
requires the uniformity of language and the more advanced 
the modern society becomes the more intense to drive out the 
minority languages. In Malaysia this does not so much 
reflect modernisation or acculturation. It actually reflects 
the Malay cultural privilege. The reason why the Malay 
language becomes dominant is not because it is the 
requirement of a modernising society that there is a 
language of discourse shared by all. It is because the 
Malays want to secure for the Malay language this privileged 
position and to promote the Malay culture and Malay language 
through national policies of the state. 
It is quite possible that in some respects cultural 
differences may diminish so that in cultural terms there may 
be a coming closer together of Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
But it does not necessarily mean that because of this 
greater closeness culturally, in the formal sense, there is 
an absence of 'ethnic antagonism'. The factors that affect 
ethnic antagonism are not the same factors that affect 
ethnic cultures. The factors that affect ethnic cultures are 
the cultural and language policies, and the extent to which 
traditional culture, form of worship and family life can be 
preserved in the condition of modern Malaysia. What affects 
310 
ethnic antagonism is quite a different thing, which is 
whether Chinese and other non-Malays feel that they are 
being discriminated against in Malaysian society. Those are 
quite separate issues in many respects, although not 
altogether separate. In many respects the factors that 
affect ethnic traditionalism are different from the factors 
that affect ethnic antagonism. 
The present survey also provides further evidence that 
-supports the continuation of the salience of ethnicity in 
modernising Malaysia. Issues and problems that have 
developed around the Malays' privileges and power, ethnic 
preferential policies and the non-Malays' rights seem to 
have strongly mobilised and sustained Malaysian ethnicity 
and potential ethnic conflict in the society. This was 
reflected in the Malay and Chinese subjects' sharply divided 
political attitudes concerning key issues and problems, i. e. 
racial discrimination, migration of dissatisfied Malaysians, 
unequal access to education, corruption, political disunity 
and ethnic differences (Chapter 6). Further analysis in 
Chapter 7 also indicates that 'modernisation', in particular 
the increase in interethnic contact, is not sufficient to 
diminish the effect of ethnically divisive issues in 
Malaysia that creates ethnic antagonism. The highly 
politicised ethnicity in Malaysia leads us to consider the 
dynamic nature of ethnicity and ethnic conflict at the 
different levels of social relationships. 
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Micro, Meso and Macro Level Ethnicity 
In any multi-ethnic society, not only can both differences 
and similarities, ethnic consciousness and national 
consciousness, ethnic norms and universal norms, ethnic 
conflict and national unity, co-exist or develop. They can 
also exist or be expressed in unequal degrees at different 
levels of social relations between members of ethnic groups. 
In other words, both dividing and conflicting elements on 
the one hand, and boundary reduction and integration on the 
other hand could be conceivable consequences when two or 
more ethnic groups meet. Both these processes can take place 
side by side at different spheres and levels of 
relationships. 
Social boundaries between ethnic groups may reduce at one 
level of interethnic relations, depending on the very nature 
of social contexts. But at other levels these boundaries may 
be reinforced in society. To be more clear about the way in 
which people may express their ethnicity, or ethnic conflict 
in private and public lives, we need to make a distinction 
between the levels of social structure at which ethnicity 
and ethnic conflict are articulated. This means that we need 
to understand the very nature of social contexts that 
constitute the different levels of social structure. This 
basically involves the understanding of the three different 
levels of interethnic relations; that is, in the circles of: 
(i) informal interpersonal relations which involve 
family and friends, 
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(ii) formal working and business relationships in 
organisational circumstances and, 
(iii) at the level of abstract relationships, in 
relation to political rights, status and power 
relations and struggle at the higher societal 
level. 
We may refer to these three levels that encompass the whole 
ethnic structures in a society respectively as micro, meso 
and macro-ethnicity. Some scholars have in fact directly or 
indirectly, using different terms, recognised the importance 
of these levels, especially micro and macro-levels, in 
exploring the way in which ethnic identities, loyalties and 
conflicts may be articulated in society, including Malaysia 
(Despres, 1975b: 87-118: Eriksen, 1993: 46-48; Jenkins, 1994: 
197-223; Jesudason, 1990: 9; Nash, 1989: 30; ). For example, as 
Jesudason states, 
... a Malay and a Chinese in Malaysia or a Tamil and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka might co-own a business and belong to 
the same social clubs. They are socially integrated and co- 
operative at the micro level. This does not mean that at the 
macro level of group contention they will not press for 
beneficial policies (in terms of resource allocation, 
employment, educational, and ownership quotas, and language 
policies) for their group (1990: 9). 
The idea in Sociology of different levels of social 
relations is not new, especially the distinction between the 
micro and meso levels. This basically corresponds with the 
distinction made by Cooley (1909) between the primary and 
secondary (levels of) social relationships in a society. 
Micro-level interactions are those of Primary relations in 
which contact is informal, personal, intimate and usually 
face-to-face in nature. One example is an interpersonal 
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friendship, or marriage relationship, that may be formed 
between a Malay and a Chinese person. Meso-level contact is 
that of secondary relations which are more formal and 
impersonal in nature and occur in organisational relations. 
An example of this is the formal working relationship among 
a Malay, Chinese and Indian in public and private offices, 
companies, factories and schools. 
The macro-level refers to a higher abstract level where 
national political decisions are made and where the 
political mobilisation of ethnic allegiance is created 
through ethnic political organisations, or built into the 
political institution of the State. It is frequently beyond 
the immediate purview of the individual - he or she knows of 
this world (more or less perfectly, more or less dimly) but 
does not live in it in the face-to-face to sense, despite 
the fact that his or her life is profoundly shaped by the 
tendencies of this macro-world. These political processes 
and decisions, as far as the Malaysian case is concerned, 
are ingrained in the Constitution; that is the very 
definition of the Malays and the granting of special rights 
to them in the Constitution. Consequently, the political 
processes of ethnic mobilisation (via ethnic political 
parties and leaders) and the framework of the ethnic 
coalition Government, together with the formulation of 
public policies (such as the New Economic Policy, National 
Cultural Policy, Language and Education Policy, and 
Islamisation), are the predominant factors shaping ethnic 
allegiance in Malaysian politics and making ethnicity more 
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institutionalised. Macro-level political power structure 
between the Malays and non-Malays forms the modus operandi 
for the persistence of ethnicity, identity and ethnic 
conflict in Malaysia. 
In both the 1969 riot and the 1987 crisis, for example, the 
relationship of the issues of Malay's special right and the 
political dominance underlying the political structure to 
the respective ethnic group members at the personal level is 
in fact indirect. Yet the influence of these issues is real. 
People are conscious of these political issues that provoke 
ethnic conflict and Malaysian ethnicity. The Malays are 
conscious of their political hegemony, but also at the same 
time aware that their economic power is not consistent with 
their dominant position in politics. This provokes a feeling 
of insecurity and resentment towards the non-Malays. On the 
other hand, though the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, 
are relatively more affluent, they too are aware of their 
marginalised political power and increasing alienation from 
the larger political system since 1969. From the non-Malay's 
point of view, the political power structure, as Chee puts 
it, '... is not more congruent with the multi-racial 
character of the country and fear that their competitive 
economic advantage will eventually be eroded by Malay 
political power and interventionist government' (1991: 2). 
Similarly, this provokes the feelings of insecurity and 
resentment toward the Malays. 
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The above larger political issues and the Malay's and non- 
f 
Malay's resentments toward each other, however, do not 
influence their daily interethnic interactions, nor are they 
openly expressed. Everyday interactions would as usual be 
influenced by pragmatic considerations. Material self- 
interest and personal obligations can continue to play an 
important role as well as other noble actions of cooperation 
and tolerance and sincere efforts to bridge and accommodate 
ethnic differences at the personal level. Without such basic 
cooperation and attitudes of tolerance among ethnic groups, 
it would be highly impossible for any multiethnic society 
like Malaysia to carry out its daily business. In any modern 
society, people understand that showing overtly bigoted 
ethnic prejudice, attitudes and hatred are simply not polite 
or consistent with the democratic principles of modern 
society. In addition, since 1969, the 'sensitive issues' 
amendments and the Sedition Act have also suppressed open 
expressions of ethnic prejudice and animosity among the 
people of Malaysia. But the political issues that articulate 
and represent macro-ethnicity have always been present in 
Malaysia politics and in the minds of people. It is merely a 
question of provoking or manipulating circumstances to bring 
out into open violence the underlying conflicts between 
people of different ethnic backgrounds. 
Latent potential ethnic conflict ingrained in a society 
needs to be identified. We cannot restrict our examination 
to the way in which people may express their ethnic 
sentiments to one another at an interpersonal level, that is 
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the dimension of micro-ethnicity. The area that needs equal, 
if not more, attention is at the societal level of macro- 
ethnicity which, in the modern world context, is frequently 
mobilised and manipulated as instruments by the State and by 
political leaders. We cannot push aside any wider political 
and economical levels of relationship between ethnic groups 
that might sharpen differences, thereby increasing the 
salience of macro ethnicity. The processes of economic 
individualism, accommodation, acculturation or assimilation 
might have brought pragmatic workable interactions in daily 
life among people of different ethnic origin; but these 
processes may not have an effect on macro-ethnicity. 
Present Findings: An Alternative View 
Evidence in the present survey (and also in Mansor's) may 
appear to show that where self-interest and personal 
obligations are apparently in conflict with ethnic 
preferences, many, if not all, Chinese (and Malays) will 
choose universalistic and practical options (for Tan Seng 
Seng). In the present survey, this was the result in ten out 
of the thirteen hypothetical situations studied. This 
simplistic interpretation, based on the number of cases in 
which the majority of the subjects chose the non-ethnic 
choices, could be misleading. In some circumstances people 
may select universalistic options. This is probably because 
non-ethnic interests that come into conflict with ethnic 
preference might have been valued higher than the latter. 
But it could be that people also choose pragmatic and 
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universalistic alternatives because these may not be 
perceived by them as real threats to their ethnic attachment 
and identity, even though it may appear so outwardly to an 
observer. We need to explore critically further the nature 
and the level of ethnic relations observed in these studies 
to understand the real strength of ethnicity in Malaysia. 
This should also include an attempt to assess critically 
whether the observations have satisfactorily measured all 
the major possible areas or levels of ethnic relations and 
conflict in Malaysia. 
In disclosing the relative strength of Chinese ethnic 
alignment to that of their self-interest of a material and 
status kind, as well as personal obligations, the present 
study has revealed different social circumstances where 
ethnicity is significantly expressed in different degrees of 
importance. Consequently, this also indicates the 
considerable importance of theoretical thinking in 
understanding different levels of ethnicity. This is to 
expand further our understanding of the dynamic and complex 
nature of ethnicity. As can be seen in the Table 8.2, the 
circumstances representing Tan Seng Seng's choices of ethnic 
preference were presented in ranking order from those highly 
influenced by ethnic attachment to those which were 
virtually not influenced by the ethnic interest at all. 
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Table 8.2: Percentage of Subjects Making Ethnic 
Preference Choices (Tan Seng Seng) 
Circumstances Chinese Malay 
1. child adoption 82 70 
2. mixed marriage 69 80 
3. zoo trip 66 57 
4. wedding invitation 34 36 
5. support Malay boss 25 32 
6. child minding 17 30 
7. office boy candidate 15 17 
8. shopping 14 28 
9. child's playmate 9 11 
10. renting out house 4 2 
11. bring Malay friend home 1 4 
12. housekey 1 2 
13. Indian friend's party 0 1 
There are thirteen cases where Tan Seng Seng (or a proxy, 
eg. daughter) makes choices which can be regarded as ethnic 
preference versus other choices. As regards the cases where 
a majority (or less) make ethnic preference choices, they 
may be ranked as follows: 
(a) A clear majority makes ethnic preference choices. This 
includes child adoption (82%), mixed marriage (69%) and 
the zoo trip (66%); 
(b) A substantial minority (one quarter to one third) makes 
ethnic preference choices. This includes the wedding 
invitation (34%) and supporting Malay boss (25%); 
(c) A small minority makes ethnic preference choices. This 
includes child minding (17%), office boy candidate 
(15%), shopping (14%), child's playmate (9%); 
(d) Almost 'none' make ethnic preference choices. This 
includes renting out house (4%), bringing Malay friend 
home, housekey (1%) and Indian friend's party (0%). 
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If we examine the Malays' judgement of Tan Seng Seng, it is 
clear that they too have ranked the circumstances in almost 
exactly the same way. In the 'majority' category, the 
Malays' ranking of judgements is 2,1 and 3, i. e, mixed 
marriage (80%), child adoption (70%) and the zoo trip 
(57%). In the 'substantial minority' category, their ranking 
is also 4 and 5, i. e, wedding invitation (36%) and support 
Malay boss (32%). In the 'small minority' category, their 
ranking is 6,8,7 and 9, i. e, child-minding (30%), shopping 
(28%), office boy candidate (17%) and child's playmate 
(11%). In the almost 'none' category, the ranking is 11, 
10/12, and 13, i. e, bringing Malay friend home (4%), 
renting-out house and housekey (2%) and Indian friend's 
party (0%). 
There may be some overlapping in matters or interests 
involved between the circumstances observed in this study. 
As such, each of the above four groups of circumstances, 
which were ranked and categorised by the criterion of the 
strength of ethnic influence, is not in any way to be 
perceived as exclusive in its nature, or in the interest it 
may represent. Practically, it is difficult to control or 
discretely differentiate the nature of each circumstance. 
However, some general characterisation of the nature of the 
above four groups of circumstances can be established. This 
would allow us to see the way in which the Chinese (via an 
ethnic representative) are perceived to attach the 
importance of ethnicity to these categories of circumstances 
that come to exist at different levels of social relations. 
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Firstly, with regard to the matters relating to traditional 
private family life and cultural-religious practices (case 
. 1,2), the results show that the 
Chinese do strongly attach 
more importance to their ethnicity than to other areas. 
These areas represent some of the micro-level informal 
social relations. This in fact seems to support the 
traditional notion of ethnicity around which central or 
original experiences are believed to be clustered, and 
passed from generation to generation through kinship of 
family and cultural practices. Some situations, like 
attending the wedding, child-minding and the zoo trip, 
though, are not strictly kinship matters as are the above 
two examples. They could also be perceived fairly as 
culturally significant, or as family affairs within the same 
ethnic group. Thus, these are capable of inspiring either a 
majority, a substantial majority, or small minority of 
individuals to opt for actions that are consistent with 
ethnic sentiments. 
Secondly, there are formal circumstances and organisational 
interactions. Good examples of this are cases of supporting 
one's Malay boss, the office boy candidate and shopping. 
These are the next important matters that seem to have an 
appeal to ethnic sentiments or attitudes. Strictly speaking, 
this can be considered as meso-level ethnicity. But because 
of the Government's policy to increase the participation of 
the Malays in all modern sectors of economy and 
administration, the people in Malaysia may find it difficult 
to express overtly their ethnic preference in public formal 
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organisational circumstances. This will be explained further 
later in this chapter. The subjects seem to reflect this in 
the case of supporting boss which also resembles the 
struggle for power or leadership at the organisational 
level. Compared with other cases, in this case a substantial 
percentage of the Chinese (33% for Tan Seng Seng and 45% for 
his mother) could not easily indicate their preference. 
Thirdly, although these circumstances are close in nature to 
the first group, in the sense that they are also micro-level 
informal relations, very marginal or virtually no importance 
is attached to ethnicity. These are the circumstances of 
informal personal business ventures, or relationships with 
friends and neighbours (case 9,10,11,12,13). These 
circumstances, however, can be differentiated from the first 
group. This collection of social circumstances does not 
directly involve matters relating to family, or culture, but 
falls outside ethnic group affairs. 
Different Levels of Ethnicity in Malaysia: An Assessment 
We need to take further the concept of different levels and 
the nature of interethnic relationships, as partly confirmed 
in this survey, to a wider context of Malaysian society in 
order to understand more comprehensively Malaysian 
ethnicity. We mentioned earlier that the existence of 
different levels of ethnicity has been recognised by some 
scholars. The concept tells us how ethnicity in a 
multiethnic society like Malaysia is articulated and 
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expressed at different levels of social structure. We are 
looking into the very nature of social context, or social 
relationship in which ethnicity may take relevance. As 
social relationships and experiences are interrelated, this 
also effects the importance people may attach to ethnicity, 
ethnic identity and allegiance at the various levels of 
social relationships. 
In Malaysia, as Nash puts it: 
Cooperation, accommodation, and confrontation among the communal 
groups and individuals who compose these categories take place at 
three analytical distinct levels: political, the economic, and the 
world of ordinary, daily interaction. These are analytical levels, 
and the separation is a construct of the observer or the analyst, 
for political symbols and acts may suffuse daily life, and 
economic considerations and activities deeply involve the flow of 
daily life and often form the stuff of politics and other kinds of 
social and cultural activities. ... ethnicity... in Malaysia comes 
near to ... a total social fact, in that its strands lead into all 
of social life (Nash, 1989: 30). 
Different expressions of the strength of ethnic sentiments 
which vary significantly according to the nature of social 
circumstances and levels of social relations, are highly 
conceivable in Malaysia. As social actors of a modern 
society, for the Chinese as well as members of other ethnic 
groups in Malaysia, it is only practical that their action 
in society is influenced by both individualistic and group 
interests which very much depend on the level of social 
relationship. 
Firstly, ethnic group interest is a possible influence 
because the Malays, Chinese and Indians are still in 
possession of their own unique set of cultural and social 
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values which gives real meaning to their everyday life and 
maintains the survival of their ethnic group politics. 
Maintenance of cultural boundaries among them are strongly 
reinforced by the continuation of parallel ethnic social 
institutions. 
Among the important influences is the practice of endogamy. 
Different religious beliefs which widely separate them - all 
Malays are Muslims, and the majority of the non-Malays are 
non-Muslims (Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and Sikhs) - also 
form a strong barrier. Mixed marriages across ethnic 
barriers, for example, are hardly encouraged or accepted in 
the 'ethno-religious' family. 3 Inclusion of members of other 
ethnic groups into family kinship, private affairs or even 
in a simple day outing can give rise to a difficult decision 
or choice to make. In this micro-sphere, according to Nash, 
religious sensibilities become the principal boundary 
maintaining mechanisms in Malaysia (1989: 35-38). These 
religious sensibilities have in recent years become more 
sensitive and an important consideration especially with 
religious revivalism among the Malays (Lee, 1988). This 
micro-ethnicity which is expressed, or practised at the 
primary level of social relationships, especially within the 
family, is creating a strong and continuous influence among 
3 Besides the old amalgamated small groups (Baba-nyonya, Chitty and 
Erusians), mixed marriages among the Malays, Chinese and Indians 
of modern Malaysia have not produced any socially significant 
mixed-blood people to attract research work. Since marriage is 
still considered very much a family, cultural and religiously 
significant matter, opposition to such a marriage of an individual 
in a family is a common phenomenon (Mariappan, 1984). Even among 
the random samples of the present study, only 2% of the subjects 
are from mixed marriages. 
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individuals, urging them to act in accordance with cultural 
and social values and practices of their ethnic group. 
While the people of different ethnic origins may attach 
importance to their ethnicity in their family circle, it 
does not in any way restrain them from forming interethnic 
interpersonal relations, or carrying out transactions with 
others in various other simple social matters outside the 
realm of family, culture and religion. Individuals need to 
be pragmatic and clear about their feelings and personal 
considerations, especially in the urban environment where 
the social contacts and transactions between the Malays, 
Chinese, Indians and others are unavoidable. In such mixed 
ethnic environments and social contacts, self-interest and 
values of personal obligations can be a strong influence 
among individuals in dealing with matters that fall outside 
one's family, cultural and religious affairs. Possibly 
derived from wider universal democratic values of equality 
and personal freedom, liberalism and economic individualism, 
they can play a vital role in the enhancement of 
individualistic considerations and self-interest that is 
more practical, convenient, or ethical in dealing with 
members of other ethnic groups, or more importantly, with 
the co-citizens of the country. 
Areas of face-to-face social contact, mainly through 
neighbourhood and friendship circles, are still, however, 
very much limited for the majority of people in Malaysia. 
Some of the structural factors that limit the interethnic 
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interactions still persist in society. By and large, the 
distribution of the Malaysian ethnic population in the urban 
and rural areas, and in occupational and economic sectors, 
has not totally broken down the 'traditional' form of 
spatial-geographical and occupational divisions among the 
major ethnic groups (chapter 1). Most of the Malay 
population (70%) still lives in the rural areas, although 
there is a rapid movement into the urban areas and new 
sectors. Less than 30% of Malays live in urban areas. In the 
government public sector, the Malay population has increased 
even more at all levels since the implementation of the New 
Economic Policy. In 1990, the Malay labour force in the 
government service sector was 587,300 while the non-Malays 
were 273,900. Between 1980 and 1990 the non-Malay population 
in this sector increased by only 0.02%, compared to 50.9% of 
the Malays (Lim, 1989). The majority of the Malays are still 
in the traditional agricultural sector (about 73% in 1985). 
Private economic sectors, business and trade are still in 
the hands of the majority of the Chinese (chapter 1, Table 
1.2 & 1.3). Although the features of 'Malay areas', 'Chinese 
areas' and 'Indian areas', 'Malay occupations' and 'non- 
Malay occupations' have reduced, these barriers are not 
totally eliminated from the Malaysian scene. Wider 
opportunities for micro-level informal interethnic relations 
are still lacking. 
In Malaysia, industrialisation, modernisation and 
urbanisation came to play a greater role in society after 
Independence. These processes have expanded social relations 
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of a secondary kind, that is, the meso-level interactions in 
public organisations where the members of different ethnic 
groups share sets of interactions that are relatively 
impersonal and formal. This mainly happens as a direct 
consequence of the government's objective of 'restructuring 
society' as stated in the New Economic Policy. This policy 
has since then continuously increased the Malays' 
participation in the formal sectors of modern occupations 
and educational institutions (Goh, 1991; Ramasamy, 1993) as 
well as in the informal social circles of urban 
neighbourhoods. As a consequence these may have increased 
interethnic contact in the formal occupational sectors, but 
not yet at a satisfactory level. This is mainly because, 
while the Malay population has increased in the private 
. sectors of formal organisations, they are still a large 
majority in the government sectors (Goh, 1991: 81-82). 
Through the implementation of the National Education and 
Language Policy, all teaching through the medium of English 
was converted to 'national' schools and Malay was introduced 
as the medium of instruction, even at the universities. 
These changes thereby increased the intake of Malay students 
in large numbers, in the formerly non-Malay dominated 
institutions. New universities and colleges - University 
Science of Malaysia, National University of Malaysia, 
University of North Malaysia, University Technology 
Malaysia, University Islam Malaysia, and the Mara College - 
have been opened to increase the intake of Malay students in 
higher education. In these government-funded institutions of 
327 
higher learning, the percentage of Malay students has 
increased from 40% (3,237) in 1970 to 67% (23,838) in 1985. 
But the representation of the Chinese students dropped from 
49% (4,009) to 26% (9,142) (Goh, 1991: 77-78). Although the 
number of non-Malay pupils also increased to a certain 
extent in former Malay-medium schools in the urban areas, in 
the rural areas and East Coast states, Malay pupils are 
still the dominant group. Two colleges which cater mainly 
for a single ethnic group should be mentioned here. These 
are the government-funded Mara college for the Malays, and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman College for the Chinese (98% in 1985). At 
the primary level, some Chinese and Indians do still send 
their children to their own ethnic vernacular schools. 
At these meso-levels of formal interactions, overt 
expressions that could be regarded as ethnically prejudiced 
would be considered highly sensitive and should be avoided. 
However, ethnic group members may maintain their own 
informal private and confidential intra-ethnic relations 
within such formal organisations. 
4 This is because the 
people, especially the non-Malays, are aware of the 
sensitivity of the government policy which was introduced 
for the sole purpose of correcting the non-Malays' 
domination in the modern-urban sectors by open pro-Malay 
4 For example, my own observation as hostel warden (1985-1991) and 
lecturer at University Science Malaysia since 1984 shows that 
although students of different ethnic backgrounds may take the 
same courses and together attend lectures, may do joint 
assignments and stay in the same hostel rooms and participate in 
some games together periodically, they still strongly maintained 
their intimate informal co-ethnic relations and privacy with 
regards to ethnically sensitive matters, and they vote for own 
ethnic candidates during the yearly Student Union election. 
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strategies. The Chinese fellowman's intention to replace 
their Malay head of department with a Chinese, as in the 
case of 'supporting boss', can be a highly risky affair, 
since the participation of the Malays at all levels in 
business organisations is supported by the policy. As this 
may also incorporate other government policies (such as the 
national language policy), Richard Basham's observation on 
one of the incidents at a Malaysian university proved the 
reluctance at the meso-level of social relations in taking 
any action of ethnic consideration, or risking accused of so 
doing. He writes, 
Writing portions of examination papers in Malay has 
also created dissension among faculty.... A school board 
meeting held to evaluate the faculty's ability to grade 
examinations in Malay produced a virtual consensus of 
opposition to the policy.... The lecturers' continued 
objection to the policy was terminated only when a 
local lecturer reminded the meeting in an irony laden 
voice, 'Our discussion is becoming subversive' 
(1983: 73). 
However, this is the level where most people in a society 
would be directly involved in competition for economic 
resources, or in plain language, for a job, promotion, 
better pay, education and training. These are matters of 
'bread and butter'. The Chinese and Indians would not risk 
their ethnic chauvinism at this level because of the 
government policy, but it causes frustration and resentment 
among the non-Malays toward the Malays and the Government's 
economic policy. As for the Malays, their struggle for 
advancement in the modern sectors of the economy is not over 
yet, although officially the New Economic Policy came to an 
end in 1990. The Government decided to continue with the 
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economic strategies of the NEP to help the Malays under the 
present National Development Policy (1991-2000). Ethnic 
inequalities, competition and resentment that are created in 
this meso-economic sphere mean that it is not an easy matter 
for Malaysians to show less concern for their ethnic 
sentiments and ethnic identity. 
Besides the different nature of social contexts at the micro 
and meso levels of social relations, there also exist in the 
society at the macro level issues that create and sustain 
the importance of ethnicity, ethnic identity and conflict. 
Although this macro ethnicity is articulated abstractly on 
the grand stage of state political structures and therefore 
beyond the control of ordinary people, in effect it is 
capable of creating strong ethnic consciousness, ethnic 
identity and issues of ethnic conflict continuously in the 
minds of people at the micro and meso levels. 
In Malaysia, the importance of ethnic classification and 
inequality of political power status between the Malays and 
the non-Malays is a deliberate form of legalised political 
measures. Malaysian ethnicity is reinforced and supported by 
rules and the law of the Constitution. At the official 
level, the institutionalisation of ethnicity is reflected in 
the frequent incorporation of information of a person's 
ethnic origin in government documentation. This becomes a 
kind of continuous reminder to Malaysians of their ethnic 
identity and consequently their political rights and status 
in public life. The documentation of information about one's 
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ethnic origin in everyday activities as registration for 
admission in schools, application for driving licences, 
jobs, businesses, acquiring public shares and places in the 
universities thus reinforces ethnic identity as the 
Malaysian citizens' primary public identity. This is 
especially applicable to jobs, businesses and admission into 
the universities and scholarships, which are highly 
competitive in nature, and where the quota system has been 
introduced to the Malays' advantage. 
At the highest level exists the legalised ingredient for 
such a political administrative strategy of ethnic 
classification and this is the very constitutional 
definition of a Malay. They are defined as people who speak 
Malay and practise the Malay custom and Muslim religion. 
This definition cannot be understood in isolation from the 
other constitutional principle that defines the 'Special 
Rights' or privileges for the Malays as bumiputra of the 
country. These constitutional definitions are in effect a 
very important categorisation of political status for the 
non-Malays as well. In pointing out this implication, 
Stephen Chee notes: 
Non-Malay, however, is a social category, a negative referent of 
not being a member of the Malay race, socially defined, without 
any imputation that non-Malays form a solitary group. Non- 
bumiputra has a specifically political connotation and, indeed, 
might have acquired a quasi-legal status because of its frequent 
incorporation in government documents as well as social 
communication (1991: 10, fn. 2). 
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The second stage is the way in which this macro-ethnicity is 
articulated in the formulation of public policies which 
carry with them the institutionalised notion of ethnic 
differences, identity and political right status. Among such 
policies are a national language and education, national 
culture, and most importantly, the New Economic Policy, and 
later, Islamisation. These policies, which are consistent 
with Malay political hegemony and nationalism, are aimed all 
in all at correcting the Malays' disadvantage in the 
economy, and promoting Malay-Muslim national culture and 
identity. Malay nationalism in effect is an important socio- 
political trend that explains the dynamic nature of macro- 
ethnicity in the present Malaysian society. Indeed, Smith in 
his study of ethnic revivalism suggests that it is important 
, to place political, social and cultural changes at the 
centre of analysis... in the process of ethnic revival' 
(1981: 5). Some examples of cultural and symbolic responses 
of Malay nationalism can be considered here. 
Since 1969, the salience of macro-ethnicity has taken 
different routes, principally in the form of new Malay 
nationalism. This Malay nationalism has not only become a 
vehicle for the Malays' greater economic rationalisation5 
but more importantly, in recent years, for widening and 
reestablishing their claims and ethnic identity within the 
society through their cultural and religious symbols. 
5 Economic rationalisation in the case of Malay nationalism, as Lee 
explains, involves 'nationalist policies (that) dictate the 
direction of economic planning, which is assumed to be conducted 
under a 'scientific' programme to eliminate poverty and to rise 
Malay standards of living' (1990: 499-500). 
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Simultaneously, the Malays try to reestablish their 
inheritance to the political hegemony status as an 
unquestionable right and agreement in relation to the 
political status and rights of the non-Malays (Nawawi, 
1990). The efforts to reinforce the cultural and religious 
identities of the Malays as supreme national identities are 
also consistent with their aspirations to reconstruct new 
dignified images of themselves, as well as to strengthen the 
claim to their being indigenous. They reject previous images 
that have cost them their pride as a social group. In 
earlier historical works, the Malay is quite often looked 
upon as not a 'pure' or 'original' ethnic or racial group as 
the Chinese and Indians, but only as a descendant of the 
Chinese (Harrison, 1964; Tweedie, 1953; Winstedt, 1953). 
Consequently, these historical beliefs seem not only to 
reject them as the earliest inhabitants of Malaysia, but 
their civilisation is also believed to have mainly evolved 
from Chinese and Indian cultural influences. Being not a 
'pure' race, or not having an 'original' culture in the 
eyes of other co-citizens, especially the Chinese and 
Indians, are images that the Malays find very uncomfortable 
in the emergence of their nationalistic sentiments after 
Independence. 
The urge to correct and rewrite history from the Malays' 
perspective which stems out of Malay Nationalism has 
especially inspired Malay scholars to look back and gather 
new material from archaeological evidence. For example, 
Malay scholars in rejecting the earlier theory argued, 
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... the theory - that Malays were decendants of migrants from the Yunnan province in southern China - as purely speculative and 
should be dismissed. ... archaeological discoveries seemed to 
indicate that there were already inhabitants in the Malay world as 
early as 35,000 years ago. ... between the period of 35,000 and 
11,000 years ago ... the inhabitants of the Malay world were from 
the same stock and practicing the same culture. ... evidence in 
Yunnan showed the Malays were not from the province, but were the 
original inhabitants of the Malay world. ... There was also no 
evidence to show any connection culturally, or otherwise, between 
some 26 ethnic minorities in Yunnan and the Inhabitants of the 
Malay world or Malay-Polynesian world (STAR newspaper, 6.9.1994). 
Other scholarly efforts which can be said to be consistent 
with this cultural-religious form of Malay nationalism 
include: rejection of the notion of modernisation in the 
Malay world as a wave brought by Western influence, but 
instead modernisation in the form of rational thinking is 
argued to have been brought into the lives of the Malays 
through earlier Islamic influences; rejecting Yap Ah Loy (a 
Chinese Captain) as the founder of the capital city of Kuala 
Lumpur; renaming the national language from 'bahasa 
Malaysia' which was introduced as a name symbolising 
national unity back to 'bahasa Melayu' or the Malay 
language. By doing so, the urge to sustain the already 
existing 'Malayness' via names like 'Keretapi Tanah Melayu' 
(Malaysian Railway) and 'Askar Melayu Diraja' (Royal Malay 
Regiment) could have become stronger, although there is not 
any obvious effort at present to change the name of the 
State from Malaysia to 'Tanah Melayu' (Land of the Malays). 
In reality, the notion of the 'land of the Malays' has 
always been the core of the Malays' patriotism towards the 
country and their nationalism. 
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Also in recent years the ethno-religious identification 
among the Malays and the non-Malays has become intensified 
(Ackerman, Susan & Lee, 1988; Lee, 1990: 482-502). Among the 
Malays especially, this has been reflected through their 
vigorous Islamic religious 'dakwah' movements, government 
policy of Islamisation and the rise of radical 
fundamentalists who demand the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Malaysia. This kind of religious nationalism among 
the Malays has not only strengthened their ethnic identity 
but has also been able to accentuate the suspicions and 
feelings of separateness between the Malays and the non- 
Malays, if not a potential source of ethnic conflict in the 
future. The rising of the religious fundamentalist movement 
does threaten Malay solidarity to some extent. But the 
present Malay Government leadership is still able to 
mobilise support from the majority of the Malays. This is 
mainly done through implementing Islamic policies and 
exercising tough and extensive disciplinary measures to 
restrict the outward manifestations of divisions among the 
Malay community (Means, 1991: 123-131). 
In the awakening of this new Malay nationalism, ethnic 
conflict in Malaysia, as pointed out by Raymond Lee (1986), 
has been inclined to take a form of 'status politics 
conflict'. According to him, conflict over status issues 
like the Merdeka University, requiring Malay attire for 
official functions and the question of who founded Kuala 
Lumpur (Raja Abdullah Jaafar or Yap Ah Loy) has taken front 
stage, instead of power issues in contemporary Malaysian 
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politics. This is due to the tight control over the 
discussion of sensitive matters and ethnic politics. The 
suppressive measures taken by the State, and cooperation 
among ethnic leaders in the present ruling government has 
provided political stability and economic growth for the 
country. Malaysia is one of the fast growing capitalist 
economies in Asia. The Government cannot afford to show any 
form of instability if it wishes to attract capital 
investment (Sundaram, 1989; Khalid, 1993). For this reason, 
it is committed to control or suppress any kind of ethnic 
unrest or overt expressions that might repeat the 1969 
incident. Khalid writes, 
... the suppression on the freedom of dissent which was 
prevalent in the 1980s is likely to continue in 1990s as the 
government emphasizes the need to maintain political 
stability which is indeed essential for attracting foreign 
investors. More than before, Mahathir's current 
administration sees the contribution of foreign investment 
in the Malaysian economy as vitally important (1993: 113). 
Political stability and economic growth are two important 
interrelated factors that will ensure the success of the 
multi-ethnic coalition Government of Malaysia. The 
government, with its Malay leaders, is willing to pursue an 
authoritarian style of government to ensure sound 
capitalistic economic growth in Malaysia. As the dominant 
political power in the Government, they have to ensure the 
State's role in meeting ethnic pressures from the Malays to 
increase their economic power in the society. The Malays' 
economic interests, as seen in the pressure from the 
expanding new Malay bourgeoisie for joint ventures with 
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foreign investors, have forced the government to look for 
capital investment from multinational cooperation. Expanding 
manufacturing sectors by attracting foreign investors would 
sustain the economic growth and employment as well as 
provide wealth, ownership and employment opportunities for 
the Malays in manufacturing (Jesudason, 1989: 166-192). 
Under a highly ethnicised Malaysian political structure and 
economic policy, the political stability for economic growth 
inevitably depends on benign authoritarianism. 
Constitutional amendment of 'sensitive issues' and the 
Sedition Act, the Internal Security Act, the Official 
Secrets Act, the Printing Presses and Public Act, the 
Universities and Universities Colleges Act, the Industrial 
Relation Act and bans on public rallies have become 
important tools for the Government to suppress any radical 
political activists, open public discussions, or 
publications of ethnically sensitive issues and others that 
the government may consider as threatening public order. All 
these measures of control themselves reflect the very real 
fear of possible ethnic tensions and violence. These areas 
of sensitive issues and policies which are articulated from 
the 'above' level of political structure in society are in 
fact the real social force that sustains the importance of 
ethnic identification and ethnic antagonism and conflict. 
Political conflict based on the political power structure 
between the Malays and non-Malays may manifest itself 
indirectly as conflict of status politics under the 
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suppression of freedom of dissent. Issues that have 
developed, or continue to develop in the future around this 
political power differences, may not interrupt daily micro- 
level interpersonal, or even casual interfamily informal 
relations. But the importance of ethnicity and ethnic 
allegiance and conflict among Malaysians that are 
articulated at the macro societal level persists in the 
process by which each group tries to realise their politico- 
cultural aspirations. 
Concluding Remarks 
Choosing a level of social relations for analytical purposes 
can be a very useful research strategy, but the observations 
are limited. Ethnicity in reality is an intricate societal 
phenomenon. In a society like Malaysia, we cannot simply be 
carried away even with the occurrence of wider interethnic 
interactions or cultural interactions and adaptations at 
everyday level. For example, in understanding the 
development of the Sino-Malay spirit cult of 
'nadugong/keramat', a Malaysian Chinese scholar stressed: 
The development of this cult shows that Malaysian Chinese are 
increasingly aware of their ethnic identity vis-a-vis the Malay 
identity, whereby local-born Chinese seek to adapt themselves to 
the patterns of multiethnic cultures while at the same time trying 
very hard to maintain their ethnic boundaries through the 
organization of their own socio-cultural institutions.... This 
process renders the existing syncretized elements more complex and 
has served as an internal defence mechanism against, rather than 
as an unconditional submission to, the on going proselytizing 
ideologies of 'Malay nationalism' and 'Malay national culturism' 
based on the parameters of Malay culture, Malay language, Islam, 
and Malay aesthetic values (Cheu, 1992: 381). 
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The present study obviously has its own limitations. The 
study cannot be assumed to have employed a superior method 
to disclose thoroughly the salience of ethnicity at all 
levels of ethnic relations in the Malaysian society. By 
concentrating mainly on the social contexts of micro- 
ethnicity, the findings of individualistic approach of the 
present study (as well as Mansor's) have not allowed us to 
make inferences about macro-ethnicity in Malaysia without 
applying some degree of caution in the interpretation of the 
findings. As we can clearly see from the circumstances 
examined in this study, none of the hypothetical situations 
represented the area of macro-ethnicity in Malaysia. Even 
the areas of meso-level ethnicity were not explored fully. 
This is partly due to the difficulties involved in 
operationalising the abstract political issues of macro- 
level ethnicity into a concrete form of everyday affair and 
by using the indirect technique of an ethnic representative 
in hypothetical situations. The questions on the political 
attitudes of the subjects do, however, demonstrate the 
importance of issues at the macro-level in reinforcing 
Malaysian ethnicity and perpetuating such conflict in its 
society. The subjects have demonstrated great concern, 
discontent and conflicting views on the issues and 
strategies of differential treatments that stem from unequal 
political rights and status which form the basic structure 
of the political culture of Malaysian macro-ethnicity since 
Independence. 
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Nevertheless, this study has interestingly disclosed the 
plausible trends in the importance people may attach to 
ethnicity, as in the case of Chinese ethnicity, in different 
social circumstances that take place at the micro-level of 
, daily interethnic interactions. At the personal micro-level 
where interethnic matters concerned do not threaten the 
basic form of private family kinship relations, traditional 
culture and religion, the Chinese (and Malays as indicated 
in Mansor's study) would probably be influenced strongly by 
self-interest and personal obligations. 
Even other noble principles of cooperation, accommodation, 
equality, or a good personal character may lead to closer 
relations among individuals and families of different ethnic 
groups. However, this does not at all mean that the salience 
and the sensitivity of ethnicity as a potential form of 
ethnic conflict in Malaysia has been reduced or totally 
eliminated. At the competitive meso-level in the public 
economic and educational domains, people, especially the 
non-Malays, are bound to restrict their open or fanatical 
expression of ethnic attitudes, sentiments, or loyalty 
owing to the government's firm commitment towards the ethnic 
preferential policy to help the Malays' socio-economic 
advancement. 
The level that needs equal attention, although not covered 
in the hypothetical questions of this study, is macro-level 
ethnicity. It is equally important for one to take into 
consideration factors or issues of macro-level that 
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influence ethnic relations in Malaysia. In fact this area is 
fundamental to Malaysian ethnicity. The importance of 
ethnicity, ethnic consciousness and ethnic conflict in the 
society are firmly ingrained at this level. Findings on 
political attitudes of the subjects has consistently 
supported the above arguments on the importance of macro- 




Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
SECTION A 
How would you respond to this hypothetical case? 
1. Which one of the following persons do you consider would 
be a 
better leader for Malaysia and why? 
(a) Mr. Halim is from a royal family, educated at a university 
in England, served many years in the Malaysian Civil 
Service, entered Parliament and became the leader of his 
(b) 
party. 
Mr. Ong Cheng Piaw is the son of a big businessman, educated 
at a university in England, active in Parliament and became 
the leader of his party. 
(c) Mr. Zulkifli is the son of a rubber-tapper, educated at 
University of Malaya and then a university in England, 
active in Trade Unions, entered Parliament and became the 
leader of his party. 
(d) Mr. Wong Ting Seng is a son of a factory worker, educated at 
a university in England, active in Trade Unions, entered 
Parliament and became the leader of his party. 
(1) Whom would you choose? 
[1] Mr. Halim 
[3] Mr. Zulkifli 
[5] Others 
[2] Mr. Ong Cheng Piaw 
[4] Mr. Wong Ting Seng 
(2) Why the choice? 
In the hypothetical cases below, Tan Seng Seng is a clerk with a 
multinational engineering firm. How would you react to these 
cases? 
2. Mr. Tan Seng Seng is going to take his children to the zoo this 
coming Sunday. Tan Seng Seng's son has been pestering his father 
to take along one of his friends on this trip. 
(1) Whom will Tan Seng Seng suggest to his son to take along on 
this trip? 
[1] Nasir, a doctor's son 
[2] Ah Chuan whose mother works as a housemaid 
[3] Others 
(2) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grandson to take 
along on this trip? 
[1] Nasir [2] Ah Chuan [3] Others 
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3. Tan Seng Seng has been patronizing Mr. Jaafar's grocery shop - 
noted for its cheapness and nearest to his house. Tan Seng Seng 
has been informed that in a week's time, Cheng San will be opening 
a second grocery shop in his neighbourhood. 
(1) Where will Tan Seng Seng go? 
[1] Cheng San's shop [2] Mr. Jaafar's Shop 
[3] Others 
(2) Where will his mother wish him to go? 
[1] Cheng San's shop [2] Mr. Jaafar's Shop 
[3] Others 
4. Tan Seng Seng's daughter, attending one of the local universities, 
wonders whom she should vote as president of the university's 
Student Union. 
(a) Ah Huat who takes religion as a personal choice. 
(b) Ah Chong who prefers religion to be seen as a separate issue 
from politics. 
(c) Ah Hock, besides belonging to the same religion as Tan Seng 
Seng, is also a committee member of the Chinese Students' 
Religious Society. 
(1) For whom will Tan Seng Seng's daughter vote? 
[1] Ah Huat [2] Ah Chong 
[3] Ah Hock [4] Others 
(2) For whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grand-daughter 
to vote? 
[1] Ah Huat 
[3] Ah Hock 
[2] Ah Chong 
[4] Others 
5. Tan Seng Seng received two wedding invitations which happen to 
fall on the same day. He has to make up his mind as to which 
wedding he will give priority to attend first. 
(1) To whose house will he go first? 
[1] Hamid's house. He is a company director. 
[2] Leong's house. He works as a storekeeper. 
[3] Others. 
(2) To whose house will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to go 
first? 
[1] Hamid's house [2] Leong's house [3] Others 
6. Tan Seng Seng will be attending the election of committee members 
of the local branch of his political party next week. The 
Treasurer's post is a keenly contested three-cornered fight. The 
previous Treasurer was found to have embezzled the party's fund. 
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(1) For whom will Tan Seng Seng vote? 
[1] Chuah, a businessman linked to the Malay elite. 
[2] Yap, a school teacher with grass-roots support from 
the local Chinese. 
[3] Lee, a candidate backed by the Chinese Religious 
group. 
[4] Others. 
(2) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to vote? 
[1] Chuah [2] Yap [3] Lee 
[4] Others 
7. Tan Seng Seng has to leave his house in a hurry to fetch his own 
family from the hospital. He has been expecting his sister to come 
any moment to assist his family, but he has waited as long as he 
can. He wonders whether to leave his front door unlocked or to 
leave the key with his next door Malay neighbour. 
(1) What will Tan Seng Seng do? 
[1] Leave the front door unlocked. 
[2] Leave the key with his next door Malay neighbour. 
[3] Others. 
(2) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to do? 
[1] Leave the front door unlocked. 
[2] Leave the key with his next door Malay neighbour. 
[3] Others. 
8. Tan Seng Seng is arranging marriage for his son to one of his 
cousin's daughters. Given a choice, whom will his son choose - the 
fair-skin elder sister or her dark-skin younger sister? 
(1) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's son choose? 
[1] the fair-skin elder sister 
[2] the dark-skin younger sister 
[3] others 
(2) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grandson to 
choose? 
[1] the fair-skin elder sister 
[2] the dark-skin younger sister 
[3] others 
9. Tan Seng Seng's daughter, Ah Siew who works in a factory making 
electronic components, was seen going out with her company's 
assistant personnel manager, a Malay, driving a silver metallic 
Volvo 340. 
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(1) How will Tan Seng Seng react? 
[1] Approve [2] Disapprove 
[3] Others 
(2) How will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to react? 
[1] Approve [2] Disapprove 
[3] Others 
10. Tan Seng Seng wants to adopt a child. The Social Welfare 
Department has sent him some forms to be filled and two coloured 
photographs of a fair looking Indian child and an unusually dark- 
skin Chinese Child. 
(1) Whom will Tan Seng Seng choose? 
[1] the unusually dark-skin Chinese child 
[2] the fair-skin Indian child 
[3] others 
(2) Whom will his mother wish him to adopt? 
[1] the unusually dark-skin Chinese child 
[2] the fair-skin Indian child 
[3] others 
11. Tan Seng Seng has an Indian friend as his workmate. This Indian 
friend is throwing a wedding party for his daughter at his house. 
(1) Will Tan Seng Seng go? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) Will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to go? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
12. Mr. Rashid, a mechanical engineer who graduated from Oxford, has 
been the head of Tan Seng Seng's Mechanical Department for the 
past three years. A Chinese group within his department is trying 
to replace his boss with a Chinese candidate. 
(1) Will Tan Seng Seng support his boss? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) Will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to support his boss? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
13. Tan Seng Seng has a next door Malay neighbour who likes her child 
to play with Tan Seng Seng's two year daughter. Will he allow the 
Malay neighbour to take his daughter to their house for an 
afternoon? 
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(1) What will Tan Seng Seng say? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to say? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
14. Tan Seng Seng has a house to rent. The house has been unoccupied 
for the past six months. A Malay accountant, with two young 
children, and his wife want to rent the house. Will Tan Seng Seng 
accept the Malay tenant or will he refuse and wait for Chinese 
tenants? 
(1) What will Tan Seng Seng's reaction be? 
[1] Accept [2] Refuse [3] Others 
(2) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother's reaction be? 
[1] Accept [2] Refuse [3] Others 
15. Tan Seng Seng has a niece whose husband works as a school 
gardener. Theirs is a big family living in a small rented Chinese 
house next to a housing scheme. The niece supplements the meagre 
earnings of the husband by taking care of four tiny tots. One day 
a young Malay school teacher came to her house inquiring if she 
could take care of her one year old son too. 
(1) Will Tan Seng Seng's niece say yes? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grand-daughter to 
say? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
16. Tan Seng Seng's wife has been persuading her daughter to marry 
Jamil, her Malay friend's son who is considered by Tan Seng Seng's 
family as a good person, having close rapport with them, speaking 
fluent Chinese and familiar with Chinese lifestyle. 
(1) Will Tan Seng Seng's daughter agree with her mother's 
proposal? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) Will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grand daughter to agree 
to the proposal? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
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17. Tan Seng Seng's twelve year old son wants to bring his Malay 
friends home to play. 
(1) What will Tan Seng Seng say? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
(2) What will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish him to say? 
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Others 
18. Tan Seng seng's office received two applications for a post of 
office boy in his company. Tan Seng Seng is asked to choose any 
one of the applicants: Abdul Taha and Lim Wong Peng who are 
equally suitable candidates, except that Abdul Taha is one of his 
neighbour's sons. 
(1) Whom will Tan Seng Seng choose? 
[1] Abdul Taha [2] Lim Wong Peng 
(2) Whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her son to choose? 
[1] Abdul Taha [2] Lim Wong Peng 
19. Tan Seng Seng and hid family were watching the live telecast of 
the Thomas Cup Badminton semi final between Malaysia and China. 
(1) Which team would Tan Seng Seng have wanted to win? 
[1] Malaysia [2] China 
(2) Which team would Tan Seng Seng's mother have wanted to win? 
[1] Malaysia [2] China 
20. Tan Seng Seng's daughter is a member of the University's Chinese 
Students' Association. They are planning to give free tuition for 
primary school children as part of their community service 
programme. They have two options: tuition for children in a 
"national school", and tuition for children in a "national type" 
Chinese school. 
(1) Which school would Tan Seng Seng want his daughter to 
choose? 
[1] National school 
[2] National type Chinese school 
(2) Which school would Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her 
granddaughter to choose? 
[1] National school 
[2] National type Chinese school 
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21. Tan Seng Seng's son will be taking his "Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia" 
examination. He is planning to do revision with one of his 
classmates. 
(1) With whom will Tan Seng Seng's son do revision? 
[1] Eng Lip whose father is a business tycoon. 
[2] Razak whose father is a clerk in the revenue 
department. 
[3] Ghazali whose father is the director of a business 
firm. 
[4] Lam Soon whose father is a clerk in the transport 
department. 
(2) With whom will Tan Seng Seng's mother wish her grandson to 
do revision? 
[1] Eng Lip whose father is a business tycoon. 
[2] Razak whose father is a clerk in the revenue 
department. 
[3] Ghazali whose father is the director of a business 
firm. 
[4] Lam Soon whose father is a clerk in the transport 
department. 
22. Tan Seng Seng's son has chosen to speak on "national integration 
and national identity in the year 2020" at a national level 
elocution contest. Two major points that he is going to stress 
are: first, Malaysian Chinese and others should adopt a Malay- 
based common name, and second, embrace Malay culture to foster 
national integration and identity. 
(1) What would be Tan Seng Seng's personal reaction? 
[1] Agree to first point 
[2] Agree to second point 
[3] Agree to both points 
[4] Disagree to both points 
[5] Others 
(2) What would be 
[1] Agree to 
[2] Agree to 
[3] Agree to 
[4] Disagree 
[5] Others 




to both points 
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SECTION B 
1. How often do you come into contact with members of other ethnic 
groups in general? 
[1] Frequently [2] Sometimes 
[3] Seldom [4] Never 
2. How often do you come into contact with the following other ethnic 
groups? 
















3. Where do you come into contact with them in general? 
[multiple choice answer] 
[1] Residential area 
[2] Workplace 
[3] Shopping centre 
[4] At the children's school 
[5] Public gatherings and festivals 
[6] Organizational meetings 
[7] Others 
4. In which occupational categories are most of them? 
[a maximum of two choice answer] 
[1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, 
petty trader 
[2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant 
[3] General services worker, general office administrator, 
technician, teacher, nurse 
[4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler 
[5] Private and government sectors executive and professional 
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5. How would you describe the relationship between ethnic groups in 





[1) Good [1) 
[2] Moderate [2] 
[3] Bad [3] 
How would you describe the relationship 





between ethnic groups in 





In Your Locality 
[1] Has improved 
[2] Remains the same [2] Remains the same 
[3] Has deteriorated (3] Has deteriorated 
How do you expect relations between ethnic groups in Malaysia and 
in your locality to change over t 
I M l i I 
he next 5 years? 
Y L lit n 
[1] 
a ays a 
Will improve 
n y our oca 
[1] Will improve 
[2] Remain the same [2] Remain the same 
[3] Will deteriorate [3] Will deteriorate 
How would you describe ethnic integration in Malaysia in the 
following areas/aspects? 
(1) Political [1] Satisfactory 
[2] Less satisfactory 
[3] Unsatisfactory 
[4] Others 
(2) Economic [1] Satisfactory 
[2] Less satisfactory 
(3] Unsatisfactory 
[4] Others 
(3) Social [1] Satisfactory 
[2] Less satisfactory 
(3] Unsatisfactory 
[4] Others 
(4) Cultural [1] Satisfactory 
[2] Less satisfactory 
[3] Unsatisfactory 
[4] Others 
(5) Self-identity [1] Satisfactory 





9. How would you describe the importance of your ethnic identity 
during the following times? 
Very Not 
important important 
5 years ago 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
At present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5 years to come 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10. Do you have negative feelings, prejudices or animosity towards 
other ethnic groups? 
[1] Always [2] Sometimes 
[3] Seldom [4] Never 
11. Do you think that such feelings have prevented you from having a 
close, cordial or wide relationship with other ethnic groups? 
[1] Always [2] Sometimes 
[3] Seldom [4] Never 
12. Do you remember the Rukunegara? 
[1] Yes [2] Slightly [3] Not really 
I am going to list seven statements. Please state if you: 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
13. It i s disgraceful if people fail to stand while the country's 
National Anthem is being played. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
14. Compared to other countries, there is much racial discrimination 
in Malaysia. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
15. People should not be dependent on government programmes. These 
destroy people's ability to look aft er themselves. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
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16. The Indonesian migrants are socially undesirable. They take our 
jobs away. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
17. Those who are dissatisfied with Malaysia should emigrate to 
another country of their choice. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
18. This country does not belong to the Malays alone. It belongs to 
all Malaysians. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
19. A multi-ethnic population in this country has proven to be more 
advantageous than disadvantageous. 
[1] Very strongly agree [2] Strongly agree 
[3] Very strongly disagree [4] Strongly disagree 
[5] No particular feelings 
20. What are the main pr oblems faced in this country? 
[1] Corruption [2] Religious deviation 
[3] Poverty [4] Drug addiction 
[5] Factionalism [6] Ethnic differences 
[1] Unequal access to education [8] Others 
SECTION C 
1. What is your age? 
[1] 30 & below [2] 31 - 50 
2. Your sex? 
[1] Male [2] Female 
3. What is your occupation? 
[3] 51 & above 
[1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, 
petty trader 
[2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant 
[3] General services worker, general office administrator, 
technician, teacher, nurse 
[4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler 
[5] Private and government sectors executive and professional 
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4. In which occupational group would you place your family (parents) 
background? 
[1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, 
petty trader 
[2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant 
[3] General services worker, general office administrator, 
technician, teacher, nurse 
[4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler 
[5] Private and government sectors executive and professional 
5. In which sector do you work? 
[1] Government [2] Private 
[3] Working on your own 
6. What is your religion? 
[1] Islam (2] Buddhism [3] Hinduism 
[4] Sikhism [5] Christianity [6] No religion 
[7] Only believe in the existence of God 
7. With which ethnic group or groups do you like to identify 
yourself? (eg. Malay, Javanese, Kelantanese; Chinese, Cantonese; 
Indian, Tamil; or others) 
Please state: .......................................... 
8. With which ethnic group or groups do you like to identify 
yourself? (eg. Malay, Javanese, Kelantanese; Chinese, Cantonese; 
Indian, Tamil; or others) 
Please state: .......................................... 
9. State the ethnic composition of your residential area during your 
childhood: 
[1] Mostly Malay 
[2] Mostly Chinese 
[3] Mostly Indian 
[4] Malay-Chinese equal 
[5] Malay-Indians equal 
[6] Chinese-Indians equal 
[7] Others 
10. State the ethnic composition of your residential area 
currently: 
[1] Mostly Malay 
[2] Mostly Chinese 
[3] Mostly Indian 
[4] Malay-Chinese equal 
[5] Malay-Indians equal 
[6] Chinese-Indians equal 
[7] Others 
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13. Do you consider yourself religious? 
[1] Religious 
[2] Normal 
[3] Not very 
[4] Not at all 
14. Are you a member in any of your ethnic organisation? If no, do you 
wish to become one in future? 
[1] Yes [2] Wish to [3] Do not wish to 
15. Given a choice, which political party would you prefer to govern 
multi-ethnic Malaysia? 
[1] The National Front 
[2] Democratic Action Party 
[3] PAS 
[4] A Socialist Party 
7 
[5] Do not know 
[6] Others 
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Appendix 2: Other Findings 
(i) Chapter 6: Findings by Ethnic Group and Sex 
Table A. 1: Ethnic Composition during Childhood, 
Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Mostly Malays 91 81 29 25 
Mostly Chinese 0 3 42 49 
Malay-Chinese equal 7 14 23 18 
Other mixed areas 2 2 6 8 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 2: Ethnic Composition at Present, by Ethnic 









Mostly Malays 58 57 25 19 
Mostly Chinese 14 12 44 52 
Malay-Chinese equal 25 26 24 23 
Other mixed areas 3 5 7 6 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 3: Percentage of Subjects Speaking Different 









Mother tongue 100 100 100 100 
Mother tongue only 29 30 0 0 
Mother tongue & English 71 69 100 100 
Malay & Chinese 5 6 100 100 
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Table A. 4: Percentage of Subjects Reading Different 
Language Newspapers, by Ethnic Group and Gender 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Malay newspaper 100 99 90 90 
Chinese newspaper 0 0 53 60 
English newspaper 79 91 94 91 
Table A. 5: Contact with Other Ethnic Groups, by Ethnic 
Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Frequently 68 56 81 79 
Sometimes 31 31 19 17 
Seldom 1 13 0 4 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 6: Contact with Malays, by Ethnic Group and 
Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Frequently 98 97 82 75 
Sometimes 2 3 18 22 
Seldom 0 0 0 3 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 7: Contact with Chinese, by Ethnic Group and 
Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Frequently 59 53 99 97 
Sometimes 40 38 1 3 
Seldom 1 9 0 0 
100 100 100 100 
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Table A. 8: Contact with Indians, by Ethnic Group and 
Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Frequently 34 39 33 44 
Sometimes 52 39 46 36 
Seldom 14 22 21 20 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 9: Percentage of Subjects Making 
Different Occupational Groups, By Ethnic 
Contact With 
Group and Gender 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Agricultural 13 6 13 12 
Factory 19 16 15 10 
General Services 71 81 77 91 
Business 18 18 9 8 
Executive 20 14 24 21 
Table A. 10: Rukunegara, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Remember fully 91 92 87 87 
Remember partly 7 8 11 10 
Do not remember 2 0 1 3 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 11: Percentage Who Believe These as Serious 









Corruption 42 51 61 71 
Religious Deviation 4 10 9 13 
Poverty 29 35 34 22 
Drug Addiction 48 77 54 60 
Political Disunity 32 40 18 23 
Unequal... Education 1 10 48 52 
Ethnic Differences 27 29 42 42 
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Table A. 12: Subjects' Responses to Statements Questions, 
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Issues MM MF CM CF 
1. Standing for National Anthem 
Agree 91 92 92 98 
Disagree 6470 
2. Racial Discrimination 
Agree 11 18 48 52 
Disagree 84 81 47 46 
3. Dependency on Government 
Agree 82 81 88 76 
Disagree 16 19 11 20 
4. Indonesian Migrants 
Agree 49 54 57 47 
Disagree 47 44 42 47 
5. Migration of Dissatisfied 
Agree 67 79 35 32 
Disagree 28 18 59 56 
6. Malaysia for All Malaysians 
Agree 90 87 97 99 
Disagree 10 11 3 1 
7. Advantageous of Multiethnic 
Agree 78 82 91 87 
Disagree 19 16 9 9 
MM (Malay Males); MF (Malay Females); 
CM (Chinese Males); CF (Chinese Females) 
Table A. 13: Quality of Ethnic Relation in Malaysia 









Good 47 52 49 47 
Moderate 53 48 49 53 
Bad 0 0 1 0 
100 100 100 100 
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Table A. 14: Current Ethnic Relations in Locality 
by Ethnic Group and Gender (X) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Good 55 49 66 61 
Moderate 43 51 32 34 
Bad 2 0 2 5 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 15: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia Compared to 5 
Years ago, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Has Improved 70 67 51 52 
Remain the Same 25 30 42 43 
Has Deteriorated 5 3 7 5 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 16: Ethnic Relations in Locality Compared to 5 
years ago, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Has Improved 64 57 42 44 
Remain the Same 35 40 54 53 
Has Deteriorated 1 3 4 3 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 17: Ethnic Relation in Malaysia in the Next 
5 Years, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Will Improve 71 70 61 60 
Remain the Same 27 25 28 31 
Will Deteriorate 2 5 11 9 
100 100 100 100 
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Table A. 18: Ethnic Relations in Locality in the Next 
5 Years, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Will Improve 68 65 54 58 
Remain the Same 32 30 41 39 
Will Deteriorate 0 5 5 3 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 19: Organisational Membership, by Ethnic 
Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Yes 38 30 26 21 
Wish to 28 30 37 35 
Do Not Wish to 34 40 33 38 
Undecided 0 0 4 6 
100 100 100 100 
Table A. 20: Choice of Political Party, by Ethnic 
Group and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
National Front (NF) 73 79 78 74 
Democratic... (DAP) 0 0 3 4 
Islamic... (PAS) 19 9 0 0 
Socialist... 3 0 2 1 
Do Not Know 4 12 14 18 
Others 0 0 3 3 
100 100 100 100 
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Table A. 21: Choice of Leader, by Ethnic Group 
and Gender (%) 
Malay Malay Chinese Chinese 
Males Females Males Females 
Halim 11 6 9 12 
Ong Cheng Piaw 2 0 6 1 
Zulkifli 82 90 55 46 
Wong Ting Seng 1 1 15 20 
Others 4 3 15 21 
100 100 100 100 
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